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ABSTRACT
The early pages of this thesis present a theoretical study 
of the theory of money supply. The theoretical analysis has been 
developed in order to show the importance of money supply and to emphasise 
the relationship between the monetary base and the controlability of 
money supply.
This thesis argues that the changes in the Lebanese money supply 
are dependent on the activities of the Bank of Lebanon, the commercial 
banks, the public, and the foreign sector. A macro-economic model has 
been developed so as to include these activities and to show their influence 
on the money supply in the Lebanon through the adjusted monetary base and 
the money multipliers; short-run and long-run multiplier.
'■ ■ ■ The empirical work of my thesis'(1965-1974) is an investigation
showing the link between the monetary base which is dependent on changes in 
commercial banks' reserves and their net foreign assets, and the money 
multipliers in the Lebanon. According to my empirical results, both the 
short-run and the long-run money multipliers hattfan elasticity of less 
.than one, and changes in commercial banks' net foreign assets are 
dependent on an4responsive to changes in the Lebanese balance of payments, 
and less responsive to changes in the differences between the Euro-dollar 
rates and the Bank of Lebanon discount rates.
The last sections of this thesis argue that monetary policy in 
the Lebanon has not been used efficiently by the Bank of Lebanon in order 
to control the expansion in the adjusted monetary base for the period 
1965-1974. The Bank of Lebanon must have a certain strategy for controlling 
the monetary expansion; one of the suggested methods is the establishment 
of a strong government bond market so as to enable the Bank of Lebanon 
to make use of open-market operations in order to control the monetary base 
and money supply.
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CHAPTER I 
The Theory of Money Supply
1 - Base Money
Two of the major money supply hypotheses are l) the linear 
hypothesis and 2) the non-linear hypothesis.^  The linear hypothesis 
describes two mechanisms; the portfolio response of banks to surplus 
reserves, and the process generating surplus reserves independent of 
‘the banks' induced portfolio responses. The difference between actual 
and desired reserves give5 surplus reserves. Banks like other business 
firms are interested in maximising their profits and do not wish to 
hold idle balances except of course for precautionary purposes. So when 
a bank has surplus reserves it would be induced to acquire earning assets 
When such an acquisition happens it generates a loss of reserves to 
other banks, an outflow of currency and an increase in required reserves.
One bank's loss of reserves emerges as surplus reserves at 
another bank /assuming there are no leakages in the system/. The new 
deposits may be converted into currency at the receiving banks or re- , 
allocated in different ways between demand and time deposits^ These 
•responses induce banks to readjust their portfolios until the repetitive 
redistribution of surplus reserves, and portfolio adjustments absorb 
the initially available surplus reserves. The total portfolio response 
of the system to a prevailing level of surplus reserves is equal to:
dE = X -  P (l-n) S
K. Brunner and A. Meltzer, "Some Further Investigation of Demand and 
Supply Functions for Money", J.F. 196^, p240-283
E is the system’s portfolio of earning assets, s the prevailing volume 
of surplus reserves, A  the average loss-coefficient of the banks in the 
system. P is the average spillover of deposits- in the system from 
expanding banks to other banks, n is a linear combination of spillover 
rates in the currency and time deposits on the secondary level occurring 
at the banks receiving deposits from expanding banks. The expression 
p(l-n) is the money multiplier, it describes the built-in leverage 
of the system's response to prevailing surplus reserves.
A relationship connecting surplus reserves with observable 
entities emerges from a systematic inquiry into the processes generating 
a surplus independent of the banks' portfolio adjustment. The surplus 
reserves stimulate the multiplier mechanism and are eventually absorbed 
into the process. The relationship contains, the monetary base, B, 
the sum of changes in required reserves and the distribution of existing 
demand deposits between classes of banks with different requirement 
ratios.
The non-linear hypothesis takes a specific view of the credit 
market where money stock and interest rate emerge from the interaction 
of the public's asset supply to banks and the banks' portfolio adjustment. 
The basic theory behind the non-linear hypothesis describes the banks'
2
desired rate of portfolio adjustment as a function of surplus reserves.
The desired reserves Rd arej a function of demand deposits; D, time 
deposits, T, a vector of interest rates, i, and the discount rate, u.
Rd = Rd (D, T, i, u)
37
The desired reserves are derived from required reserves R , excess
e dreserves R , and banks' vault cash outside legal reserves, v, with r
£
and r being average requirement ratios for demand deposits and t^ .me 
3deposits. A money multiplier could be derived for the non-linear
^ibid p.2^9-236
^Rd = Rr + Re + V 
Rr = rd +*D + rtYT 
Re = Re(i, u, D+T)
hypothesis where money stock is responsive to base money, reserve 
requirements, discount rate, the public's behaviour with cbmand deposits 
and cash.
The monetary base can be calculated by adding currency in 
circulation and member bank deposits at the central bank, or by adding 
currency held by the non bank public and banks' reserves including 
vault cash of non member banks. The reserves can be expressed as a 
proportion of total bank deposits.
R = r(D + T + G)
D being demand deposits, T is time deposits and G is the Treasury's
k
deposits with commercial banks. If we assume that the public holds
a fixed total amount of currency, then all changes in the supply of base
money by the central bank would remain in the commercial banks in the '
form of deposits, the amount depending on the legal reserve requirement
ratios for different types of deposits. But if the public always desired
to hold a fixed ratio of currency to demand deposits say £0.20 for every
£0.80 of demand deposits, in this case the deposit creating potential
of the banking system is less than in the fixed total.amount case. There
is a certain ratio of currency drain directly linked to the value of d,
where d = ^  ’ c being currency. The value of the ratio d must be taken
into account in determining how much base money must be supplied to
achieve a desired-increase in the money stock. The behaviour of the
currency to demand deposit ratio ds influenced by many Jactors such as
income levels, credit facilities and uncertainty regarding the general
economic situation.
Banks are required to hold reserves behind time deposits,
the public's desire of holding a certain ratio of time deposits plays
a part-'in determining the change in the stock of money which follows
the changes in the monetary base, with the t-ratio being equal to 
• Tt = ^  , T = time deposits. The t-ratio is influenced by various
V
J.L. Jordan, "Elements of Money Stock Determination", Fed. Res. Bank 
of St. Louis 1969i p. 10-19.
factors,, chief among many is the competition among banks for individual 
and business savings. Banks pay interest on time cfeposits up to ceiling 
rates set by the central bank. As banks compete for more deposits the 
interest rate on time deposits increases. The interest rates offered 
on time deposits are themselves dependent on the opportunities available 
for profitable investment by the banks. If there is a high demand for 
bank loans then the interest rates on bank loans are expected to be 
rather high and banks would compete for more deposits in order to have 
more funds available+for lending, thus increasing the rate of return 
offered on deposits.
Commercial banks are required to hold a certain proportion of 
reserves against government deposits. The amount of government deposits 
in commercial banks is determined by the flow of Treasury receipts 
..relative to. Treasury expenditures, and by the Treasury's discretion 
about what proportion of.its balance to keep with commercial banks rather 
than the Central Bank. Let G be the government deposits, it can be 
expressed as a proportion g of private demand deposits D; G = gD, g + G/D 
Let M the money supply be.equal to currency C plus deposits D, and the 
monetary base B.equals R plus C, we have:
R = r(D + T + G)
C = dD, T = tD, G = gD 
From this information we could develop a multiplier-base framework 
within which the money stock M is expressed as 
M = mB
m  being the money multiplier and is influenced by changes in d, t and
g, aid the changes in these parameters reflect the actions of the public,
banks, and the Treasury with respect to deposits. B is the monetary 
base which is taken as the control variable for the process of controlling 
the money stock. The money multiplier is the connecting link between
the monetary base and the money stock.
The high-powered money or the monetary base is held either
5by the public as currency C outside banks or by banks as reserves , R, 
B.= base money.
B = C. + R divide by both sides by M
we get:
B _ C R
M ~ M + M
^  ^1 - ~  y  can be substituted^ for —-
Let ULs consolidate all commercial banks.’into one hypothetical unit/
then the aggregate reserve-deposit ratio of the banking system is denoted
,  R 
by D
then
B C R R G
M " M + % “ D M
B = M
This expresses the total money stock in terms of the quantity of the
monetary base the currency-money and reserve ratio. .
7 —The monetary base as defined by Gagan /includes currency 
held by the public and bank reserves/ is ultimately under the control 
of the monetary authorities. The components of the monetary base as 
used by Cagan are gold coin or certificates and other money fully backed 
by gold, paper money or deposit balances not secured by gold reserves 
but constituting a liability of the Treasury, and bank rates issued 
as the liability of national banks.
5See P. Cagan, Determinants and Effects of Changes in the Stock of Money 
1875-1960, Columbia University Press, New York 1965, pp. 11-16
^Ibid
7Ibid p. 45-117
The monetary base satisfies the following equation:
B = DA + R + C - (d + o. + f + TC)
DA = -discounts and advances of the central bank to commercial banks
R = bank reserves
C = Treasury currency outstanding
d = Treasury deposits at the central bank
o = Central Bank's other deposits plus other accounts
f = Foreign deposits at the Central Bank
TC = Treasury cash
Cagan used Tj{rlt sources of changes in the monetary base for 
9selected periods from 1876-195.5• The ThrJLt sources of changes are 
’ a) the monetary gold stock, b) Federal Reserve operations and c) Treasury 
operations.
Cagan's work tells us that gold flows have important effects 
on the quantity of high-powered money, and the changes in the monetary 
gold stock offset high-powered money directly, and in "the long-run 
.there is a mutual dependence between the stock of gold and high-powered 
money. Cagan's findings support his view that the gold stock 
‘dominated the long-run movements in the U.S. quantity of high-powered 
money from 1876-191 ,^ and became less predominant after 191 ,^ and 
eventually lost their primary role in determining the quantity of high-. 
powered money.
8K. Brunner and A. Meltzer op. cit. p. 2^5
Q •
P. Cagan, op. cit., p. 51 
10Ibid, p. 55
The operations of the Federal Reserve System as used by
Cagan studies the relationship between changes in Federal reserve
credit outstanding and changes in the monetary base. Throughout 1920
Federal Reserve credit outstanding was stable /for the U.S.7 and began
to decline around the end of that year, and afterwards it fell drastically
for 1921-22. The significance of the absence of large increases in
Federal Reserve Credit outstanding during the 1920’s means that the
Reserve banks were not using the excess gold reserves to increase the
monetary base. The other point tells us that due to the large increases
in the gold stock during 1921-24, it seemed proper to reduce Reserve
Banks Credit outstanding in order to offset any expansion in the monetary
base caused by increases in the gold stock. And the increases in Reserve
Credit outstanding in 1925 and 1928, almost wholly counteracted concurrent 
11losses of gold, which could have lead to falls in the monetary base.
Cagan's results show that the Treasury operations /in the U.S.A.7 
have not in the long run made a significant contribution to the monetary 
base. Cagan mentions four instances in which Treasury operations were 
used to offset the monetary base:
a) preparations for resumption of specie payments in 1875-79*
b) sale of bonds to augment the Treasury's gold reserve in 1895-98.
c) support of New York banks during stringencies of credit from 
I9OO-I914, and
d) gold sterilization during 1958-38
The main conclusion is that these Treasury operations produced random
12effects on the monetary base.
^Ibid, p. 68-71 
12See ibid, p. 78-86 for more details
The monetary base cannot be explained simply as the sum. of
the sources of change, because the sources are partly determined by the
13
behaviour of the aggregate and of each other. Federal Reserve operations
were related to the other sources of change, because the Reserve Banks
worked to offset undesired movements in the monetary base produced by
the other sources. The Treasury operations which were examined by Cagan
were all connected with gold flows, and represented attempts to offset
14movements m  the gold stock and changes in the monetary base.
The Central Bank has the power to stop commercial banks from 
having discounts with it,' or it can make discounting with the central 
bank rather unattractive. On the other hand the Central Bank cannot 
make the commercial banks more willing to demand advances and discounts 
from it. The discounts could be made more attractive, and the commercial 
banks have the option of either borrowing or not borrowing from the 
Central Bank. In other words the commercial banks could refuse to 
borrow from the Central Bank. I think it would be better analytically 
to subtract discounts and advances of the Central Bank to commercial
clbanks from the base B., thus having an adjusted base B .
The above mentioned argument can be carried one step further, 
in an open economy /In a country such as the Lebanon/ the commercial 
banks have the ability to borrow money from foreign banks aid markets,
Let us assume that commercial banks borrow money from foreign markets 
when the domestic rate is higher than the foreign rate, the net result 
would then be an increase in capital inflows. Such capital movements are 
not only responsive to interest differentials, but also responsive to 
changes in the value of the Lebanese currency with respect to other 
currencies such as the dollar and the pound. My empirical results support 
this argument.
^ I b i d ,  p. 98 
lZfIbid
a.
The adjusted monetary base B should be re-adjusted to 
allow for the movements and changes in capital flows by adding net 
foreign assets /or subtracting if net foreign assets have a negative 
sign7 to the monetary base Ba.
BL = Ba + NFA 
where B^ is the re-adjusted monetary base.
My argument for controlling the money supply in an open economy deals
L
with the factors that determine the monetary base B , they are, the public 
the commercial banks, the Central Bank and the foreign sector, and the 
relationship between B^ and the money supply M via the money multiplier, m 
M. = mBL
2 - The Traditional View
The traditional monetary view holds that the behaviour of
the monetary authorities dominates the behaviour of the public and
commercial banks in its effect and influence on the money supply. The
monetary base according to the traditional view is a more important
determinant of the money supply than income and the rate of interest.
The traditional view argues that money supply bears a very close and
predictable relation to variables under the control of the Central Bank.
And money supply is partly aa eidogenous variable determined by market
forces, but is (money supply) mostly an exogenous variable determined
by the monetary policy of the Central Bank.
Brunner and Meltzer^ treat money and bank credit as endogenous
.variables where their partial equilibrium responses to monetary policy
changes include a response to the changes in interest rates induced
by policy operations. Then they argue that if the money supply and other
monetary variables are treated as endogenous variables this permits
the factors determining the differences in the relative responses to
policy operations of money supply and bank credit to be analysed and to
lead to the conclusion that open market operations induce a larger
2
relative change in the money supply than in bank credit.
The Brunner Meltzer arguments make use of money nultipliehs 
and their links with the monetary base. I*t is assumed that the money 
multiplier is dependent on an index of interest rates representing 
yields on loans government securities, and other earning assets included 
in the banks' portfolios, on the reserve requirement ratios. Interest 
rates are assumed to change the monetary multipliers through three 
1
Brunner and Meltzer "Liquidity traps for Money Bank Credit and 
Interest Rates" J.P.E. 1968, p 1-37
2
Ibid for more details on this argument.
relations expressing desired ratios, a) the ratio c£ desired excess
reserves to total deposits is assumed to depend on market interest
rates and on the rediscount rate, b) a similar dependence is assumed
for the ratio of the desired volume of member-bank borrowing to total
deposits, c) -ftie index of market interest rates, the interest paid by-
banks on time deposits. But the money multiplier is the connecting link
between the monetary base and the money stock, where the base is the
•control variable and is taken to be an exogenous variable /according
to the traditional view7 . And the control of the base itself could be
achieved by using open market operations and a reserve aggregate target.
Money is held by three different holders; the public, banks
and the monetary authorities in different types. S is the public’s
holding of specie, S is the banks’ holding of specie, D is deposits,
0 is the obligation of the monetary authorities to the public, and 0^ is
the obligations of the monetary authorities to banks which is equal to
3
currency plus the deposit obligations of the monetary authorities.
Let us assume that the obligations of the monetary authorities are
considered as perfect substitutes for specie. And the banks desire to
:maintain some ratic of D to R,
. R = ' Su + (1 , 
b b’
R represents the reserves of the banks and is divided into two major
parts;- a) legal reserves, and b) precautionary reserves. and 0^
constitute the legal reserve requirements, while precautionary reserves
reflect the bank's own judgment of the amount of it wishes to hold.
Banks are indifferent about the proportions in which R consists of S
or 0 . b
■^ M. Friedman and A.J. Sch$t?flfrjfgr A Monetary History of the U.S. 1867-1960, 
Princeton University Press 19^3i P- 776-808 ~ '
The public also'maintains a certain ratio between D and C ,
C being currency
C = S + 0
The public is indifferent about the proportions in which currency
consists of S and 0.
Let us assume that the' authorities do not hold deposits at
banks, and
M = C + D
R = S, + 0, , C = S + 0b b 7
the sum total of specie and the consolidated obligations of the monetary
authorities is referred to as the monetary base, B,
B = S + S. + 0  + 0,
b b
and
M = B i t  * §JD D
C + R
Let b, the banks1 ratio, and let = p the public's ratio then
M = B ^ ^ +- Pm
we get:
Tb" +■ p)
the change in the money stock depends on the monetary base, B, and on 
b and p.
M = B.bCl + p) (b + p) 
base, B, can be adjusted by subtracting from it the total borrowings 
of the commercial banks from the Central Bank, thus having an adjusted 
base Ba , with ;
M = Ba. b(l -i- p) (b + p)”1 
we are interested in -the relative changes in Ba, b, and p, and in their 
effects* on changes in the money supply in order to do so we take the 
logarithmic form of the above equation getting;
log M - log Ba + log b + log (1 + p) - log (b + p) 
and in order to find the continuous changes we take the total derivative
c lof log M.B p. and b can be calculated and the changes in them could be 
easily measured. The Traditional theory argues that the monetary base
c lB is an important determinant of the money supply,^
The determinants of the stock of money as defined by Friedman
kand Schwartz are the monetary base the ratio of deposits to reserves, 
and the ratio of deposits to currency. Their work has shown a close 
parallelism between the money stock and the monetary base, and changes 
in the monetary base were found to be the major contributors to changes 
in the stock of money, and the monetary base could be put mder the 
Control of the Federal Reserve Banks.
5 — ^The determinants of the money stock according to Cagan i; ' 
the monetary base, the currency ratio, and the reserve ratio have 
different effects on the money stock. His analysis is based on the 
contribution of each determinant to the rate of change in the money 
stock rather than its absolute level. "The chief reason for using the 
rate of change in the money stock rather than the quantity of money, is 
to dLiminate the strong upward trend in the quantity, which c?bsC0Y*€S 
fluctuations."^ The rate of change in the stock of money attributed
to changes in each of the three determinants has been derived.as follows:
M - —  -- ^ ------ -—
C R C R
M + D " M D
the derivation of this equation was presented in section 1 of this 
chapter, it can be expressed in terms of change by taking natural
L
Ibid, p. 119-13^, p 270-279? and Appendix B
5
P. Cagan, op. cit.
^Ibid p. 4.
logarithms and then differentiating with respect to time
log.M S. log B - log
d log M 'sz 
dt
d J-Og B + H
dt B
The right hand side of the equation gives the contribution of the rate 
of change in the monetary base, in the currency ratio, and in the reserve 
ratio respectively to the rate of change in the money stock.
ratio 9% and reserve ratio 2%/ • Cagan's calculations show that increases 
in the monetary base accounted for nine-tenths of the growth of the money 
stock- Cagan adopted the use of specific cycle stages of the money 
series to compute various averages of the relative contributions. In 
this case the chief contributor to specific cycles in the rate of change 
in the money stock is the currency ratio. The contributions of the 
monetary base were very irregular and did not parallel the money series 
closely for the periods 1877-1953, 1877-1913 and 1918-53• The contributions 
of the reserve ratio have shown a fairly regular cyclical~pattern, 
but with a comparatively small amplitude compared to that of the currency 
ratio.8
tentative. Cagan treats the monetary base as being a variable under the 
control of the Federal Reserve, and it could be used to offset the combined
The contributions in percentage rates of change and in relative
7terms were calculated by Cagan for the years 1875-1955- For all years 
the monetary base has shown a relative contribution of 91$, /currency
The interdependence among the three determinants is in Cagan's 
words<hazardousf and the inferences made must be viewed as highly
7Ibid, p.18-21
8Ibid, p. 25, 26, 29, .32, 33, 3^ and 36
contribution of the other two ratios', the currency ratio, and the reserve 
ratio. The reserve ratio itself involves activities of the monetary 
authorities, while sources of variation in the currency ratio involve 
action of innumerable holders of money, or the public.
The view that the growth of the money stock could be under ^
the control of the monetary authorities if they wish to do so was also 
voiced by Gibson and Thom. Their approach is a base-multiplier method 
which considers the monetary base to be under the control of the Central 
Bank aid changes in the monetary base bring about corresponding changes
"  9in the stock of money which is determined by the size of the multiplier.
1
m “ b - b k + k
R Cb = bank's cash ratio, k = ^  non-bank public cash to money ratio
' b and" k are assumed to be less than one.
Goodhart provides a number of arguments against the base-
multiplier method which treats the base as an exogenous variable, and
develops his model which, treats the monetary base, and the money supply
as endogenous. "The first S'tlep in arriving at a satisfactory theory
of the determination of the money stock is to abandon the assumption
of a given stock of high powered money and to proceed to an examination
10
.of the factors which determine this total."
The method followed by Goodhart develops an accounting . identity, 
which is taken from the accounts of the flow of funds which describe 
how the financial surplus or deficit of each sector is financed by 
flows of funds through the different financial markets. The accounting 
identity is composed of the public sector deficit PSD after taking account
Q
N.J. Gibson and D.R. Thom, "Can the Money Stock be Controlled?" The 
Bankers' Magazine, 1971? p« 206-211.
10• Goodhart, "Analysis of the Determination of /the Stock of Money", 
in Parkin and Nohay (eds.) Essays in Modern Economics, p. 250
of various financial transfers, OMD is the outcome of the authorities' 
operations in marketable debt, NMD is the outcome of transactions in 
non-marketable debt, MAT is the required use of funds to pay off maturing 
debt, EOF gives the total finance obtained from accepting external 
currency flows and AH is high powered money or base money:
PSD = OMD + NMD - MAT + EOF + AH 
AH = PSD - OMD - NMD + MAT - -EOF
Some of the financial flows in the above equation are outside 
the control of the government; such as the short-term variations in 
the size of the deficit which is outside the control of the monetary 
authorities. C. Goodhart argues that it is difficult to devise fiscal 
measures that can be frequently altered without involving considerable 
...disturbance of one kind or another. And there are lags which intervene 
between the policy changes and the resulting effect on monetary flows, 
so that the public sector deficit in any given year may be conditioned 
as much by the previous Budget as by current fiscal changes.
For all the abovementioned reasons the monetary authorities 
cannot hope to vary the size of the public sector deficit in the short- 
run as a flexible instrument for the purpose of achieving some desired 
rate of growth in the monetary aggregates.^ I think this argument is 
■in the tradition of analysing the possibilities of the co-ordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy.
The main issue which we are concerned with.is that the traditional 
monetary view is based on a theory'which is of a long-run nature and is 
mainly interested in variables which constitute the money multiplier 
and in the monetary measures which could influence changes in the monetary 
base and with its exogeneity. The Goodhart method leads to the use of
11Ibid, p. 252
a reduction in tax and'its effects on,'disposable income, and the effects 
of an increase in government expenditure on the national income. Such 
a method makes us aware of the various ways economists have followed in 
order to resolve the dispute between the endogeneity and exogeneity of 
the monetary base aid the money supply, and leads, to the conclusion that 
the quantity of money is not an autonomous variable controlled by the 
government, but is an endogenous quantity.
The monetary flows affecting the level-of the monetary base 
are the public sector deficit, and the required funds to pay off 
maturing debt are to some considerable extent outside the control of 
the authorities. And the outcome of transactions in non-marketable 
debt, and the total finance obtained from accepting external currency 
flows tend to respond perversely to interest rate changes, in -that an 
increase in domestic interest rates will tend to lead to flows from these 
sources causing increases in the monetary base.*|2
The total finance obtained from accepting external currency 
flows as treated by Goodhart is assumed to be only responsive to changes 
in interest rates. I think it would be more realistic to include in the 
analysis of external currency flows, the responsiveness of such flows 
to changes in the value of the currency /devaluations and re-valuations/ 
of the country in question with respect to the major world currencies.
We must aLso take into consideration investment facilities, political 
and economic stability.
In any country where the commercial, banks have the ability 
to borrow money from the external markets then the Central Bank Control 
over external currency flows would be greatly reduced. The monetary 
base should be adjusted.so as to include the movements and changes in 
capital flows, and the new monetary base would be responsive to domestic 
and external interest rate changes, and to fluctuations in the values 
of the domestic currency with respect to the major currencies.
12Ibid, p.
The traditional monetary view argues that when given a set 
of institutional arrangements and predictable behaviour on the part of 
those engaged in market activities, then changes in the monetary base 
produce predictable changes in the money stock. The objective is to 
identify and measure the monetary base, because the monetary base can 
be used as a predictor of the money stock and as a variable whose control 
implies the control of changes in the quantity of money. But in order 
to identify and measure the monetary base the behaviour of the public, 
and the commercial banks should be described to show their relationship 
with the monetary base. But the Central Bank's behaviour and control 
over the monetary base, dominates the banks and the public's effects 
and influence on the money supply.
James Toxin's point is that "the quantity of money as conventionally
defined is not an autonomous variable controlled by governmental authority
but an endogenous or. inside quantify reflecting the economic behaviour
13
of banks and other private economic units." Such a point leads to
the argument, that the theory of the determination of the money stock
should be treated as one branch of the more general theory of portfolio
adjustment in response to relative changes in interest rates. And the
time path of the process depends on the various speeds of adjustment of
the various sectors’to relative changes in the rate of interest.
Oilitir <3f o w  cr* -£€Qnomic YYioiels h ave beem deve$of>l.cl i n
order to analyse the determination of the money stock. One of the known
methods uses a set of equations that are composed of the income equation,
a consumption function, an investment and saving functions, demand and
supply equations and the monetary base.. The demand and supply of money,
the monetary base, the consumption, investment and saving functions are
treated as endogenous variables. Such method also treats or, assumes
that the demand for money Md = Ms the supply of money. , _
J. Toiin, "Commercial Banks as creators of Money" in Financial Markets 
and Economic Activity eds. Hester and Talin, Yale Univqrsi^y Press 19&7 P*
Ms. = Ms(Y, r, B) 
where money supply is dependent on changes in the income levels, a 
rise in income (other things being equal) tends'to increase money supply.
An increase in the rate of interest and in the monetary base would lead 
banks to increase their holding of earning assets. The idea behind the 
above equation is that the money supply is determined jointly by the 
behaviour of the monetary authorities, the commercial banks and the public.
The monetary base when treated as being only partly exogenous 
then it would be.determined by income, open-market operations, and the 
borrowing requirements of the government. As income increases, people 
would reduce their holdings of base money in order to hold other assets, 
mainly earning assets due to higher interest rates, and some of these assets 
are usually government bonds.
The monetary base could be treated as the control variable 
for the process of controlling the money supply. In this case the major 
component of the monetary base would be the Central Bank holdings 
of government securities, and the monetary base is attained by the use 
of open market operations. And changes in the money multiplier reflect 
portfolio decisions by banks and the public, and Central Bank policy 
actions.
Tinbergen derived a money supply equation involving short­
term interest rates and the net indebtedness of the member banks.
Tinbergen studies the business cycle mechanism in the United States 
/1919-19327. The money supply relation was regarded as a price-fixation 
relation for short money. The banks regulate the amount of credit 
granted by changing their interest rates. They do this in such a 
way in order to keep their debt position with the Federal Reserve Banks 
within the prescribed limits.
Jan Tinbergen, Econometrics, Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1961, p. 137-1^1*
The debt position can be indicated by 
Bi - Re,
Bi =■ ■ rediscounts, and Re = surplus reserves, and
ms = 4^  /Bi - Re7 + 2
ms = the short-term interest rate., and according to Tinbergen1 s
' 15work ms has shown a high correlation with Bi - Re.
The above equation was found by rough approximation for the period 
1917-1932, where the right hand side had to be expressed in terms of 
the corresponding quantity of money. Such correspondence is reflected 
in the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve Banks and in the legal 
reserve requirements for deposits prevailing in the United States.
According to Tinbergen the factors that determine M the money 
supply are: ms the rate of interest, which is taken instead of Bi - Re,
the gold reserves A, the policy of the monetary authorities which 
determines P, where P = bills of Exchange, and bonds bought in open 
market, and on M 1 or MM, where M 1 = Bank notes in circulation, and 
M" = The member-banks outstanding deposits.
r l6
Mn has shown that it has a linear relation to R reserves of banks,
Rr = 0.038Mm (omitting a constant),
and Bi - Re = M* + Rr - /A + P7
by substitution we get:
Bi - Re "= M' + 0.038M” - /A + P7
we have ms = A/Bi - Re7 + 2
M 1 and M" are the two components of money Tinbergen assumed that M ’ 
is given and is much less important than M". We can derive from the 
above equations the following equation for the supply of money;
15 'Ibid, p. 139, see Figure lA
*^Ibid, p.lAO
0.038M = 0.038/M' + M”7 ?lms - 0.962M 1 + A + P
or M = 6.6ms - 23M' + 26/A + P7
In this case we have a supply relation for money from which an elasticity 
can he calculated.
3 - The New View
The monetarist hypothesis of the money supply process assigns 
to the behaviour of the monetary authorities an important role in 
the determination of money supply behaviour. The behaviour of the 
banks and of the public is acknowledged by the monetarists, and it 
dominates in particular the shortest-run variations of the money 
stock but declines in relative importance beyond the short-run.
The monetarists1 investigations establish that the longer the 
period or the larger the relative change of the money supply, 
the greater is the role of the monetary authorities in the behaviour 
of the money stock.
A countercritique
rapidly emerged and launched its arguments under the flag of the
New View* "In the general approach of the Yale School monetary
theory broadly conceived is simply the theory of portfolio
management by economic units: households, business, financial institutions
and governments* It takes as its subject matter stocks of assets
and debts and their values and yields; its accounting framework
is the balance sheet. One of the major implications of this approach
is the necessity to regard the structure of interest rates, asset
yields and credit availabilities rather than the quantity of money
as the linkage between monetary and financial institutions on the
7one hand and the real economy on the other.”
g
James Tobin argued that commercial banks do not possess, 
either individually or collectively, a widow’s curse which guarantees 
that any expansion of assets will generate a corresponding expansion 
of deposit liabilities. According to the New View the essential 
function of financial intermediaries, is to satisfy simultaneously 
the portfolio preferences of two types of individuals. On one side 
we have the borrowers who wish to expand their holdings of real assets 
beyond the limits of their own net worth* On the other side we have 
the lenders who are willing to hold some (or all) of their net worth 
in assets of stable money value. The assets of the financial intermediaries 
are obligations to the borrowers, and their liabilities are the assets 
of the lenders.
7
E.G. Johnson, "Recent. Developments in Monetary Theory - a Commentary"
In Further Essays in Monetary Economics, H.G. Johnson,
Allen and Unwin, London 1972, p. 38
g
J. Tobin, "Commercial Banks as Creators of Money" in Financial
Markets and Economic Activity, eds. Eester and Tobin - 
Yale University Press, 19&7, P* 1-12
According to Tobin the banking system can expand its assets
either (i) by purchasing or lending against existing assets;
(ii) by lending to finance private investment, or buying government
securities financing public deficits. In case (i) there is no increase
in private wealth, and no new private investment and saving. In case
(ii) new private saving occurs, but in neither case will there be
an automatic increase in demand for bank deposits equal to the expansion
in bank assets. Though there is an increase in private wealth
in case (ii) - yet the community will not ordinarily wish to put all
9of its new saving into bank deposits.
10Tobin and Brainard tried to find answers to the following
questions: Does the existence of uncontrolled financial intermediaries
vitiate monetary control? What would be the consequence of subjecting
these intermediaries to reserve requirements or to interest rate ceilings?
Their main approach is to set up models of general equilibrium in
financial and capital markets and to trace in these models the effects
of monetary controls and of structural changes. And their conclusion
states that "the presence of banks.even if they are uncontrolled,
does not mean that monetary control through the supply of currency
has no effect on the economy. Nor does the presence of non-bank
intermediaries mean that monetary control through commercial banks is
11an empty gesture."
9- /•ibid, p0 6
10 J. Tobin and W.C. Brainard, "Financial Intermediaries and the
Effectiveness of Monetary Controls" 
in Hester and Tobin op. cit. p 55-93
^  ibid, p. 56
The main purpose of Tobin and Brainard1s work is to study the
effects of financial intermediation by banks, the consequences of
leaving their operation unregulated, and the effects of regulating
them in various ways. The argument uses three Financial Regimes;
a regime is characterised by listing the assets, debts, financial
intermediaries, and interest rates which play a part in it. In all
three regimes net private wealth is equal to fixed capital stock.
valued at current replacement cost; and the non interest-bearing debt
of the government, taking the form either of currency publicly held
or of the reserves of banks and other intermediaries. The public
is divided into two parts: wealth owners and borrowers. (A borrower 
may be also a wealth owner).
Let us take Regime one where there are no financial intermediaries 
and no credit market.
\c
o
C
Fig. 1
Ro = return on capital, ow = total private wealth divided
-between the supply of currency OC and the replacement value of 
capital CW. Curve DD*^  is a portfolio choice curve shoving how wealth 
owners wish to divide their wealth between currency and capital at 
various rates, Rq. The sole monetary instrument is a change 
in the supply of currency relative to the supply of capital. An
increase in the supply of currency relative to capital stock
is shown by shifting CC^ in Figure 1 to the right, thus lowering
the rate of return, -
In regime two we introduce a financial intermediary 
and study two cases, (a) that of an uncontrolled intermediary;
(b) that of a controlled intermediary. For case (a) assume 
that the intermediary is not required to hold reserves and 
does not hold any, its sole assets are loans. In this case 
the demand for capital is divided into two parts; the direct 
demand of wealth owners measured leftward from the right 
vertical axis to curve Kk \  And the demand for capital by 
borrowers measured rightward from line CC^ to curve Ll\
While the horizontal difference between 3)D^  and KK^ is the borrowers 
demand for the liabilities of the intermediary. In this regime 
there is a second interest rate to be determined the rate on 
intermediary liabilities while is the rate on intermediary loans. 
In case (a) a reduction in the supply of currency will raise 
the required rate of return on capital and it will also raise 
the intermediary rates. The intermediary will make the monetary 
control less effective in the sense that a pound reduction in 
the supply of currency brings about a smaller increase in Rq 
when it can be counteracted by expansion of the intermediary'.
- 27 -
Por case (!>) assume that there is some quantitative restriction 
on the expansion of the intermediary, and that the government non­
interest hearing debt is divided into two segregated parts: currency 
held by the public and reserves held by the intermediary pursuant 
to a legal fractional reserve requirement. Assume that this 
requirement is effective, so the margin between the intermediary*s 
lending and borrowing rates is greater than is needed to 
compensate for risk and administrative costs. A reduction in 
the supply of currency will raise Rq higher than that of case (a) 
because the expansionary response by the intermediary is 
prevented in case (b).
12In Regime Three introduce the commercial banks, and 
they hold a certain fraction of their deposits as reserves 
in currency. Assume that interest on bank deposits is competitively 
determined, and is subject to an effective legal ceiling. In regime 
three, there are two sources of demand for currency; the direct demand 
of the public, and the banks' reserve requirement. Let us consider 
separately the conditions of equilibrium in the market for 
currency and in the market for loans in order to understand the 
equilibrium in regime three.
oo
Pig. 2
12 ibid, p. 65-73
CC"1* is the supply of currency* AA^ is the demand for currency in
relation to the deposit rate (it includes both the direct and
the indirect demand for currency*) Assets could be either
complements or substitutes in the system as a whole* In figure 2(a)
the assets (currency, or government bonds, or other securities) are
substitutes, and we have a downward sloping AA^ curve*
Figure 2(b) represents the case of the complementarity with
an upward sloping AA^ curve* In each case the position of the
demand curve depends on the level of Rq, the dashed curve shows
a higher Rq, thus reducing the demand for currency to C”* From
this relationship we can have a locus of pairs of rates Rq and R^
«
which equate demand and supply for currency. For figure 2(a) 
the locus would be a downward sloping curve, and for figure 2(b) 
the locus would be an upward sloping curve*
Fig. 3
Figure 3 shows us the loan market where BB^ the supply of loans
is essentially the public demand for deposits, after allowance
for the fractional reserve requirement. LL^ is the demand
1 1for loans curve. The positions of both curves BB abd LL depend 
on the rate of return on capital Rq.
A greater Rq shifts "both curves upward as observed in Figure 3 where 
the dotted lines represent the new demand and supply of loans. The 
locus of the two rates Rq and R^ would be an*upward-sloping curve E^
in Figure 4. E is the currency equilibrium curve, with Y0 being the
O Cm
Y!
Fig* 4
loan rate. If there is an increase in the controlled deposit rate, the 
effect depends on whether currency and deposits are taken as substitutes 
or complements. If they are substitutes, an increase in the controlled 
deposit rate will reduce the net demand for currency thus Rq which balances 
the supply and demand for currency will be lower, in Figure 4 a movement
1 mof E to the left to E . ™here will be an increase in the supply of loans c o
1
i.e. a downward shift in curve E^ to E^ . In this case an increase in the 
deposit rate is an expansionary monetary action. On the other hand if 
currency and deposits are complements the result of an increase in the 
controlled deposit rate is the revers. So in this case the increase in 
the deposit rate is a deflationary monetary action.
The new view pushed forward three themes, the basis similarity 
between money and non-money substitutes, and between banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries. It also directed attention to the operation 
of an economic mechanism governing the banks1 acquisition and deposit supply 
The new view never examined the nature of money, and its similarity argument
(between bank and non-banks financial intermediaries) is based
on a formula with minimal content. Such as, both banks and
other intermediaries supply liabilities to satisfy the preference
of the ultimate lenders. The argument is of an aggregative nature,
it should allow for the differences inherent in the financial market,
and for the different services offered by different intermediaries.
The new view suggests that in the absence of reserve
requirement ratios and ceiling rates the money supply and bank
13credit are independent of the monetary base. Karl Brunner , 
criticised Tobin’s approach because it ignored the marginal productivity 
of excess reserves. So the Tobin monetary analysis did not 
really recognise the role of money and its effects on the real 
opportunity set. It.also missed the role of cash assets,
Tobin assumes that cash assets in excess of required volume 
are zero. The new view omits the interaction between existing 
stocks and new production flows and rejects the idea that excess 
supply expands output and changes the price levels. Finally the 
new view is "remarkably short on testable or tested theoretical 
propositions about the way the economy works, and specifically 
how it responds to monetary impulses, when the interaction of 
the monetary and the^ real sector is taken into account’1^
13 K. Brunner, op. cit
^  H.G. Johnson, "Recent developments in Monetary Theory -
a Commentary", op. cit. p. 41
k - The Real Balance Effect
Newcomb emphasised that changes in the quantity of money 
affect prices only through their prior effect on the demand for 
commodities, but he did not clearly distinguish between money considered 
as an income or expenditure flow, and money considered as a reserve 
balance. Fisher was influenced by Newcomb, but his exposition of the 
real-balance effect issue is more revealing. Fisher's main assumptions 
are, a constant Q (quantities) constantV, and there cannot be surplus 
money and deposits without a desire to spend it, and there cannot be 
a desire to spend it without a rise in prices. Let us suppose that 
there is a doubling in the currency • -
in circulation, and this doubling in the currency does not raise prices
at once. Prices being unchanged the individual has double the amount of
money he usually holds. He will try to get rid of this surplus money by
buying goods. The surplus money will be transferred to someone else, he in
turn will want to transfer this surplus to someone else and so on. Fisher
assumed a constant Q and V, so the net effect of doubling money will be a
doubling in prices.
The Cambridge cas’n-balance tradition as we know begins with Marshall,
Pigo&Tand' continues with Keynes and Robertson. They all have indicated their
recognition ofthe real-balance effect. Keynes in the General Theory
clearly argues that the real-balance effect does not directly influence
the commodity market.
"It is therefore, on the effect of a falling wage and
price-level on the demand for money that those who believe in the
self-adjusting quality of the economic system must rest the
weight of their argument; though I am not aware that they have
done so. If the quantity of money is itself a function of
the wage and price-level, there is indeed nothing to hope
in this direction. But if the quantity of money is virtually
fixed, it is evident that its quantity in terms of wage-units
can be indefinitely increased by a sufficient reduction in money
wages ... We can, theoretically at least, produce precisely the
same effects on the rate ofinterest by reducing wages, whilst
56leaving the quantity of money unchanged."
Keynes’ argument simply states that an increase in the money supply influences 
effective demand through its prior influence on the rate of interest, Keynes 
like Pigou emphasises that the alternative to holding money is to hold bonds, 
56
j.M. Keynes, The General Theory op. cit. p. 266
and so an increase in the money supply will lead to an j^crease in the. demaid 
for bonds. There is never any indication that the surplus money may also be 
diverted to purchasing commodities.
Let us assume that an economy is in equilibrium, and for every set
of given conditions there corresponds one and only one equilibrium position,
and prices change during the tatonnement in an equi-proporticnate manner.
The demand and supply for nominal money holdings are represented
respectively by DD and SS. The demand curve has an elasticity which is
generally less than Unity. Let E^ be the elasticity of demand for nominal
money and E^ be the elasticity of demand for real balances. At any given
price level E^ = 1 - Eg, and since the normality of real balances means that
57is positive then E^ will be less than Unity.
FIGURE (1)
Assume that the initial money supply at M is doubled so that the total 
quantity of money in the economy rises to 2Mq. This will cause a shift
D. Patinkin, Money. Interest and Prices, Harper and Row, London 19^6, p.50
in the supply curve S3 to the right, to S’S’ in Figure 1. By definition
the amount of money demanded is equal to the initial holdings of money plus
the amount of excess demand for money. The amount of excess demand for
money is not affected by a proportionate change in all money prices and
in the initial amount of money. Then it follows that demand for real money
58balances depends only on real wealth and relative prices. The real-balanee
effect in the money market is represented by a rightward shift from DB to
B'B1; at the same level of absolute prices, individuals because of their
increased wealth feel themselves able to indulge in a higher level of
liquidity, (assuming no money illusion). Curve B ’D* shows twice the
amount of money demanded at DD, as R lies on curve DD, point T lies on curve
B'B’. But T must also lie on curve S’S ’. Thus B'D* necessarily intersects
S’S’ at point T, corresponding to a price level of 2Pq. Similarly if
money supply is increased to the new demand curve must intersect the new
supply curve at the point V, with the price level being 3Pq. At price PQ
if the quantity of mondy is doubled, then there will be an amount of excess
supply equal to UQ0 Theexcess in the money supply means an excess demand for
commodities. There is a pressure on the price level in the commodity markets;
and the price will be driven up, and since P goes up then ~  must come down.
"Nevertheless, we ultimately reaffirm the conclusion; that an
increase in the quantity of money causes a proportionate increase in
59equilibrium money prices". x
There are at least two notions of the Consumers demand for money, 
one supposes, in essence, that people hold money because they want to.
They gain utility from so doing. The utility accuses directly the real 
balances rather than to money as such, but it is money that is held.
The other approach, supposes that money is held, not because people want 
to hold it, but because they must. They are constrained to do so by the 
functioning of - the economic system.
58iMd, p. 27 
^ibid, p. 48
According to C.L. Lloyd , the consumer chooses those quantities
x^, ..., x^ of commodities 1, ..., n that maximise his utility function, 
U s* U(x^ ..., xn) , subject to a budget constraints
n n
x±Pi + M = L +Y, and to M* = K
i=l i«l
where Y is money income, L is initial money holdings, M is final money
holdings, K is a positive constant, and is the price of commodity i. 
Combining the above two equations will give us:
| i M = L + Y; (1+K) M = K(L + Y);
(l + K)
K (L + Y).
Let us assume that money does not depreciate and cannot be traded except 
during some weeks. And the amount of money with which the individual begins
M = KY, having observed the value of K, it is possible to predict 
the amount of additional cash which will be hoarded by the consumer in each 
subsequent period so long as his income does not change unpredictably.
Such information may be aggregated in order to predict the future demand fo r 
money to hoard for the entire economy. converges monotopically for all
K > o ,  and for any consumer then, the time path of money hoarding will 
converge mono topically to some level KY. Let us use as an example a 
certain individual who has no money hoarded yet and his income is £300 per week,
week t is the same as the amount with which he ends week t - 1, so we have the
following equation:
Mt r h c  Y - with
(Mq - KY) + KY, which converges monotonically to
^Cliff L. Lloyd, "Two Classical Models" in Value, Capital and Growth, 
©d. J.l-l. Wolfe, Edinburgh University Press, 19&9f P« 305-317*
and his K = 2. According to M = KY his equilibrium money hoard will be 
£600. The theory presented in the previous page predicts that during period 
one he will hoard £200:
Mt = | -f | (500), Mt_x = 0 so Mt = £200
During period two we have: = ~(200) + •|{300); = £353*5
his hoarding increased by £133*3 during the second week, and so on.
The above model presents consumers as members of an economic society where the
individual is constrained to hold a certain part of the value of what he spends
on consumption in the form of money.
Some economists have argued for the invariance principle, which implies
that an exogenous change in real-money balances has only a temporary.effect
on consumption and on real money, leaving their long-run equilibrium values
unchanged. In other words a windfall gain will not alter the individual’s
61standard of living in the long-run. Let be the consumer’s wealth at 
the beginning of period t, his holdings of real balances and C^. his 
consumption of goods and services, with W^. = C^. + , where = M^ . ^+Y,Y =
income, and there are no windfalls. So the allocation of a person’s 
wealth between consumption and real-balances is subject to a budget 
constraint at time t. If we regard money as being the only asset then
represents also planned wealth for the period t^ -l, (interest rate is zero). 
Since there are no windfalls then would consist of planned wealth
for t+1, i.e. of M^ . only. As the individual moves from t to t+1 a new income 
Y appears. Y is not planned for, so the actual change in wealth will 
consist of the planned change plus the unexpected change Y.
- Wt = Mt + Y - £ c t+1.lj = Y - 0t
^See Archibald and Lipsey, "Monetary Value Theory: a Critique of Lange 
and Patinkin", Review of Economic Studies, 1958
The situation will change if we introduce the bonds market,
62where the consumer may hold bonds as well as money. We have a new 
situation where r is a fixed psoitive rate of interest and ^1+r ’
as the value of a bond. Let be the present value of wealth
planned for period t + 1 in a money-and-bond model.
P^ = “ C.J. - ~i+r~ Mt* ' "l+r" ^t cos  ^ usinS the
t
liquidity services of money balances. The new budget constraint will be:
W, = P, + + r Mj.t t t -r---  t1+r
In order to simplify the argument let us take r as fixed then the
relative price of consuming goods and liquidity services rendered by
is constant, we have: G^ = + r M^, with the new budget constraint
1+r
Wf. = In the money bond model = (l+r)P^. + Y, which means that:
V  " wt = rPt + Y - V  rPt - - Y -
and so for a given Y, a long-run equilibrium can be consistent with any
value of G and not only with a single value as in the money model.
The presence of money increases real income properly conceived;
and the gain in real income from the presence of money is higher if the 
money is credit money than if it is commodity money, and higher again if the 
money pays some return on holding it. In our modern world the monetary 
authorities are able to induce changes in the price level, either upward 
or downward. A deflationary monetary policy induces downward pressures on 
prices, as a result holders of money are offered an asset which bears a positive
yield in real terms additional to the utility yield of money. The holders
of money in such a situation will be induced to hold larger quantities than 
they would hold at a constant price level, and this increases the utility yield 
they enjoy. The fall in prices creates some capital gain, and people in general
N. Liviatan, "On the Long-Run Theory of Consumption and Real-Balances" 
Oxford Economic Papers Vol. 17» 19^5» ?• 205-218
■will want'to hold larger real balances, and the increase in purchasing 
power so created will not in the aggregate ever be exercised, and so leads 
to an increase in the aggregate income. Both elements-utility yield and capital 
gains must be included in the concept of the income gain from the holding of 
real balances.^
Using the same analysis it then follows that the influence of the rate 
of inflation adopted by the monetary authority is a compound of two influences 
on real income, working in opposite directions. The lower rate of return 
on holdings of real balances means that the utility yield obtained from holding 
money balances is now lower, thus lowering the amount of national income 
available for investment. And on the other hand it lowers the ratio of desired 
real balances to income, which means that the proportion of any given amount 
of savings that has to be invested in the accumulation of real balances will 
be lower.
5 - Optimal Money Supply
"The question of monetary optimality, like most questions in 
Welfare economics, is important not so much for its own sake as for the 
stimulus it has given to monetary theorists to re-examine the foundations 
and strengthen the superstructure of their subject. Perhaps, we shall never 
have a definitive answer to the optimality problem but we shall certainly 
have many attempts at it. And in the process we shall get what is most 
urgently needed: an improved theoretical understanding of the actual working 
of the economy in which we live."^ The main question is, "Is there an optimal 
money supply?" This question can be approached from two different angles; 
by welfare analysis of the existing monetary arrangements of actual economies, 
and by studying and exploring various models of a monetary economy.
63
H.G. Johnson, "Inside Honey, Outside Money, Income, Wealth and -Welfare in 
Monetary Theory" in H.G. Johnson ed. Further Essays in Monetary Economics, 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1972, p. 124-25
^R.W. Clower, "Is there an Optimal Money Supply?", J.F. Vol. 25, 1970, p. 433
Let us start by tising the welfare analysis of the existing monetary 
arrangements. The government through its monopoly of legal tender, 
its ability to force commercial banks to make an interest-free loan 
directly to the Central Bank, and prohibition of interest payments on 
demand deposits, creates a state of sub-optimality of the stock of real 
balances held in comparison with a fully-free competitive economy.
Elimination of the various regulations and the payment of competitive 
interest rates on government and central bank obligations would achieve
optimality of the real money stock. The payment of competitive interest
65on money is one way of achieving the optimal money supply.
The argument can be taken one step further by assuming that the
monetary authority controls the nominal money stock in such a way as
to maintain a stable price level. In addition to fixed prices, assume 
a fixed single period of analysis and stationarity. Feige and Parkin^ 
used these assumptions to analyse and improve the inventory theory in 
relation to optimal money supply. The study is presented in one model 
which is divided into two main parts, in part one we have the case of 
individual optimum, in part two the case of social optimum.
Part one assumes that the economy consists of representative family
units which maximise the utility function: U = U(P9) , where P9 is the money
volume of commodities consumed, U is the utility index. The utility
function is maximised subject to the constraint:
A = Y + R - P£ - T 
Y being balance income, R the net return from inventory management, and 
T is taxes, R is the profit, and is defined as the return of capital K,
bonds B, money M, and commodities net of transaction costs PQ and inventory
carrying costs C.
65H.G. Johnson, "Is there an optimal money supply?" J.F., 1970, p. 437 and439
66E. Feige and M. Parkin, "The Optimal Quantity of Money, Bonds, Commodity, 
Inventories and Capital." A.E.R. Vol 61, 1971» P. 335-349
-  t}0. -
R = K + B + M - PQ - C 
The individual is subject to a wealth constraint, and he wants to 
maximise his utility function which is subject to his budget and wealth 
constraints. Feige and Parkin concluded the argument by revealing that 
the demand for average cash balances, commodity inventories, and bonds, 
depends upon disposable human' and non human income, as well as interest 
rates, transactions costs, and inventory carrying costs.
Part two is concerned with the social optimum, and so it deals with
the sources and uses of resources for the entire society. Given the
stationarity constraint and assuming a total population of N families,
the total non human wealth for the society is NW = N(K + PQ), where K is
the average stock of capital in current dollars, and the total income
available to society is N /Y + 7r where r^ is the rate of
return on capital. For society as a whole the opportunity cost of holding
commodity inventories is the income foregone by not utilising these
inventories as productive capital. Society must allocate its resource flow
among the following uses: holding money, bond inventories, commodity
inventories, capital inventories at a cost, and transacting in the bond
markets at a cost, and also pay an interest rate on money. Thus forming
a social constraint against which society will maximise the utility function.
r
The main theme of the argument reveals that thednly way that
/—
individuals can be induced to undertake the socially optimum number of 
transactions, and hold the socially optimum stocks of inventories, is to 
pay interest on cash balances and bonds equal to the net rate of return on
/ n
capital. And optimum individual consumption will equal optimum social 
consumption if, and only if, r = r^ = r^ - 4^  where r^ j)s the rate of 
return on cash balances, r^ the rate of return on bonds, r^ the.rate of 
return on capital and %  ^ is the cost per dollar of carrying capital 
inventories. According to Feige and Parkin the Parato-efficiency requires
67 ibid p. 344
that interest rates should be paid on cash balances which is equal to the 
rate of return on bonds and the net rate of return on capital. And the 
inventory theory approach makes the problem of optimal money supply dependent 
on the problems of optimal bond inventories, commodity inventories, and 
capital stock. The effects of paying interest on money are: 1 - cash 
balances will increase, 2 - bond holdings will decrease, 3 ~ commodity 
inventory holdings will decrease, 4 - physical reproductive capital will 
increase, 5 - commodity market transactions will increase, 6 - consumption 
will increase.
The second type of analysis makes use of various models of a monetary 
economy. Economic theory made it possible for the students of economics 
to examine any economy in which money has one function, say as a medium 
of exchange. But such analysis is not enough, and so economic theory and 
logic combine to give us more methods and tools of analysis, thus the 
analysis can be extended to include the other functions of money 
(mainly the function of money as a store of value) . A barter economy 
might have an organised market 7/hose function is to act as a medium of 
information. In this case economic life takes a new form, with reduced 
search costs. Because in a barter economy we have the double coincidence 
of wants before any trade can take place. Themarket brings together all 
those who are interested in trading, but the market does not reduce those 
costs of barter which arise from the necessity for a double coincidence 
of timing of transactions. The introduction of money eliminates 
the necessity of a double coincidence of wants. In an economy where 
money functions only as a medium of exchange monetary theory is based 
on two assumptions about constraints and one hypothesis about behaviour.
The two assumptions about constraints are, (a) there are resource costs 
in converting income into a desired bundle.of goods in a money economy, 
and (b) there are costs in converting money into assets. The behavioural 
hypothesis is based on the idea that people maximise utility subject to 
both an income constraint and a transactions cost constraint.
The optimum pattern of transactions between money and goods, 
and the costs of transactions between money and assets and theyield of assets 
determine the quantity of money demanded. As far as society is concerned 
the optimum quantity of money is determined solely by the optimum pattern 
of transactions between money and goods (only if money has one function: 
medium of exchange)• In case the quantity of money is not at its social 
optimum, (because the costs of transactions from money to assets is less 
than the yield) payment of interest on money will not achieve the social 
optimum, because it will distort the optimum transactions pattern 
between money and goods. The second best solution for minimising total 
resource costs can be attained by paying interest on money but .not 
necessarily equal to that of assets.
Let us take an economy in which money is held specifically as a 
form of wealth. Assume that the economy has no assets, and we only have 
contingency inventories (wealth). The economy has two goods, current 
consumption and a stream of insurance services yielded by wealth.
Assuming utility maximisation in equilibrium MUc/MU^ = Pc/P^ = 1, the first 
term MUc/MIL is the marginal rate of substitution between current 
consumption and the insurance services yielded by a unit of goods, and 
Pc/P± the relative price is equal to unity because the alternative cost 
of holding one extra unit of goods in the form of inventories is one 
unit of goods consumed currently.
Now introduce commodity money and pure assets into the economy, 
in such an economy the individual has the choice among present consumption, 
future consumption (due to the pure assets) and precautionary services 
(due to money commodity) The individual can exchange the money commodity 
either for present consumption by buying goods or future consumption by 
buying assets. In equilibrium we have:
MU MU. MU.
.ggr (1+V); jjjj- = V ; j^jT =
s+1 s+1 £
The three ratios represent themarginal rates of substitution between
present and future consumption, between precautionary services and future
consumption, and between precautionary services and present consumption,
68respectively. Changes in the quantity of the money commodity would 
change the margins between precautionary services and current consumption 
and between precuationary services and future consumption. The increase 
in the quantity ofthe money commodity would raise all prices, because 
of the increase in the demand for both goods and assets. A return to 
equilibriumwould be achieved at higher prices.
According to Professor Friedman the optimum quantity of money 
depends on the shape of the demand curve for real balances and the change 
in the cost of holding money balances required to attain the optimum 
quantity. Friedman argues his case by supporting the demand studies 
which show that the quantity of money demanded is rather inelastic with 
respect to changes in the rate of interest. A change in market interest 
rates is partly offset by a change in the rate of interest paid on money.
X
To allow for this Friedman suggests to take a cost elasticity rather on
the high side, about - 0.5 when the interest rate is about 5 P®r cent.
This would mean that a one percentage point change in the interest rate
69would change real balances in the opposite direction by 10 per cent. 7
^  M. Perlman, "The Roles of Money in an Economy and the Optimum Quantity 
of Money", Sconomica, Vol. 58, 1971 > p* 248-250
69 M. Friedman, "The Optimum Quantity of Money", op. cit p. 42-43*
f ;T
Professor Friedman pushes the argument further and tells us that at 
an internal rate of discount of 5 per cent, the optimum quantity of money 
would he attained with a rate of price decline of -5per cent per year, or 
given the assumption that prices are currently anticipated to rise at 2 
per cent per year with a 7 percentage point decline in the cost of holding 
non-interest-bearing balances, this implies that money balances would at 
least double. Friedman is in fact using the following demand function: 
log M = a - 1 0 ( |
where the 10 per cent (due to the one per cent point change in the rate
of interest) is treated as the change in the natural logarithm of money
balances. According to the above equation (demand function) a decline of
7 per centage point means a change in (jj) (dP/dt) by - 0.07> or in log
M by + 0.7 whose antilog is about 2. "At an ultimate internal discount
rate of 17 per cent, theoptimum quantity of money would be attained with
a rate of price decline of 17 per cent per year, or a shift of 19 percentage
70points in the cost of holding non-interest-bearing balances".
70 ibid, p. 43
6 - Some Empirical evidence'<on Monetary Models
In macroeconomics we have two opposing ideas, monetarism
and fiscalism, the first seeks to control the stock of money in order
to stabilise the growth in money income and prices. The second, is
mainly based on income-expenditure models and emphasises the importance
12of budgetary surpluses and deficits. My main reserach is based on
monetary doctrines and monetary models, and my task is to prove that
such models are relevant to our economic life; /they can explain some
of the economic pheonomena we experience in a capitalist system7*
Lawrence Klein argues that monetarism is governed by a single
simple reduced form type relationship expressing the quantity theory of
money, and this makes their postion depend on the adequacy of simple
and reduced models. Then he adds that large structural models stand up
at least as well as small reduced form models, and given enough time
with repeated forecast testing, Klein feels that their superiority
(large models) will become evident. But Klein admitted that though the
crude quantity theory breaks down if it is stated as a simple stable
relationship |g*£ween money supply and the value of production; Milton
Friedman's attempts to save the quantity theory by "generalising the
relationship with different lag distributions, and the more flexible
form stands as a candidate along with other hypotheses about money
13holdings tiat cannot be refuted by available data." Perhaps when 
econometrics becomes much more sophisticated we will be able to use 
new methods (or dimensions) and .improve our models.
12
For more analysis on Monetarism and Fiscalism look, D.I. FaYld 
"Monetarism and Fiscalism" Banco Nacionale del Lavoro Quarterly 
Review, 1970, p.275-307, and Andersen and Carlson, "Monetary and 
Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in Economic 
Stabilisation", Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Review, 1968, p. 11-24.
13
L.R. Klein, "Empirical Evidence on Fiscal and Monetary Models", 
in Issues on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, (ed), J.J. Diamond, p. 36
^Needless to mention that most of the data available on money supply is 
estimated with a great margin of error, and the demand for money is measured 
by being assumed to be equal to the supply of money.7 One hopes that 
in the near future we will be supplied with better data and more advanced 
econometric tools.
Klein analysed three diffent macro-models and used his results for 
comparison purposes. The three models are; the Wharton Model, the Federal 
Reserve Board -MIT - Pennsylvania Model, and the St. Louis Federal Reserve 
Model.^ According to Rlein1s empirical work the three models all fit 
the data fairly well. ^They have been tested in individual equations 
fitting, ex post simulation, and in ex ante forecasting applications.7 
Dynamic simulation was used and was obtained by solving the system as a 
set of finite difference equations, where the central relationship of the 
monetarist scheme is:
4 4
A Y t = 2.84 + ±  + £  ei A  Et-i
A Y  is the change in current priced GNP, A M  change in money stock and 
A E  is the change in high employment federal expenditures. The results 
show an error of $3*84 billion in one-quarter forecasts of GNP, while the 
error shown by a structural fiscal model is around $2.5 billion; because 
it uses a priori information while the St. Louis model does not use a 
priori information. Klein’s objection to monetarist models is based on 
the idea , that their models are not convenient for the insertion of a 
priori information as is the case with structural models.
The research method of the monetarists generally speaking is to 
determine GNP from a single equation version of the quantity theory and 
then to decompose it into segments of the economy. The fiscal research 
method (Wkarton-model) adds up all the separate components determined from 
individual equations and the result gives the estimates of the GNP. The 
fiscal models do not have a-single dominant relation in the system.
14
The Wharton model, is a Keynesian model based on the theory of income 
and employment determination.
It seems to me that the basic difference between the two methods of 
model building is partly*philosophical dispute. The monetarists have a 
certain idea or theory which they present in one equation, and then 
decompose i:% into various parts. While the othex* school of thought 
(fiscal models^ believes in doing the opposite, adding up various equations 
to give us the general equation, /though there is no single dominant
relation in the system7 Klein tried to answer this dispute Empirically
and his results were in favour of the fiscal models, but we know a priori
that he belonged to the fiscal school from the way he built his models.
I am not claiming that Klein’s models or the other models are not 
argument&tavely valid, but the answer to the dispute is not entirely empirical.
One must accept the view that a theory or a hypothesis can be tested by 
testing the ability of its predictions; but at the same time we must also 
note that any method used for empirical work is itself based on certain 
methods which are determined by the individual’s beliefs and ideas,
(philosophy). Economists do not build models which will give them good
results or bad results, i.e. they do not use models whose results can
a priori be known. Models are based on certain theories and theories
are based on certain ideas and beliefs. Each theory has its own methods
of model building which is consistent with the main idea of the theory
itself. In fact the dispute between the two theories is the result of
two different ideas, and the answer is not only empirical but also philosophical.
Klein examined the central monetarist equation, from a statistical 
point of view. Money supply is of course (according to the monetarists) 
statistically and theoretically more significant than government expenditures.
The Klein thesis is that we can get different statistical interpretations 
from the monetarist equation; instead of using first differences of variables 
and high-powered government expenditure, Klein used the levels of money 
supply and government expenditure on goods and services:
where G = government expenditures on goods .and services, (The D.Y/ is 1.90).
the implications are; government expenditures a.re just statistically
significant, while the money stock is not. Of course we will get
different results if we do not use first differences and high-powered
government expenditure. Monetarist models are interested in the changes
in the money supply, and not in the levels of money supply. Monetary
theory argues that changes in money supply cause changes in the price
level, so when we built a monetary model we usually treat the changes in
money supply rather than the levels of money supply. Sfd money multiplier
models we are mainly interested in the percentage changes of the variables.
The quantity theory relates income to the money stock, assuming
that money is exogenous and determined by the government. In theory
the monetary authorities can control the stock of money by controlling
the reserves of the commercial banks; (banks have some flexibility, for
they are able to hold excess reserves in times of low interest rates,
and use it when rates are high)• The empirical results of any study
are to some extent dependent on the period used or considered by the
15experimentor. Barrett and Walters, studied the stability of the 
Keynesian and monetary multipliers in the U.K. They used a simple 
quantity theory hypothesis where
Yd = K M  + * o ,  Yd = C + A,
d.with C M + & o  - A, Y * disposable income
16G = consumption, and A = autonomous expenditure*
A = + A , A being the true autonomous expenditure, then
C = ( J M — A + ^  o
The statistical version of the simple quantity theory if put in a 
stochastic model would be as follows:
15C.R. Barrett and A.A. waiters, "The Stability of Keynesian and Monetary 
Multipliers in the U.K.", Review of Econ. and Stat. vol. 48, 19^6, P* 595-405
16Autonomous expenditure has more than one definition, Friedman and Meiselman 
treat investment as the excess of exports over imports, and government
deficit is^  exogenous. Accelerator theorist treat investment as being 
determined by expectation about future demand, expectations are measured 
by past changes in output. Barrett and Walters consider government revenue
Ya = M + X  o + M* • M is a random variable with aero mean.
Lags were introduced into both models on the basis of Friedman's permanent 
income hypothesis; = ^Y^ + M, Y^ is gross national product.
The final form of the models which were tested by Barrett and Walters are: 
Keynesian model;
ct = 1 (yAt + ct-i^; and i
1 - y
The monetary model;
Ct = |(Mt - *  Mt_1) - At i V >  o and o <  A <  1
Five periods were used; 1878-1914? 1920-38 and 1948-63? 1878-1914? and
1921-38, 1948-63, 1879-1938. The results tell us that money is much more
significant than autonomous expenditure before world war I, The inter-war
years are strongly in favour of the Keynesian model. For the period
1948-63? the results were closer to a quantity theory hypothesis. The
main conclusion of such an empirical work is that both money and autonomous
expenditure are important factors in the determination of aggregate
consumption. But their relative importance or significance depends on
the economic conditions and the periods chosen for empirical testing.
Let us go back to the St. Louis model which is based on
the quantity theory of moneyjthe .-model accepts the idea that changes in
the money supply influence only nominal magnitudes in the long-run; total
spending and the price level. Output and employment are not affected,
in fact output is determined by the economy's natural resources, productive
17potential, capital, labour and productivity. The St. Louis model is 
as follows:
4 4
^ Yt - 2-67 + t W i  + £ eiAEt-i.
17 L.C, Anderson and K.M. Carlson, "A Monetarist Model for Economic Stabilisation" 
Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Review, vol. 52, 1970, p. 7—21
A  Y, is the change in total spending, A  M, . is the change in money "t "u—i
stock, A  is the change in high-employment Federal expenditures, money 
stock (changes,) is sji exogenous variable. The above equation is the back­
bone of the St. Louis model; price changes are estimated as a function
18of current and past demand pressure, and anticipated price change.
The model uses ex post dynamic simulations for sub-periods (1955-19&9) > 
the results tell us that the model is able to trace the movements of the 
endogenous variables ( Y^, P^ ., X^, rate of interest, U^ ., and G^,
see footnote 18) quite well during 1955—19^9•
Ex ante dynamic simulation was also used and it extends beyond the 
sample period. The whole model was re-estimated up till 1967» and the 
period used for ex-ante simulation is 1968 and 1969# The results show 
some confidence in the tracking ability of the model in estimating the 
econom:'.^  to monetary and fiscal actions. Simulation was used to find the 
effects of possible future increases in the money stock on spending, 
output, prices, unemployment and interest rates. Three cases were taken 
into consideration, (a) No change case, (b) three per cent case, and 
(c) six per cent case, (in money stock). The first case is a restrictive 
monetary action, which leads to a fall in the rate of increase in total 
spending, upward pressure on prices due to the post-inflation, and a fall 
in output during 1971# Case (b) is a moderate increase in the stock of 
money (corresponds to 1961-65 in the U.S.A.) it would maintain a steady 
growth in the rate of total spending, but due to past inflation output 
will fall slightly through 1970. Long-term interest rate will not change, 
while the short-term interest rate will fall slightly. Case (c) is a sudden
increase in the money supply, again the main influence will fall mostly on
the rate of change in total spending, while the other variables will be
18 The other equations of St. Louis model are:
= ^Y^. - (X^ - X.j. )^ The demand pressure D^; X^ is potential output.
^t
^P^ » 2.70 + £  i + , the price equation,
Ut = (^0^ ., G^ ^) the unemployment rate equation.
G.j. *= GNP gap, U^ , = unemployment rate
sirgntiy enectea. remaps tne m a m  advantage or using a simple model 
like the St. Louis model is in its dependence primarily on two variables, 
money stock and high employment. It is considered as an advantage, because 
we have to collect information about two variables, and in many countries 
a lot of information cannot be obtained and some of the data is not very 
reliable. The main purpose of the model is to study and measure the 
general influence of monetary and fiscal actions on certain important 
economic variables.
The St. Louis model is small in size and is not designed for
quarter-to-quarter forecasting. The projections of the St. Louis model
in early 1970 show that there was little prospect of strong economic
recovery in 1970 because of the lagged effect of monetary restraint in
1969. When the model was interpreted in light of its objectives, it
succeeded in sharing out the average time path of total spending, real
product, prices, unemployment, and interest rates during the period
from late 1969 1971* For evaluating the model three sets of
simulations were used, the simulations were designed to identify the
sources of error underlying model projections based on constant growth
rates of money and Federal expenditures during the six-quarter period.
Total error is equal to the difference between the observed value of a
19variable and the value projected in the ex ante simulation. The 
results show that the average error for total spending attributable to 
the assumption of steady growth of the policy variables is the largest, 
(amounting to one percentage point) The total error for price projections 
was 0.35 percentage points. The total error for the unemployment rate 
averaged 0.43 percentage points.
19' K.M. Carlson, "Projecting with the St. Louis Model: A Progress Report", 
Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Review vol. 54» 1972, p. 20-27
Another form of monetarist models was also tested by many economists
(money multiplier models), this form includes the behaviour of the base
money, the public and the commercial banks. (The Theoretical background
for such models was presented in Chapter part I). The main equation
of the model is M = mb, where M is the money stock, B is the base and m
is the money multiplier. The money multiplier can be obtained by using one
of three methods: (a) Definitional method, (b) regression method and
(c) behavioural method. Method (a) treats the multipler base framework
as an identity; method (b) expresses the money multiplier as a function
of variables that are known to the monetary authorities at a certain time
(c) expresses each ratio of the multiplier as being dependent upon other
variables such as interest rates, policy instruments, and other factors
influencing the deposit behaviour of the banks and the public. Burger,
20Kalish III, and Babb used method (b) where each month’s multiplier is
forecast using the three-month moving average of past values of the multiplier,
reserve adjustments, dummy variables (accounting for seasonal factors),
and an adjustment for autocorrelation. The model used the simulation
method for money stock control. It assumed a constant four per cent
seasonally adjusted annual growth rate for money over the control period.
The net source base is adjusted monthly. The model used two control periods
1962-65 and 1966-69. The money stock achieved by the control stock is,
computed by multiplying the net source base by the value of the multiplier
that actually prevailed in that month.
21The empirical results, of simulating money stock control over the 
sample periods show us the differences between the controlled level and 
the desired level i.e. controlled level in 1969 I = 188.54 Billion $ while 
20A. Burger, L. Kalish III, and C.T. Babb, "Money stock control and its 
implications for monetary policy", Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis. Review 
vol. 53, 1971, p. 6-22.
21The money multiplier (by Burger, Kalish and Babb)
“t - b0 + Vlt + b2X2t + * bi2di + ,
where x. is three month moving average of past value of the multiplier,
Xp is the reserve adjustment magnitude in the forecast month, d^ = dummy
variables, p is the correlation coefficient, and U. lagged value of 
the error,
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the desired level is 188.27 billion $. The results show the mean, variance, 
mean square and median of the errors. The idea behind using models is 
not final, our main objective is to produce some policy recommendations; 
controlling the stock of money is a means to an end, not the end in itself. 
The Burger, Kalish, Babb model uses a four per cent growth rate in the 
money supply as a policy objective. They move one step further and compare 
the desired GNP /^growth rate for money7 with the growth of GNP attained 
with controlled money, for the same two sample periods used above.
Their results show some kind of success in achieving the desired GNP in 
both periods. The main conclusion is that the money stock control procedure 
does not require the use of any information which the Federal Reserve does 
not already have available. The errors were not high, the largest was 
less than one per cent.
The interest elasticity of the money supply was given considerable
attention by many economists, such as Brunner, Meltzer, Teigen, De Leeuw,
Goldfeld and Kane. The work of these economists show us that the long run
elasticity of the money supply function was less than 0.5 and the short
run elasticity was not greater than 0.10 to 0.15. If the goal is to°
control money through changes in reserve aggregates then the issue of
elasticity would have to be concentrated around the relationship between
22the money stock and reserve aggregates. Teigen used an econometric 
investigation of the money supply function, he treated the stock of currency 
and demand deposits at non-member banks as an exogenous variable. He 
also assumes thi& time deposits at member banks and government deposits 
(at member banks; to be exogenous. His estimated coefficients of elasticity 
are - 0.1695 for the discount rate and 0.1950 for the commercial paper rate.
22R. Teigen, "Demand and Supply Functions for Money in the U.S.,:
Some Structural Estimates", Econometrica 1964, p. 476-509
De Leeuw used another method for estimating the interest elasticity for 
currency demand and time deposit demand at. commercial banks. De Leeuw’s 
results show us that there is an obvious degree of inelasticity in both 
functions in the short-run and in the long-run. In the short-run the 
highest value obtained by De Leeuw for elasticity is 0.070 (time deposit 
demand; and in the long-run the highest value for elasticity is 0.683 
(both cases are inelastic). In another model De Leeuw aggregated the excess 
reserves and borrowings equations into one single function to explain 
free reserves. The function is interest inelastic in the short-run 
and in the long-run.
23
K. Brunner and A. Meltzer,  ^have estimated the interest elasticity
of the money supply relationship using annual data for the period 1930-1959»
and quarterly data for the period 1949 I - 19^2 IV. The study uses both
definitions of money M2 and , three elasticities are revealed, the
elasticity of the public’s asset supply to banks with respect to the
interest rate, i, and the interest elasticities of the monetary and asset 
24multipliers. The results are due to ordinary least-squares estimates, 
and to two stage least-squares estimates. The main importance of their 
results are their findings that the elasticity of the money supply function 
with respect to the adjusted monetary base is insignificantly different 
from one. The Brunner, Meltzer study is really utilised to or can be 
interpreted as estimating the of the reserve multiplier. Using
M^ and TSLS the estimate of the Treasury bill rate elasticity is 0.657 
using annual data, (1929-1959)» using M2 gives 0.721 for elasticity.
The results show that the supply function always has a larger interest 
Elasticity than the M^ function, and regressions with adjusted base yield
2^K, Brunner and A. Meltzer, "Some Further Investigations of demand and 
supply functions for money" J.F. vol. 19, 19^4» p. 240-283
24ibid Table 2, p. 254
larger interest elasticities than those regressions involving an unadjusted
base. M without an adjusted base using TSLS shows an elasticity of
0.019 while with an adjusted base its elasticity is 0.657. M2 without
an adjusted base using TSLS shows an elasticity of O.276, and an elasticity
of 0.721 using an adjusted base. The D-W test gives poor support to the
Brunner, Meltzer study. The autocorrelation could have been caused by
the approximation involved in their procedure. The model in question
is a non-linear one, and the Durbin-Watson (D-W) test is inappropriate
for testing for higher order serial correlation or for other forms of
autocorrelation.^^
S.M. Goldfeld produced massive work on the equations of the demand
for excess reserves and the demand for borrowings from the Central Bank.
The results obtained by Goldfeld show large interest elasticities for the
borrowings equations, but the excess reserve interest elasticities are
negligible. The borrowing elasticities in the short-run are - 0.98
(discount rate) and 0.88 (Treasury Bill rate); in the long-run the
elasticities are - 2.382 (discount rate) and 2.134 (Treasury Bill rate),
using only City banks, country banks show similar elasticities as city
banks in the short-run, and a bit higher in the long-run. The elasticities
for currency demand are significantly less than one in the short-run and
the long-run (-0.008 to 0.14). The elasticities for time deposit demand
varies from 0.028 to -1.62. His findings support the idea that banks
26
respond quite quickly to disequilibrium in excess reserve holdings.
Most of the empirical estimates tell us that the money supply function
has a rather low interest elasticity.
25
A. Kautsoyiannis, Theory of Econometrics, Macmillan, London, 1973»
p. 209-210
26
S.M. Goldfeld,^Commercial Bank Behaviour and Economic Activity, 
Amsterdam, 1966 Look also S.M. Goldfeld and E.J. Kane "The 
Determinants of Member-Bank Borrowing: An Econometric Study", J.F. 
vol. 21, 1966.
The velocity of money is one of the important parts which constitute
the quantity theory of money. Our main object in this section is just
to analyse one of the most recent empirical models which deals with the
income velocity of money. Income velocity is equal to GNP divided by the
money stock. The use of income velocity is based on the monetary theory
which assumes that at a given time holders of money desire a certain ratio
of money to income and equilibrium income velocity is the inverse of this
27desired ratio. L.C. Andersen tested a monetary model of income
determination in order to observe movements in income velocity. The
theoretical model of income determination is based on the central postulate;
that the rate of change in nominal spending by households and business
firms for newly produced final goods and services responds to a discrepancy
between the rate of change in actual and desired nominal money balances.
The model treats the desire for nominal money balances as having two
functions or purposes^can be used to conduct market transactions and to be
held as a store of value. The demand for money balances is positively
related to the perceived price, and to the amount of goods and services
28that perceived nominal income can purchase.
Nominal income is taken to equal nominal spending for both domestic 
dand foreign product Y , spending by all units of government for both
domestic and foreign product G, foreign spending on domestic product X,
d.and IM (imports,): Y^ = + G^ + X^ . - 1^. ®odel consists of
three relationships, the above identity and weights involved in it, and 
of the change in the rate of change in spending by households and business 
firms which is equal to;
27L.C. Andersen, "Observed income velocity of money: A Misunderstood 
Issue in Monetary Policy", Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Review vol. 57,
Aug. 1975, p. 8-19
28L.C. Andersen, "A Monetary Model of Nominal Income Determination”, 
op. cit, June, 1975, p. 9-19.
* 'J?l.Yd = -/{0 lREt - “ K ^ rt J
dt
M being the desired nominal money balances,. E is the technical efficiency 
of the payments system, Yp the perceived level of nominal income, and r 
is the nominal short-term interest rate.
The above model is in terms of changes in time which are 
infinitesimally small while data on the variables are available only 
for discrete points in time separated by a month or a quarter of a year.
At the same time there are no measurements of the technical efficiency 
of the payments system - so it is assumed to increase at a constant rate.
A linear approximation in discrete time is used in order to deal with 
the first problem about discrete points in time. And the first difference 
of natural logarithms of a variable between two discrete points in time 
is presumed to approximate its rate of change.
The main purpose of the empirical model is to test whether the 
theoretical model can be accepted or not, and to test the ability of the 
model to forecast nominal income. The ability of the model to forecast 
is determined by dynamic simulations. The results (period used 1955-73) 
show a variability in the rate of change in the observed velocity.
This can be explained by the changes in the rates of change in money, 
government spending, and the interest rate. We also observe that the 
model simulation projects a 3*6 per cent annual rate of increase in observed 
velocity from 1955 I to 1966 IV the same as the actual increase. For 
the period 1966 IV to 1971 I there is a 0.5 per cent error in the 
forecasting of the observed velocity and a 0.4 per cent error for the 
period 1971 I to 1973 IV. The results finally tell us that neither 
short-run nor long-run movements in observed velocity, taken alone, provide 
evidence in the debate about the predictability of the response of income 
to a change in money growth.
The money supply process plays an important role in our economic
life, and is dependent on many variables, the banking system, the
central bank,the public, and the foreign sector. Some monetary
economists believe that the monetary base is the most important determinent
of the money stock, and so have developed various econometric models to test
29this idea. In fact according to A.E. Burger, J the empirical evidence 
supports the view that the growth rate of money would adjust to the 
growth rate of the monetary base if the central bank follows certain 
guidelines such as: (a) decide upon a growth path for money over a twelve­
month period; (bj control the growth of the monetary base at the same 
rate as the policy determined growth of money; (c) disregard the 
monthly errors in the growth of money, i.e. hold the growth of the base 
constant. The results obtained by A.E. Burger state quite clearly that 
in the short-run the growth of the monetary base will be substantially 
different from the growth rate of the money stock. In the long-run 
the deviations between the growth of the money stock and the monetary 
base are reduced significantly.
Many empirical attempts were made to estimate the degree of influence 
between the monetary base and the money stock, and the general view among 
the monetarists, simply states that the changes in the base contribute 
or influence to a very high degree the changes in the money stock. Some 
studies are used to test the ways through which the monetary base affects 
the amount of credit, and interest rates in a money market. Such a study 
was undertaken by A. Fazia for Italy, Fazict's model defines the monetary 
base in Italy to be made of currency, deposits held with the central bank, 
Treasury bills, liquid foreign assets held by banks, commercial discount5l
29 A.E. Burger, "The Relationship between Monetary Base and Money: How Close?" 
op. cit, October, 1975, P. 3-8.
30 A. Fazia, "Monetary Base and the control of Credit in Italy", Banca 
Nazionale Bel Lavoro Quarterly Review, vol. 22, 1969, p. 14^-169
by banks and issued for the financing of compulsory wheat stock pilings, 
and post office deposits. Italy is an open-economy and the inclusion of 
foreign liquid assets is a must, because they can be converted at any 
time into Italian currency. The supply of credit function is the following: 
CE +/£, BMBt + / 2 + ... + Y2^ t_1 + & Gt +<52Gt-l
CR is bank credit, BMB^ is the adjusted base, I) is a dummy variable and
G the level of interest rates (long-term bonds)• The results tell us
that the banks are very sensitive to change in the rate of interest,
and a change in the monetary base brings about only a limited change
in the effective amount of credit. The model is not really complete
and fails to tell us about the importance of the base in relation to the
rate of interest. The model is meant to study the affects of the monetary
base on credit and interest rates, the result is a model which is only
able to present an empirical support to the influence of the rate of interest
on the supply of credit in the short-run, and some support for a limited
influence by the monetary base.
A monetary model focusing on commercial banks' behaviour and their
influence on the stock of money through their demand for borrowed reserves
31is based on the following hypothesis,
oM + RD = f(P,A) , f1 (p)^ > o , f1(A) < o
where p is the net return to bank credit expansion and A equals total 
bank reserves (R), oM is open market, and RD are rediscounts. The 
hypothesis can be produced in a more sophisticated form: 
oM + RD = aQ + a.jp-a2 (T+F-C+L) + u; o < a 2^ 1 .  
where T + F -  C +  L = A° = adjusted non-borrowed reserves. T is the Bank
of France's advances to the Treasury, F is foreign assets, c is currency
o ^and L is legally required reserves - A could be replaced by A which
is entirely independent of any bank recourse to oM and RD i.e. A* is tied
31
Jacques Meltiz, "Some Results concerning the French Money Supply",
April, 1973 unpublished paper.
to oM and RD. This model uses (M^ + Time deposits) and assumes 
that the ratio of currency to money remains constant even when there is 
a change in the borrowed reserves thus having the following relationship:
C* ■ Ct-1 + Z h  - t-1 J M2 + ,— ' 0—1
The statistical analysis used quarterly data for the period 1959 I “
1971 IV inclusive. And the results show a striking feature of the French
conditions, there is great significance for bank profits and for unborrowed
reserve base in determining the supply of money in France.
In an open economy the net capital flows influence a country’s
32stock of foreign reserves and its monetary base. M. Willms presented 
the German case in relation to two different hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis argues that in an open economy, a country with continuous ,- 
balance of payments surpluses unable to control the money supply 
without an adjustment in the exchange rate. This argument assumes a rather 
high interest elasticity of international capital flows. The second 
hypothesis assumes a rather low interest elasticity of international 
capital flows, and argues that the monetary authorities can control the 
money stock in an open economy even under a system of fixed exchange rates. 
The finai decision is based on empirical evidence.
The model used by M. Willms is a money multiplier model, with net 
base Bn and m11 as the money multiplier, h.B as bank credit, and kB as the
credit multiplier, we have the following:
n -Dn , _JB . B _,n ’M = m .B and K = k . B
where Bn = B - DB + (FAB - FLB) + (FAP - FLP)
B BB is the monetary base, DB = discount borrowings FA and FL are short­
term foreign assets and liabilities respectively of commercial banks,
p p
FA and FL are foreign assets and liabilities respectively of non-bank 
public (short-term). The interest elasticity of the money supply according 
32
M. Willms, "Controlling Money in an open Economy: The German Case",
Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis Review vol. 53> 1971» p.10-27
to this model is determined by the interest elasticities of the money
multiplier, the bank credit multiplier and the demand for bank credit
by the public. In the regressions the market interest rate is a function
only of the net monetary base and national income, while the money supply
is a function of the net monetary base, real non-human wealth, the rate
of change in the price level, and the domestic money market rate.
The results of the regression estimates the money supply elasticity
to be equal to 0.77» so we may conclude that for the estimated period
i960 II - 1970 II the Bundesbank had control over the money supply.
Such a statement is only true for the average of the period under consideration
which includes two revaluations of the German Mark against the Dollar, It
seems that commercial banks respond to changes in domestic and foreign
interest rates, particularly with respect to short-term foreign assets,
and discount borrowings. In an open economy the monetary authorities are
able to act or respond to changes in the total amount of foreign reserves
by adjusting the components of the monetary base:
^  (B - PR) = + / 2 £  FR,
FR = Foreign reserves at the central bank. According to the results
(period used 1958 I - 1970 II) the monetary authorities on average offset
about 86 Marks out of each 100 mark change in foreign reserves through
opposite changes in the domestic component of the monetary base.
33Another model was presented by J. Sieb^e to study the 
contribution of three sectors to changes in the money supply. The 
model is used to derive a money multiplier and is dependent on the
Mbehaviour of the monetary authorities, the commercial banks and the public.*'
33J. Siebljj&e,, "An analysis of the German Money Supply Process: the multiplier 
approach". Instiut fur gesellschafts - und wirtschaft swissenschaften, Bonn.
34 +The money supply equations is: M = m.B , where m is the money multiplier
T>+B the adjusted monetary base.
While the multiplier itself is dependent on the reserve ratio, the liquid 
assets ratio, and the ratio of hanks1 borrowing to deposits. Accordingly 
the central hank controls only indirectly the money supply by inducing 
movements in the multiplier, that is by influencing borrowing of banks
and their holdings of liquid assets. But it can influence the supply
i i
of base money directly by changing reserve requirements. In Sieb^y^’s 
model the portfolio decisions of banks plays an important role in 
determining the money supply function. The portfolio decisions are responsive 
to changes in the interest rates, the policy variables of the monetary 
authorities, and to structural changes in the financial assets holding of 
non-banks, 0
In a paper presented at the University of Surrey Conference on 
the West German monetary development, M.J.M. Neuman^ used a non-linear 
money supply hypothesis to analyse the money supply process in an open- 
economy. The money supply process and the development of the 
money stock, bank credit and interest rates are explained simultaneously 
by the interaction of commercial banks and the public in the credit market, 
subject to constraints imposed on them by the monetary authorities. The 
monetary base as defined by Neumannincludes liberated reserves (LJ in 
order to account for the required reserve policy, and the extended base 
is:
Be = R + C + L,
g
The extended base B was adjusted by subtracting from it RF, and foreign
sliabilities, so we get another monetary base B (adjusted); RF = borrowing
0
through rediscounting. Accordingly we have two money multipliers, m the
siextended multiplier, and m the adjusted multiplier. The money supply 
can be expressed as the product of a multiplier and the respective base:
0  0  Si cL
M «*■ m .B ; M = m .B . The empirical testing of the hypothesis 'shows that 
35M.J.M. Reumanyi| 11A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the German Money 
supply process, 1958~1972n, paper presented at the University of Surrey 
conference on West German Monetary Developments, July, 1974*
0 0 cl cl
m and B are more stable than m B . Generally speaking 
0 a
for both B and B , (th'e contribution of the domestic public to the long-
run growth of the money supply was found to be rather negligible. On the
other hand the contribution of the international reserve flows-empirically
constituted the most important determinant of the German monetary growth,
for the period 1958-1972.
The results show a high positive interest responsiveness of
commercial banks' borrowing from the Bundesbank. The average contribution
to monetary growth through selling of bills and mobilisation paper was
during periods of rising interest rates more than double the contribution
during periods of decreasing interest rates, banks reduced their borrowing
drastically, thus contributing negatively to monetary growth.
A money supply function was postulated by treating the mnney
stock as an endogenous variable and taking as exogenous the magnitudes
over which the Deutsche Bundesbank has more direct control. Then the
model of the monetary sector was integrated with a macroeconomic
relationship focusing on the real sector, and econometric techniques
3 6
were used for the estimation of the whole model.
The supply of money function used by Frowen and Arestis is:
M, . = m + m_ r. + nu r,:. + nu B„ t o I t  2 dt 3 2
where = M^t, = M^ plus time deposits with maturities of less
than four years, seasonally adjusted, DM millions. M = money supply.
B^_ = Central Bank money stock, which is currency in circulation
and minimum reserves on domestic liabilities.
= r^, is the average money market rate on three-months
loans in Frankfurt and the net rate of three-months loans in the Euro­
dollar market. The reasons for using r ^  are; a) .because it is a 
36
Frowen, S.F., and Arestis, P., "Some Investigations of Demand and Supply 
Functions For Money in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1965 to 197^n)
Weitwirtschaf tli che s Archiv, 1976, pp. 136-16^ and Frowen, S.F. and 
Arestis, P., "The Demand for and Supply of Money in the Federal Republic 
of Germany: 1965 to 197^"? in Frowen, S.F., Courakis, A.S. and Miller, M.H. 
(eds) Monetary Policy and Economic Activity in West Germany,
(Surrey University Press, 1977) pp- 129-1^6.
short term rate, b) the three-months money market rate is supposed to
reflect the going rate charged on bank credit, and c) the Euro-dollar
rate,' can be thought of as a measure of the degree of substitution
37between domestic and foreign financial assets.
r,, = discount rate of the Deutsche Bundesbankdt
B^_ and r ^  are treated as exogenous variables determined by the Bundesbank, 
and r ^  is treated as an endogenous variable determined by the forces 
} of supply and demand for money.
Frowen and Arestis hypothesised to be positively related 
to r ^  and argue that since ceteris paribus one should expect the 
banks to expand their earning assets when market interest aates rise, 
thus increasing the money supply; and the same should also happen .
when the base money increases.38
The real sector is represented by an income determination 
equation, where the real sector is assumed to be a fflnction of the money 
stock, autonomous expenditure and lagged income, thus we have:
rt = * o  +* l Mt + ^ 2 Et + “ h - 1
Y^ . being real GNP, and is tue sum of govex-nment expenditure, investment
and exports. They argue that changes in monetary conditions affect
income in two . vays; a) through consumption, and b) through investment
via cuanges in tue rate of interest, /investment x's treated as an
exogenous element/. The reasons for treating investment as part of E^ _,
ana Y^_ as a function of M  ^ax-e, "because changes in tne short-term
rare which the Modsl accounts fur mast work through the whole spectrum
of intex-est rates before the impact on investment is felt, and
consequently there must be a lag here before investment decisions are
39influenced which will affect tne level of xncome."
37Ibid, p .157
38Ibid, p.158
39Ibid p.158-159
The supply of money function and the income determination
equation were combined with a demand for money function and two-stage
least square techniques were used t<? estimate the system. showed
a very strong relationship with the money supply, and as used could
be though of as being determined by the same variables as the money
supply. A more suitable definition of B^_ may include free liquid
reserves where B* is equal to the monetary base plus liquidity reserves.
The authors also argue that r ^  definition of the short-term rate of
interest is not the relevant one, and r ^  should be used instead of
r^. r ^  being the money market rate on three-months loans in Frankfurt.
M.,, r7J and B* were tested empirically, and the results showed an • J-U t
Z|0
improvement in the t-statistics of r ^  and B* variables. But the
. ..free liquid reserves came out to-be insignificant /according to t-statistics
of 1.107. This may be explained by the fact that even though the
Bundesbank at times was able to control bank lending via changes in
free liquid reserves, the variations in the stock of money often tended
to be affected more by international capital movements during periods
of fixed exchange rates.
According to the empirical results of Frowen and Arestis
the money-supply function provides satisfactory and encouraging
estimates. The discount rate is significant, and their results support
the argument that the Bundesbank can have a strong influence on the money
stock by pursuing a conscious discount rate policy. And also the German
monetary authorities can have a powerful impact on the money stock via
Al
changes in the base money which they are assumed to control. Their
most significant result snows a strong relationship between r ^  and
M^, and between r ^  and And the only variable in the supply function
Ibid, see pages 159 and l6l
At
Ibid p.162
which is not under the control.of the monetary authorities is r ^  or 
r,.. Finally the authors conclude that the money-supply function is 
shown to be well explained by tne short-term interest rate, along with 
other variables, and there is a strong link between the monetary sector 
and the real sector via some interest rate.
The short-run money supply(Concept gives the supply response 
on the assumption that the public's demand for currency in circulation
outside the banks' vaults C, and for time deposits at all commercial
42banks is restricted.
Ms = f/X, rb; T, C: 17
where Y is the vector of rear sector variables; /GNP, DI and
durable consumption/1 X is a vector ox policy controlled variables such
as tne monetax-y base, cliscuunt rate, and x-esox-ve x-equirement on bank
43deposits, r^ xs tne treasury bill rate. The above function assumes 
that all variables in tne real sector of the economy, including stocks 
of real assets and flows such as consumption and investment are held 
constant.
The M^ function can be represented in a different form
M s = f/X, rb , 6o/aM , M / J|M 17
Tnis form makes Iz possible to have additional adjustments by permitting
* 44
the autonomous components of currency and time deposits to vary. The
above two M functions are defined so as to permit only short-run leakages, s
and The M concept is dependent on the public behaviour which is definedS'
by their holding of currency, and time deposits, and on the banks'
behaviour which is defined by free reserve adjustment and the supply
of demand deposits, and on the vector X. The empirical results derived
from these two M functions seem to support the view that money is an s
45independent factor.
4p
D. Fafld, "Some Implications of Money Supply Analysis", A.E.R., 1967? 
Papers and Proceedings, p.384.
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See S. Goldfeld, op. cit.
44See Brunner and Meltzer, op. ext.
*^ D. Fand, op. cit. p. 38?.
The money supply concept has been defined in such a way 
so as to measure the movements in the stock of money in response to 
adjustments in the entire financial sector. "To derive this money supply 
we solve all the equations in the financial sector simultaneously. . 
Variables such as the Treasury bill rate and the rate on time deposits 
which are endogenous to the financial sector will therefore be determined
' hG
, and can no longer enter as arguments in the money supply function."
The money supply function which is a reduced form for the entire
range of financial assets while holding the variables in tne real
economy constant uakes the following form:
■ M =• f/X, Y7 
s
it measures the supply.response due to a change in any of the policy 
.. controlled variables including tneir effect on other endogenous variables 
in uhe financial sector. If we allow some substitution between demand
deposits and time deposits, and currency, and we could obtain a M'* • s
equation with an estimate of tne substitution possibilities in the form:
T = T(rb)
C = 0(r )b
givenl Ms f/X, rb,
then M = s f/X, rb ,
and since T(r, ) b
= T(X)
C(rb) = C(X)
rb
'—
'
• 
^II
then M = f/x, Y7
and if Y = Y(X) ‘
Then M = f(X) is a reduced form equation for both the financial s •
and the real sector. The elasticities for this money supply equation
Ibid, p.389
and for those of M = f/X, Y7 were calculated by De Leeuw, Goldfeld,S — —
*47
and Teigen, M, was used for money. The elasticities of M, with respect 
to the discount rate r, ranged /for the equation M = f/X, Y7 / fromQ — S
-0.00*4- 1,0 -0.028, and for M = f(X) the elasticities of M_ withs 1
respect to r^ ranged from -0.008 to -0.(066. The empirical results 
of these money supply equations show that the elasticities of tne money 
supply with respect to the interest rate /discount rate7 are all
*4-8less than one. The elasticities of with respect to tne monetary
base are as follows; Brunner and Meltzer O.76, 0.8*f, 0.6*4/ and 0.3*4-7*
Goldfeld 2.28, 1.11, and 0.88, and Teigen’s 3.85, 2.22, and 1.10.
These results tell us tnat is more responsive to changesm the
monetary base than to changes in the discount rate.
The monetary base as used by Brunner and Meltzer and tne
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.includes the effect of deposits
shifting between banks with different reserve requirements.. However,
such monetary base does not include the effect of shTpts7 in deposits
between demand and time deposits or between member and non-member banks,
and this Base distorts the effect of Federal Reserve policy actions
on the growth in the money supply during periods when reserve requirements
do not change. This recurs because the rai,e of growth in B + L will
not, in general, be equal to the rate of growth in B during these 
lf.g
periods. L being liberated reserves.
*4-7See S. Goldfeld, op. cit., and R. Teigen "Demand and Supply Functions
for Money in the U.S.: Some Structural Estimates", Econometricet, Oct. 196*4-
*18 ‘
See Brunner and Meltzer, op. cit.
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Peter A. Frost, "Short-run Fluctuations in the Money Multiplier and 
Monetary Control", Journal of Money Credit, and Banking, Feb. ±97J 1 p.168.
Peter Frost shows that the rate of growth in the monetary 
base will understate the expansionary effect of an increase in the 
source base if the cumulated sum of the liberated reserves is positive, 
aud overstate tne expansionary effect of an increase in the source base 
if the comulated sum of liberated reserves is negative.
dln(B+L) dB/dT ^ dB/dT dlnB T >  ^
— —  = s n  ?  b = “  as L ? °
50•Frost suggests an alternative logarithmic reserve adjustment variable.
dln(B + L*) d In B _ d^
dT ~ dT ” r dT
G =■ -l(r + k), r is the reserve ratio, and k is the currency ratio
L* is the reserve adjustment variable, and the.behaviour of the reserve
adjustment variable can be seen by the following equation:
dL* = L* dB +(B + t,) dT
dr B dc dr
T is the cumulative sum of -G^ during periods when reserve requirements 
dT
do not change is zero and consequently, the percentage change in L*
is equal to tie percentage change in B. As a result, B and B + L*
grow at the same rate. Empirical results show a substantial difference
.between L and L*, but "this difference, does not indicate which reserve
adjustment variable, when added to the source base, gives the more accurate
51reflection of Federal Reserve action.”
Frost's results show that short-run fluctuations in the
monetary multiplier played an important role in determining year to year
52fluctuations in’ the rate of growth in the money supply. The money
multiplier is m = (l + k)/ (r + k) and M = mB
The results also show tue relative contributions of several determinants 
of the rate of growth of the money supply for each year from 1961-7 ,^
Wnich are tne currency ratio, the monetary base, and the reserve ratio.
The currency ratio according to tne empirical results is an important
5°Ibid p.169-171 
51Ibid p .172 
^^Ibid Table 2, p.17^
determinant of the cyclical movements in the rate of growtu of the money 
supply. The monetary base B and B + Lm came out to be more related 
to changes in the money supply than the currency ratio, and the reserve 
ratio for the period 1961-197^ (for the U.S.A.)
Before developing and resting my macroeconomic model for the 
Lebanese money supply, it is important to note that:
. . a) I am aware tnat there are other possible methods and models
to study the influence of the Central Bank, tne commercial banking systems, 
the public and the foreign sector on the money supply, than the model 
used in Chapter III of this thesis.
b) A sample of the other models /applied to other countries 
than the Lebanon/ has been presented analytically in the last section 
..of. tnis chapter.
The main reasons for using a macroeconomic model based on 
the relationship between tne monetary base and the money supply with 
the money multiplier as the link are:
1 - Because a macroeconomic model in this form makes it possible 
to analyse the many factors that influence both the monetary base and 
the base multiplier which are linked to the money supply; and are
the activities of the commercial banks, the Bank of Lebanon, the public 
and the foreign sector.
2 - We can also use the metnod followed in Chapter III to analyse 
and trace specifically the influence of the foreign sector on the monetary 
base in the Lebanon.
5 - The macroeconomic models which use multiple equations such as 
the consumption function, income, investment and saving functions, 
and the demand and supply of money, require tne use of data on interest 
rates and return on various Treasury bills and local authority bills for 
empirical testing; such as
short-term bond rates
long-term bond rates 
Treasury bill rates
Unfortunately we do not have a bond market in tne Lebanon. 
Therefore, I do not think it is realistic to cfevelop a macro-model 
and test it empirically for the Lebanon, if its equations include 
certain variables which are rates'of return on Treasury bills and 
short-term, and long-term bonds, for they do not exist in the Lebanon.
Chapter II
The Financial Institutions of the Lebanon 
The central bank of the Lebanon is the Bank of Lebanon, 
established in April 1964.
The other financial institutions can be divided into the 
following:categories:
I Commercial banks 
II Semi-public financial institutions
(a) The Agricultural, Industrial and Real Estates Credit Bank, and
(b) The National Bank for Industrial and Touristic Development 
III Other private financial institutions
I The Commercial Banks in the Lebanon
At the end of 1974 there were 74 commercial banks operating 
in the Lebanon. These are divided into three groups.
1. Banks owned mainly by non-Arabs
2. Banks owned mainly by Arabs
3. Banks owned mainly by Lebanese
These three groups of banks are wholly owned by the private sector of 
the economy.
The main activities of the commercial banks in the Lebanon 
are divided into two fields, firstly the field of accepting deposits, 
and secondly the field of lending. The liabilities side of the banks' 
balance sheet shows that deposits are divided into (a) demand deposits
and (b) time and foreign currency deposits.^ The published figures include
so-called secret deposits, i0e„ deposits about which no information 
regarding ownership is obtainable.
The commercial banks' activities in the field of lending are 
divided into lending to the private sector and lending to the government. 
Lending to private individuals consists of short-term loans. Lending to 
the business sector is composed of two types of credits: overdrafts, 
and short-term loans. There is a clear lack of medium-term and long-term 
loans to the private sector. The Lebanese public authorities finance 
themselves partly by borrowing from the commercial banks. For the period 
1965-1974 the amount borrowed by the government from the commercial banks 
amounted to roughly 1.5% of the total borrowed by the private sector.
Ownership of the commercial banks in the Lebanon and the names 
of the main shareholders of each bank are as follows:
^~IMF International Financial Statistics, Oct. 1975, p.237
Group I - Banks Owned Mainly by non-Arab Foreigners
Name of Bank Main Shareholders Shared
The Bank of Lebanon B.K. de Paris et Des Pays Bas 70%
and Syria
The Franco-Lebanese CIE, Francoise de Suez 70%
Bank Trankhaus et Burkhart 6%
The General Lebanese STE Generale de Baft^ ue 2g%
Company Bruxelles
Sebay Bank Banque de l'indocline 25%
Banco Commerciale Italiana 25%
The French Bank of Banque de l'indocline 70%
the Middle East
Trad Bank Credit Lyonnais 45%
British Bank of the British Bank of the 070
Middle East Middle East
Leetex Bank BK Bulgare de Commerce 98.5%
The First National The First National 96%
Bank of Chicago Bank of Chicago
Royal Bank of Canada Royal Bank of Canada 9 %
The Lebanese-Pakistan 
Bank
Reef Bank
Machrek Bank
United Bank LTD 
(Karachi)
Commerz Bank (V/.G.)
Morgan Garantee
95$°
w °
40$
Trans-Eastern Bank Kesmit Roosveld 
INT. Trust co of Liberia, 
INT. Bank of Washington 80°/o
Continental Illinois 
Nat. BK Trust Co.
Credit Suisse
Rabieh Bank
Continental Illinois 
Nat. BK Trust Co.
Credit Suisse
Chemical Bank N.Y.
60a/o 
80^ o
AOfo
Mediterane Bank
ItifS^ad Bank
Fidelity Bank
United California Bank c
Group II - Banks Owned Mainly by Arabs
Name of Bank Shareholders
Bank of Egypt and
Lebanon Egypt
The Bank of Beirut and
the Arab Countries Saudi Arabia
Bank of Beirut and Riad Saudi Arabia
Bank
Reef Bank 
Machrek Bank 
Awda Bank
Iraq, Kuwait, S.A. and 
Jordan
Kuwait
Kuwait and Ratar 
Kuwait
eop/o
AJlo
shares 
over 907& 
4070
20f
80fo
50Jo 
50% 
50"/o
Group III - Banks Owned Mainly by Lebanese
The Lebanese ‘Sank for Commerce, The United'Lebanese Bank, Saradar Bank, 
Farhon and Shiha Bank, Byblos Bank, Adcom Bank, the Lebanese BraziLian Bank, 
the Lahor and Industrial Bank, Bank of Beirut for Commerce, the Lebanese 
African Bank, Gagah Bank, Majdalani Bank, Cedar Bank, Liberal Bank,
Beelsa Bank, Mahjar Bank and some other smaller banks.
The banks’share of the money market can be divided into three different
sections:
Section A Total Loans 4171 million LL Total deposits 
6235 million LL
non-Arab Foreign Banks 28.03% 27.11%
Lebanese banks - main 
shareholders non-Arab 
Foreign banks
32.05% 29.88%
Section B
Arab Banks 7*32% 11*7%
Lebanese Banks - main 
shareholders Arab Banks 10.7% 11.31%
Section C
Lebanese Banks - huu^  
staredVers Leiahese
21.9%
100%
20%
100%
The above figures were taken from Al-Nahar paper 26.1.1974* According 
to the figures shown in sections A, B and C the foreign banks control 
about ^ 8.10% of the lending market, and about 80% of the commercial bank 
deposits. Lebanese banks have only 21.9% of tie-lending market and 20% of 
bank deposits. One of the main characteristics of banks operating in 
the Lebanon is their heierogeneity. They range from banks with half a 
billion L.L. in deposits to those v/ith four million L.L.
It seems that* one of the weaknesses of the Lebanese banking system
has been the financial assets side. Commercial banking in the Lebanon
has been offered limited opportunities for portfolio diversifications
in domestic financial assets. Banks in the Lebanon have shown some
willingness to invest in illiquid assets and to undertake a certain
amount ofrisk by speculating in the foreign exchange market.
Table 1 shows the development of the commercial banks’ assets over
the period 1965-1975• It tells us that commercial banks in the Lebanon
have high liquidity with reserves and foreign assets. Prom 1967
foreign assets grew more rapidly than claims on the private sector around
1970 they became of equal importance. Due to unexpected fluctuations in
exchange rates and buoyant domestic demand the banks became less willing
9
to invest in the foreign markets. The Lebanese pound showed relative
stability during the period 1971-1975* this plus^the fact that the Bank
of Lebanon has been willing to accumulate foreign exchange made it possible
for the commercial banks to treat their foreign assets or consider them
to be-equivalent to cash. The division of commercial banks according to
three groups shows up that r' : pjost of the strong banks in the
Lebanese market (group I and group II) are owned mainly by big non-Lebanese
banks that operate in America and Europe. These big banks are able to
to
increase or decrease their foreign assets as they wish, while the bank of 
Lebanon might influence their decisions by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market. Such an action is not always possible, because in some 
cases it would be unadvisable to change the exchange, rate thus influencing 
the Lebanese Balance of Payments. There are times when an intervention 
in the exchange market might reduce exports and increase imports or viCG ver
% ’his holds for the period 1972-1975 where the Lebanese pound appreciated 
vis-a-vis the dollar about 22% 
inDuring the 1970*s foreign a s s e t s a b o u t  20fo - 2 %  of total deposits, 
this might be due to the lack of alternatives for investment such as 
the bond market.
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The commercial banking system in the Lebanon is affected by the
lack of facilities. The Bank of Lebanon tends to discourage
access to 'ceiisioontjn^  ^except in emergencies, by setting fairly low quotas
11for individual banks. The data available shows banks with total assets 
of around 300 million L.L. and have only 15 million LL quotas. The Lebanese 
market really has a big shortage of bills which are eligible for refinancing.
Tables 2 and 3 use the period 1967-1974 and show the banks assets 
in West Germany and Italy. Both West Germany and Italy are open economies 
and their banks have a fair amount of Foreign Assets. Table 4 is derived 
from Tables 1, 2 and 3 and isdivided into two sections or parts. The 
first section represents the Foreign Assets as a percentage of Banks 
Total Assets /Lebanon, West Germany and Italy/, while the second or lower 
section represents Foreign Assets as a percentage of total bank loans
for the same countries. According to table 4 the Lebanese Commercial banks
hold a very high proportion of their assets in the form of Foreign Assets; 
in 1972 foreign assets were about 44.7% of banks total assets the lowest 
is 34.7% for 1967 and 34«9% for 1974. If we consider the lower part of 
Table 4 we find that Foreign Assets of the banks in the Lebanon in 1971 
were 95.4% of total bank loanSv'(the lowest value is 56.670 - 1967).
The West German and the Italian cases are different, the highest 
value for West German Foreign Assets when taken as a percentage of total 
bank assets is 13.8% -  1970, and the lowest is 5.6%. For Italy the highest 
is 15*7$ - 1972, and the lowest is 6.8% in 1967. In the case of foreign 
assets taken as a percentage of total bank loans, the highest for West 
German banks is 10.7% 19^9 and the lowest is 6% - 1973; for Italy the
highest is 21.9% for 1973 and the lowest is 8% for 1967. L 5
11Figures produced by the Bank of Leoanon
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From. Table 4 we can draw two main conclusions:
(a) The commercial banks in the Lebanon hold a high
proportion of their total assets in the form of
liquid assets. The bulk of these consists of foreign 
assets as the domestic money market does not offer enough 
or sufficiently diversified investment opportunities.
(b) Commercial banks in the Lebanon have been able to
treat their foreign assets as equivalent to cash,
as the Bank of Lebanon is always prepared to exchange 
these against cash and/or central bank deposits.
Graph 1 shows two curves for the period 1965-1974, it is based on
quarterly data in millions of Lebanese pounds, the iipper curve represents
the commercial banks' total deposits and the lower curve represents the
commercial banks’ loans or claims on the private sector. It seems that
over the period 1965-1974 both total deposits and bank loans moved almost
in identical paths. Both curves show a minor peak in the third quarter
15
of 1966, after that they show a drop up till the end of 1967* The 
curves have another minor peak in 1968 III and a fall or sudden drop in 
the end of 1968, but they grow steadily over 1969 and 1970, and from 1971 
till 1974 we observe a rather high increase in both total deposits and 
bank loans.
Table 5 Is divided into two sections, the upper section represents
banks’ total loans, for Lebanon, West Germany and Italy, while the lower
section gives us the percentage of total loans with respect to total
bank assets for the same countries. The three countries are open-
economies and are subject to capital inflows and outflows, the main purpose
of the comparison is only to show the contributions of bank loans to the 
16
banks' assets. The lowest percentage for the Lebanon is 46.5^ in 1971 > 
and the highest is 6I.5/0 during 1967. The lowest for West Germany is 8Sfo 
in 1970 and the highest is 89.4ft in 1967* The highest for Italy is 88.^ 
for 1968, and the lowest is 76.^0 for 1973* The Lebanese banks as argued 
before have placed a great proportion of their assets in the form of foreign 
assets, thus are left with a relatively low proportion of assets to lend.
15The drop in bank deposits and banks' claims on the private sector is 
due to the Intra-bank crisis
16The three mentioned countries have different economies, this 
makes comparisons almost unrealistic, but we are only interested in 
the Banks' assets and their total claims.
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Some bankers in the Lebanon argue that commercial banks in the Lebanon
have more deposits than they can absorb i.e. the Lebanese economy is
not sophisticated enough to absorb these deposits. Banks in the Lebanon
are " ;:r r. i - * invest./^^ in the Euro-dollar market for the
rate of return in that market is higher than it is in the Lebanese market,
9nd therefore have less resources to lend in the Lebanon. West Germany
and Italy have heavy industries and relatively bigger capacities to absorb
capital than the Lebanese economy, perhaps this explains partly the higher
percentages shown in Table 5 ^y ‘West Germany and Italy.
The commercial banks’ overall lending must be'well spread.
The banker usually advances to various kinds of customers. The banker
is aware of the following points 1 - the current level of interest rates,
2 - the risk involved in investment and 3 - "the speed with which the invested
17capital can be withdrawn. Table 6 uses the period 1970-1973 and presents
the commercial banks’ claims on the private sector in the Lebanon. Loans
are divided among Trade and services, Agricultural industry, construction
and loans to other financial institutions. Trade and services had the
lion's share of bank loans around 53*5% for the period 1970-73, while
industry has around 17% of total loans, and agriculture has only about
4.8fo of total bank loans. Such allocation of credit is really expected
in an economy which is highly dependent on trade and services.
ik
Table 7 shows the distribution of assets of commercial banks by 
credit instrument in the Lebanon. The most striking observation is the 
limited importance of various types of bonds and bills. Bills and bonds
when taken as a percentage of Tht . assets vary between 9% and 12% ^ or
the period 1969-1972, while bank cash for 1971 and 1972 was about 22% 
of The ..'_v assets. Securities have been even less important, they-average 
3% of assets for 1969-72, and shares are virtually negligible.
17The higher the risk is the higher the rate of return should be.
■fcvForeign Assets not included, j
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Advances are the most important form of assets, 59$ of Tht assets for
1972, this is mainly due to two reasons. The first reason is the unpopularity
of honds in the Lebanon. Bills and bonds are not popular, because banks
must pay about 0.2^ stamp tax on each bill, and since tax is maturity-sensitive
means that short-term paper is highly discouraged. If 50 day paper were
18rolled over ten times, the stamp tax would add up to 2/> in extra cost.
The second reason is really the absence of a solid Treasury Bill market 
in the Lebanon.
The end result lead banks to lend mainly in the form of advances 
and overdrafts. The prime lending rates have been low, due to the 
high degree of competition in the Lebanon caused by the great number of 
banks operating in Beirut. The rest of the assets are held in the forms 
of foreign assets and reserves.
The commercial banks have certain rates which will be changed on 
loans and they are related to the rates obtainable on other alternative 
assets that banks could hold and to the liquidity of their existing portfolio 
in order to obtain preferred combinations of return and risk in the management 
of banks portfolio. If the money market can provide bonds in the Lebanon 
then the commercial banks will be furnished with alternatives which are 
earning assets with very low risk, and so the banks will want to charge 
higher rates on leans.
18Another reason given by the banks is the customers * unwillingness to 
utilise bills for they wish to avoid detailed records of their 
credit operations.
2 - The Lebanese Semi-Public Financial Institutions
In the Lebanon there are two semi-public financial institutions, 
the Agricultural Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank - AIRECB - and the 
National Bank for Industrial and Touristic Development - NBITD
(a) The Agricultural Industrial and Real Estate Credit Bank
The AIRECB"s capital is 40% owned by. the government, and
60% by the private sector. It has a paid up capital of 50 million LL
and derives its resources in three ways:
i Deposits of banks
ii Funds arising from refinancing with the Bank of Lebanon.
iii Funds provided by government
The AIRECB was established in order to provide loans to "socially 
desirable projects" in the agricultural and industrial sectors of the 
Lebanese economy. The law provides for the bank to lend for periods 
up to 12 years, but in practice most of its long-term credits cover 
periods from 5 to 8 years. Its rates of interest charged are regulated 
by the authorities i.e. the lending rate to agriculture is not allowed 
to exceed AIRECB"s special discount rate with the Bank of Lebanon by 
more than 3.5%
Agricultural loans were originally limited by law to 60,000 LL
per person or per project, but the demand for such loans has been so high
that the limit was reduced to 30,000 LL. AIRECB is entitled, within 
certain limits, to create a large number of cheap loans to encourage 
industrial and agricultural output.
AIRECB, like any other commercial bank, is capable of causing 
changes in the money supply by expanding its volume of lending.
(b) The National Bank for Industrial and Touristic Development
The National Bank for Industrial and Touristic Development 
was originally thought of in the 1960s as a result of apparent 
unwillingness of the banking system to provide medium and long-term 
financing for domestic, investment.
The original concepts of establishing a finance company under 
state control received so much criticism from the private sector that 
eventually a compromise was reached according to which the 49% of the share 
capital of NBITD is held by the private sector and 51% by the government.
The NBITD is explicitly forbidden to engage in refinancing activities, and 
is not allowed to receive time deposits from any source for less than two- 
years.
The role of the National Bank for Industrial and Touristic 
Development is to generate new projects and help new ventures. Unfortunately 
the NBITD's activities can be vetoed by the Council of Ministers, thus 
hampering the NBITD's role in the financial market, in fact the NBITD's 
rates of rejection for new projects has been very high.
The NBITD is allowed to issue bonds, receive time deposits 
for periods of not less than two years (as mentioned above) and to grant 
loops to commercial bankscx| the statutes of the NBITD remain; unchanged, 
with the Council of Ministers retaining the power to veto its activities, 
then it does not have a very promising future, and a rather high proportion 
of the demand for loans to start new industrial and touristic projects 
will remain unsatisfied.
The effect of the NBITD's activities on the money supply 
does not appear to be very clear. However, since the NBITD did not 
play.any important role in the financial market until 1975 it appears 
that the NBITD's contribution to changes in the Lebanese money supply 
has in any case been rather negligible.
3 “ Other private Financial Institutions
Before 197& there were no financial institutions providing 
medium and long-term loans wholly owned by the private sector operating 
in the Lebanon, although the law authorising and regulating such 
institutions has been in existence since 1967. The 1967 law was enacted 
principally in response to the collapse of Intra Bank and with the aim of 
encouraging the specialisation of long-term financial operations within 
different sets of financial institutions. The authorities decided to 
issue licences for the establishment of up to four credit banks specialising 
in the provision of medium and long-term loans, but only two institutions 
in this category started their operations in 1972. One is the long-term 
credit bank which is owned by foreign financial institutions, with a 
35% share held by a local bank; this financial institution issues 
certificates of deposits to be placed principally with Arab institutional 
and individual investors, and it conducts project financing and Euro­
currency lending on both the regional and international level. The second 
of the long-term credit banks operating so far is the Bank of the 
Near East which is organised by a group of domestic and foreign insurance 
companies, and is mainly concerned with the provision of mortgage finance 
to individual home-buyers and with conducting limited amounts of long-term 
domestic lending. Unfortunately there are no other financial institutions 
dealing with mortgages to finance individual home buyers.
It is the task of the credit banks specialising in longer term 
loans to expand the flow of medium and long-term funds to Lebanese 
corporations and enterprises^ The demand for long-term funds by Lebanese 
corporations is not high, and existing demand for explicitly fixed-term 
loans is currently being adequately provided for by the commercial banks.
The relatively limited development of a market for long-term domestic 
securities and for certificates of deposit of maturities longer than one 
year can entail an average interest cost of between 6% and 7.5% for borrowings 
by long-term credit banks from the public. This in turn implies an average
loan cost for term loans taken up by non-banks of about 10%. This compared 
to a current prime rate (1973) of about 8% would make it difficult to 
induce term borrowings by Lebanese investors who for the reason mentioned 
above may not be prepared to pay a higher rate for the advantages of a 
longer term loan. Up till 1975 the credit banks operating in the longer 
term loan market have not been able to influence to any marked degree 
the volume of medium and long-term borrowing. The medium and long-term 
credit banks are a new phenomena in the Lebanese financial market and 
the monetary authorities have not encouraged a more rapid growth in the 
number and size of these institutions.
Apart from these institutions there are about 90 small 
Financial Companies whose main function is lending to small business 
men and to consumers. These financial companies are not under the direct 
control of the Central Bank and they are not required to hold any legal 
reserves with the Bank of Lebanon; they rediscount their bills with 
commercial banks, and their share of the loan market is rather small.
Apart from the commercial banks there are six prominent 
foreign exchange dealers in the Lebanon who sit at the top of a pyramid 
structure composed largely of lesser dealers, and finally street dealers 
who are part of the foreign exchange organisation. The rates charged 
by these dealers for small sums are more competitive than those charged 
by the commercial banks.
The insurance sector in the Lebanon, other than life insurance 
and pension schemes, is well developed. There are 87 companies operating 
in the Lebanon, 15 of which are Lebanese, and 72 of which are branches 
or agencies of international insurance groups.
4 - The Bank of Lebanon *
The Bank of Lebanon started its operations on the first of 
April 1964. The charter of the Bank of the Lebanon was drawn up under 
the Law issued on 1 August 1963, which promulgated what is known as the 
Code of Money and Credit.
Article 12 of the Code of Money and Credit stated that a 
Central Bank should be established in the Lebanon under the name of the 
Bank of Lebanon. Its capital is LL 15 million entirely subscribed by 
the Lebanese state. The Bank has a governor, three deputy governors 
and a central council. ^
The Bank of Lebanon is owned by the state, but is free from 
political interference and has an independent Board. The Governor of 
the Bank of Lebanon is proposed by the Minister of Finance and appointed 
by the Government for six years. The Deputy Governors are chosen by the 
Government for five years on the proposal of the Governor of the Bank and 
the Minister of Finance. All terms of office are renewable.
The Central Council is composed of the Governor, two deputy 
governors and the directors-general of the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of National Economy. Article 33 of the Code of Money and Credit 
states that the general policy of the Bank of Lebanon is decided upon 
by the Central Council. In all its decisions, the Central Council will 
be j]£,lped by a consultative committee of six members which will report to 
the Governor of the Bank of Lebanon.
The Consultative Committee of six is made up of one member 
from each of the following sectors: he Commercial Banking sector, the 
Industrial sector, the Agricultural sector and the commercial sector, 
the fifth member is from the Planning Council and the sixth member is a 
Professor of Economics. The term of office is two years and is renewable. 
The Consultative Committee of six has advisory power only and can give 
advice when asked by the Governor of the Bank or when it deems it necessary.
^The Code of Money and Credit, published in Beirut, Aagust 1963, and with 
some amendments in October 1969
The main role of the Bank'of Lebanon according to article 70 
of the Code of Money and Credit is to safeguard the value of the 
Lebanese currency in order to further the economic and social progress 
of the country. Article 75 gives the Bank of Lebanon the power to use all 
the monetary tools which are necessary to stabilise the Lebanese pound.
And article 76 states that the Bank of Lebanon is able to use legal reserve 
requirements up to 25% on demand deposits, and up to 15% on time deposits, 
and is able to use discount rate changes and open market operations as 
stated in articles 106, 107 and 108„ Article 105 states that if government 
bonds are available the Bank of Lebanon can buy and sell such bonds whose 
date of maturity must not exceed 90 days. The Bank of Lebanon is not 
able to sell government bonds to the public, only to commercial banks 
which.have deposits with the Bank of Lebanon (article 109 Code of Money 
and Credit).
The matters relating to note issuing is decided upon by the 
Central Council. This activity is regulated by articles 47-69 of the Code, 
of Money and Credit. In particular a minimum gold cover of 50% is 
required for the Lebanese currency. The Central Council decides also 
on matters relating to transactions in the gold market, dealings in 
foreign exchange and co-operation with other central banks. The Bank 
of Lebanon is not allowed to carry out any ordinary commercial transactions 
with the private sector, its banking business can be performed with the 
commercial banking sector, and governmental bodies only (article 82).
The Bank of Lebanon is authorised to grant the Government overdraft 
facilities repayable after four months with amounts not exceeding 10% 
of the average fiscal receipts over the previous three years and in 
. "exceptionally grave circumstances" the Bank of Lebanon after having studied 
all other alternatives, is allowed to grant a loan to the Government 
(article 88). The Bank of Lebanon is also allowed to grant loans to other 
public agencies but in all cases they have to be repaid within ten years, 
and the rates charged will be the market rates (articles 91,92,93).
The Bank of Lebanon will also help the state in issuing bonds and bills
and will manage the public debt (article 97).
The Bank of Lebanon will act as the Bankers' bank allowing 
the commercial banks to keep accounts with it (article 98). The Bank 
of Lebanon rediscounts the banks' commercial paper on the understanding 
that the commercial banks will buy it back within a month (article 101) .
The Bank of Lebanon may grant the commercial banks credits not exceeding
twelve months and against the security of first class commercial paper, 
gold, foreign currencies or shares (article 102).
The control of the activities of the Bank of Lebanon is 
undertaken by a Commissariat du Gouvernement Aupres de la Banque Centrale 
which is part of the Ministry of Finance (article 41). The functions of 
the Commissariat are to make sure that, the law is obeyed and to check 
the Bank of Lebanon's accounts and to report to the Minister of Finance 
(articles 42, 44, 45). Article 43 states that the Commissariat must be 
kept informed of all of the Bank of Lebanon's decisions and it has the 
right to stop their implementation within two days, if they are contrary 
to the law.
Up till the end of 1975 the Bank of Lebanon used two monetary 
tools the discount rate, and changes in legal reserve requirements.
There is an obvious absence of open market operations from the activities 
of the Bank of Lebanon. Table 1 shows us that the discount rate remained 
the same between 1964 and November 1973, at 3%, it then increased.up to 
5% in November 1973 till June 1974, and then up to 7% during July of 1974, 
and to 8% in August 1974. Legal reserve requirements reached 10% of 
demand deposits at the end of 1974.* Table 2 shows the interest paid 
on Treasury Bonds for the period 1967-1973. The Treasury issued bonds 
whose value is 284 million LL for the period 1967-1973 almost one third 
of the amount .. the Treasury was authorised by Parliament to issue.
The issuing of bonds was discontinued after 1973„
PERIOD BANK OF LEBANON DISCOUNT RATE
1965
I 3%
II 3%
III 3%
IV 3%
19.66
I 3%
II 3%
III 3%
IV 3%
1967
• .... I. • 3%
II 3%
III 3%
IV 3%
1968
I . 3%
II 3%
III 3%
IV 3%
1969
I 3%
II 3%
III 3%
IV 3%
1970
I 3%
II 3%
III 3%
IV 3%
1971
I
II
III 
IV
1972 
I-
II
III
IV
1973
I
II
III
IV
1974
I
II
July
August
IV
3%
.3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
5%
5%
5%
7%
8%
8%
T A B L E I
PERIOD INTEREST ON TREASURY BONDS
1967 3.5%
1968 3.5% 2^Interest^6%
1969 "  6%
1970 6%
1971 6%
1972 4%
1973 4%
Table 2: For the period 1967-1973 parliament authorised
the issue of Treasury bonds up to 700 million LL«
The Treasury issued bonds whose value is 284 million LL 
for the period 1967-1973.
The establishment of the Bank of Lebanon has certain impacts 
on the money market and different monetary tools have different effects 
on the behaviour of commercial banks.
Let us consider the liquid assets of the commercial banks 
where we have the following:
: Legal Reserves plus other reserves with the BL = LR,
Cash = C, , Banks Net Foreign assets = BNFA, and call 
b
loans plus Treasury Bills = L/Treasury bills were sold
only once to some commercial banks, so in real terms
L = call loans/
The regulatory base of commercial banks (A) is
A = LR + BNFA + L .____. (1)
we can include BNFA because they constitute an important part of 
commercial banks assets, specially for foreign banks whose balances abroad 
are easily interchangeable with their Lebanese assets, i.e. they can increase 
their cash holdings by bringing in some of their foreign assets from abroad, 
and so can some of the big Lebanese owned banks.
BNFA = Foreign Assets - Foreign Liabilities, and
C = C + C, , where C is currency in the hands of non-bank 
p b p
public, and is the notes in hand of the commercial banks, and is 
treated as a part of LR.
The Bank of Lebanon Assets consist of Foreign Assets (FA), 
which represent the foreign exchange reserves held by the Bank, plus 
claims on the government, the private sector, and on commercial banks (LA), 
/^hese claims are the domestic assets7»
BLA = LA + FA ....  (2)
BLA = Bank of Lebanon Assets
The Bank of Lebanon Liabilities (BLL) are reserve money R^ government
deposits GL, and other net items u.
BLL = R + GL + u   (3)m
R = C + LR: C = R - LR by substitution we get
m p ’ p m
BLL = (C + LR) + GL + u   (4)
BLA *= BLL (Assets = Liabilities)
so BLA = C + LR + GL + U   (5)P w /  . .
and C + LR + GL + u = LA + F A   (6)
P
. * i £ C + A LR + A GL + ^ u  = A  LA + A  FA
P
and A  LR = A  LA + A FA - ACp - A GL - A u .....  (7)
we can see from equation (7) that changes in the commercial bank reserves 
are dependent on LA, FA, C^, GL and u. We have from equation (1) the 
liquid assets of commercial banks 
A = LR + BNFA + L 
A A  = A LR + A  BNFA + A L
So A  LR = A  A - A BNFA - AL ....  (8)
- m > —
we can also have the following equation if we substitute equation (7)
for A L R  in equation (8)* ’
A  BA +AFA - A C  -4 GB - 4 u  = A A  - A BNFA - A L
p
or
A  A - A  DA + A  FA - A  C - A  GB u +A BNFA + A  L (9)
p
FA + BNFA = NFA (Net Foreign Assets)
A  A = A B A  + A  NFA - A G B  - A  u + A  L - A Cp ... (10)
Using equation (10) we then can argue that the changes in the liquid assets 
of the commercial banks depend mainly on changes in the net foreign assets, 
government deposits with the Bank of Lebanon, Commercial banks borrowings 
from the Bank of Lebanon, and changes in bank loans.
If we wish to look at the same problem from anotherang!e, we can 
do so by using the liabilities of the commercial banks which are demand 
deposits (B), time deposits (T), credit from Bank ofLebanon (CBL), capital 
accounts K, and other net items (w). So we have the following:
Liabilities = B + T + CBL + K + w
since liabilities are equal to assets then
B + T + CBL + K + w = LR + BNFA + L
^  £ b + T + CBL + K + wj = BA + NFA - GB - u + L - Cp (11)
CBL = BA given; (CBL is credit from the BL, and BA is the claims
on commercial banks by the BL))
. B + T  = NFA - G B + L - K - u - w - C
P
A  (B + T) = £NFA - AGB + A L  - A K  - a u  - A w  - A C p (12)
or
^ ( B + T ) + A C  NFA - A G B  + A L  -*K - ^ u - A w {13)
p
the values of K, u, w and are relatively small, L is divided into two 
parts, claims on government for April, May and June 1975 are only 0.005% 
of the claims on the private sector for the corresponding months, in fact 
the claims on government if taken as a proposition of the claims on the 
private sector for the period 1967-1975 vary between 0.06% and 
0.005% claims on the private sector by commercial banks7
Therefore it seems to be possible to treat changes in L as being dependent 
only on changes in the supply of loans by the banks and on the private 
sector's demand for loans, unless the government increases its demand for 
loans from the commercial banks.
Equations (11) and (13) both show that the NFA and GL (government 
deposits with the BL) have opposite signs, so if there is a change in the 
balance of payments the BL can try to offset it by changing GL, i.e. an 
increase in NFA can be met by an increase in GL thus balancing the effect 
caused by the increase in NFA. According to equation (7) the changes 
in thelegal reserves depend on changes in the BL's foreign assets, banks 
borrowing from the BL and government deposits with the Bank of Lebanon.
The three main monetary tools which can be used by the Bank of 
Lebanon are changes in the legal reserve requirements, open market 
operations, and the discount rate. In order to analyse the first tool 
legal reserves, it would be rather helpful to reproduce equation (7)
A  LR = ALA + A  FA - A  C - A  GL - A  u
P
The bank- of Lebanon has the ability to increase the legal reserves on
demand deposits up to 2% ,  on the other hand equation (7) tells us
that there are other ways to produce changes in the level of legal reserves
a) Changes in LA (commercial hanks’ borrowings from the Bank of Lebanon)
Such a method is not very strong, for it works only in one direction.
The Bank of Lebanon can only reduce its lendings to the banks, but is not
able to increase the lendings unless the banks are willing to respond.
The Bank of Lebanon if it wishes to increase LR through changes in LA
must reduce the discount rate, such an action does not necessarily lead V
an increase in LA, because LA is a derived demand and dependent on the
public’s demand for loans. The Bank of Lebanon might be able to use the
foreign exchange reserves (FA), say b<^  selling foreign reserves such as
the dollar and create an artificial demand for the Lebanese pound. I do
not think that using the FA as a tool to change LR is a convenient
alternative in the long-run. FA is dependent on the changes in the
balance of payments, and therefore is not under the direct control of the
Bank of Lebanon, except in one case. The Bank of Lebanon can expect for
example a change in capital flows when it changes the discount rate, thus
effecting FA. I would like to note that each central bank has its
3
own demand for international monetary reserves, and thus can influence 
FA (to a certain extent) accordingly.
b) Changes in government deposits with the Bank of Lebanon could cause 
some changes in LR (from equation (7))* GL has a negative sign and so 
has Cp and u, which means that LR and GL move in opposite directions.
If the government wishes to reduce (or change)' LR it can do so by increasing
n
GL given that LA, FA, Cp and u are constant. The government can also
offset changes in foreign reserves (FA) by either increasing or decreasing
GL, because FA and GL have opposite signs. C is dependent on changes in
P
the level of income and 011 the interest rate. We are mainly interested in 
3
'The topic of international reserves or the demand for such reserves .. 
has been treated in different ways, but the main theme of the argument 
is based on the idea that every central bank must have a certain demand 
function for international reserves, and thi3 function has some 
influence on FA.
changes in the money supply and the relation between C and M , and
P ^
Cp and LR. An increase in LR would lead to a decrease in the money
supply, according to equation (7) a fall in the changes in C could
P
increase LR given that DA, PA, GD and u are constant.
Year C in Millions of LL 
P .......
M-l in LL
°P/M1
1965 547 1510 0.35
19 66 645 1555 0.41
1967 78 6 1584 0.49
1968 838 1763 0.48
1969 868 1667 0.52
1970 845 1672 0.52
1971 919 1987 0.46
1972 . 1033 2255 0.45
1973 1226 2593 0.47
1974 1353 2965 0.45
Using the data for ten years 1965-74 of and M^ we find for the Lebanon 
that the ratio Cp/lvl^  varies from 0.35 to 0.52, while the mean of the 
ratio is 0.46 and the deviation from the mean is 0.11 only for 1965 for 
the other years the highest deviation from the mean is 0.06 for 1969 
and 1970. This ratio tells us that it can be to a certain extent treated 
almost as a constant. The above analysis does not in any way prove thqf 
^ 0^  is a constant, but in order to simplify the argument, let us treat 
AC^ of equation (7) as a constant.
The main body of the argument rests on the idea that if the Bank 
of Lebanon cannot for one reason or another change the level of legal 
reserves, it can produce similar effects on the money supply (like those 
produced by changes in LR) by chaning FA, DA and GD. The changes in 
PA, DA and GD will change LR without using the traditional monetary tool.
The government can also offset changes in the foreign reserves by altering GD.
The government security market or government hond market does not
exist in the Lebanon in practice yet, but in theory it can exist,
/Article 105 states that the B.L. can buy and sell government bonds if
they are available/. It seems to me that the use of open market operations
in the Lebanses money market could offer some help to the other two main
monetary tools to control the changes in money supply,^ If we
study the Lebanese experience in this sphere of monetary economics up
to I975 in order to understand what possible alternatives jto open market
operations/could have or has been used to control the money supply we
have to concentrate our attention on equation (13)*
A  (D + T) + £> 0^ = NFA — 2LGI) + A L ~ aK ~ 4u —
Let us use = D + .T + C as money supply so we have the following equation:
 ^ P
A  Mg = A NFA + A  L - ^  GL - &K - /au - fiw
K, u and w can be replaced by s (s = k+u+w) wh©$e value is relatively
small
£ M 2 = ANFA + A L  - a G D - 4 S  .....  (14)
if we wish to use the narrow definition of money where 
Mg = M o r  = Mg - T, we get the equation:
^ M 1 =ANFA + 4L -^GL - /IT - S . (15)
the negative sign given to time deposits in equation (15) simply means 
that an increase in T will cause a fall in the value of demand deposits 
or is due to a shift of deposits from demand deposits to time deposits.
The argument does not hold if there is an injection or an outside increase 
in the money supply i.e. new deposits in the banks. If thenew deposits 
all take the form T then according to equation (15) there has been a drop 
in the level of money supply , but this is not true. For this reason
it would be more realistic to use Mg and equation (14), because equation
(14) is able to show more truly the increase in both demand and time deposits.
^The importance of open market operations is related to the argument that 
treats base money as a controllable variable where M = mB, m being the 
money multiplier B, base and M money.
Equation (15) holds only in the case where the change in a time deposit 
has been caused by movements between time deposits and demand deposits.
In the absence of open market operations a change in the money supply 
can be to a certain extent influenced by changing government deposits 
with the Bank of Lebanon and by changing the level of banks1 call loans.
Assume there has been an increase in thelevel ofmoney supply due 
to an increase in net foreign assets. Euqations (14) and (15) tell us 
that in order to offset such an increase in thelevel of money supply the 
government has to increase its deposits with the Bank of Lebanon. If 
the increase in the money supply is due to an increase in bank lending 
then the Bank of Lebanon has to increase the discount rate in order to make 
borrowing more expensive thus reducing the demand for loans. In an open 
economy with free capital mobility the increase in the rate of interest 
would lead to an increase in capital flows and a reduction in capital outflows. 
So if the Bank of Lebanon increases the discount rate, according to equation 
(14) there will be a fall in the value of NFA. The increase in capital 
inflows will eventually increase the level of UFA, and the Banks in the 
Lebanon are able to bring into the country at any time any amount of foreign 
assets to lend in the money market if the rate of interest is increased 
thus increasing thelevel of NFA. Therefore the central bank must ask 
the government to increase its deposits again in order to offset the 
increase in NFA. The conclusion is that an increase in the discount rate 
might not lead to the expected results if not accompanied by an increase 
in government deposits with the Bank of Lebanon.
The Bank of Lebanon has not used or been able to use all the 
traditional monetary tools, chief among them open-market operations.
The potentials of the BL are much greater than the actual present and past 
activities show it to be. The Code of money and credit has furnished the 
Bank of Lebanon with considerable power over the commercial banks and 
other financial institutions, but the actual Lebanese experience paints
an unsatisfactory picture of the Bank of Lebanon. Open market operations 
have been hardly used, and the legal reserve requirements on foreign 
deposits are virtually non-existent, andhave been increased to 10% on 
domestic demand deposits during 1974*
Chapter U X
A Macro-Economic Model For The Lebanon
’’The word model indicates that the assumptions made about the
nature of an economy’s behaviour are explicitly stated and that they are
in many respects a simplified picture of reality. These assumptions are
partly of a natural character, partly of a technical or legal, and partly
of a psychological character. Together they specify the foundation and
structure of the economy considered. Such specification has always to be
a simplification because of the very complicated nature of economic life.
As a rule, only a few of the most relevant characteristics of society are
implied and reality may widely differ from one situation to the other,
it follows that there will have to be made many different models, each of
them meant to focus on certain aspects of economic life.”
1 - The Money Multiplier in The Lebanon
The object or the idea behind the money multiplier is to derive
some implications concerning the degree of controlability of money
2
supply in the Lebanon. The model utilises four different economic 
agents, the public, the banking system, the Bank of Lebanon, and the 
Foreign Sector.
a - The public or the money holding public, its demand for 
cash is taken as a function of wealth and money supply.
This demand is responsive to changes in the money supply 
and to changes in interest rates, the responsiveness to 
changes in interest rates is due to changes in the yields 
of certain entities which are defined as wealth.
1
J. Tinbergen, Economic Policy: Principles and Design., North-Holland 
publishing company Amsterdam 1967, p. 27-28
2
The model and its empirical findings are based on the economic conditions 
Y/hich prevailed in the Lebanon prior to the civil war - up till the end of 1974*
b - The banking system, we are only interested in commercial 
banks, the non-bank financial intermediaries have been 
excluded, because (up till 1974) of their minimal importance 
in the Lebanese financial market. The most important banks 
are branches of foreign banks and they dominate the lion’s 
share in the Lebanese financial market, 
c - The bank of Lebanon which in the model represents the 
monetary authorities, 
d - The foreign sector which represents the outer world, or 
other countries and are extra-economic variables.
I would like to present an hypothesis of the money supply process 
which will distinguish the role played by each of the four agents in 
their contribution to changes in the money supply of the Lebanon.
The money multiplier is based on a set of equations where money M 
is defined as currency demanded by the public C, plus demand deposits L.
M = C + L (1;
with B = C + R (2)
B is base money, and R represents the reserves demanded by the banking 
system. Let us assume that the banking system holds some of their debts 
to the public as reserves consisting of a franction of demand and time 
deposits so that;
R = K (D + T) (3) K is bank reserve ratio
assume also that currency demanded by the public is a fraction of total 
money holdings thus we have;
C = cM (4) o - currency ratio
and Time deposits T are asuumed to be a fraction of total money holdings 
with;
T = tM (5) t = time deposits ratio
by.using adequate substitutions we can derive a money supply equation
3
which has a money multiplier such as
M = m^ B (6)
with im. as the multiplier -
1-c+tj + c7
and B as the monetary base.
The Bank of Lebanon sets the price of the discounts CL, to the 
commercial banks and fixes it at a certain price or discount rate. But 
themonetary authorities in the form of the bank of Lebanon cannot by 
law make it obligatory for the commercial banks to borrow money from it.
The Bank of Lebanon can only refuse to lend money to the commercial banks. 
According to this argument the initiative is divided between the Bank of 
Lebanon and the commercial banks, where the Bank of Lebanon can influence 
the volume of discounts by changing the discount rate, but the commercial 
banks have the option of-'.not borrowing from the central bank, CL or 
discounts and advances to commercial banks by the Bank of Lebanon represent 
the indirect supply of base money, because it comes into circulation only 
when the banks ask for it. In other words at a given certain discount rate
3
Using the first five equations we get:
R - Kt M D = ----   and R = B - C
D = B - CM - KtM and
K
B - cM - KtM + cM andM K
B = kM + cM + KtM - KcM
with B = M 1“ K(l-c+tj + c7
M «* B /K(l—c+t; + c7 ”1 
Let m^ = /K(l-c+t) + T ^
part of the monetary base B is determined by the commerical bank's
behaviour with respect to borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon.
Therefore we must use a more representative base rather than base B.
a
We are able to derive a new monetary adjusted base B by subtracting 
CL from base B;
Ba = B - CL (7)
c l
The adjusted base B leads to the derivation of a new money supply equation 
with a new money multiplier, in order to derive such an equation we need 
another set of equations with
B = G + TL + CL (8)
G being Bank of Lebanon stock of gold and foreign currency and TL is 
Treasury Liabilities’
Let-CL - b(D + T) (9)
where b is the commercial banks' borrowing ratio. The Treasury Liabilities, 
TL, in the Lebanon are divided between the Bank of Lebanon and the Commercial 
banks. TL in the Lebanon is usually a small amount almost equally distributed 
between the Bank of Lebanon and the Banks. In our hypothesis only the 
Treasury Liabilities given to the Bank of Lebanon are accounted for or 
included.
Using equations 6, 7 and 9 we get the following
Ba = M/K(1 - c +t) + c7 - b(D + T)
and b = bB - bcM - bktM
D   ------
Ba = M/Tk - b ) (1 - c + t) + c/
.*. M = Ba /7k - b) (1 - c + t) + c7 ^
OR M = m BS (10)
Siwhere the money multiplier with the adjusted base B is equal to
m2 " + c? *"1
and equation 10 is another form of the money supply equation.
The Lebanon has an open-economy, and in an open economy the monetary 
base is partly determined by the domestic activities of the commercial 
banks with respect to the bank of Lebanon lending policies. The outer 
world or other countries must be alloY/ed to show their influence on the 
changes in the money supply equation for the Lebanon. The outer world 
provides the commercial banks of the Lebanon with the choice of borrowing 
money from various financial markets, thus providing the banking sector 
in the Lebanon with an alternative to the Bank of Lebanon.for discounts.
The Bank of Lebanon could not interfere with the commercial banks by 
imposing-regulations on international capital movements, because the 
raison d'etre of the Lebanese banking system is based on the freedom 
of capital mobility. We must also add that foreign banks are located in 
Beirut mainly to attract capital from the rich Arab oil producing countries, 
using part of it in the Lebanon, and the other part in the Euro-dollar 
market. There are no figures to indicate or show the amounts of foreign 
capital Yfhic-h is invested domestically or used for investment in the 
Euro-dollar market.
The Lebanese economy operates on a relatively fixed exchange 
rate where the bank of Lebanon participates in the foreign exchange 
market by buying and selling foreign currency. The bank of Lebanon 
has to sell or buy whatever amount of foreign currency demanded or 
supplied by the commercial banks. The commercial banks of the Lebanon 
have the right to borrow money from various financial markets. Some if 
not all of the big banks of the Lebanon are branches of American and French 
banks; such banks are able to borrow from either the bank of Lebanon or 
from Euro-dollar market (so can Lebanese owned banks). The presence of 
the outer-Y/orld as an alternative financial market for lending to commercial
banks operating in the Lebanon adds another dimension to our money supply 
equation in the form of foreign assets. Thus the Balance of payments 
must be included in the model in the form of:
G1 = G + IMF -f NFA (11)
1
G is the national stock of monetary reserves and is equal to the sum of 
the bank of Lebanon1s stock of gold and foreign currency, and the Lebanese 
I.M.F. position, and the banking system's net foreign assets NFA which 
according to the figures are greater than both G and I.M.F.^ The 
borrowing of commercial banks from the outer-world to changes in their 
net foreign assets NFA, and a change in NFA would result in changes in
8Lthe values of both G and then in B , because
Ba = G + TL from equations 7 and 8
SISince changes in the monetary base B are influenced by changes in the
Sibanks net foreign assets then we must adjust base B in Order to include
SLthe new dimension (NFA)• In order to do so we must add to base B the 
changes in the banks net foreign assets ^or subtract banks net foreign 
liabilities7thus arriving at another new adjusted base for an open-economy. 
Let us assume that:
NFA = a (D + T) (12)
where a is the net foreign assets ratio.
Equation 11 makes it possible for us to present the adjusted
Si Simonetary base B in an alternative form to B = G + TL, we have 
G = G^- IMF - NFA from equation 11 
Ba = G1 - IMF - NFA +TL (13)
by substituting equation 12 into equation 13 we could obtain 
Ba = G1 - IMF- a (D + T) + TL (14)
^For the period 1965-1974 end of the value of NFA is about three times 
that of (G + IMF).
Since our money supply equation can "be written as 
M - m2Ba
where ~ [~(k-b) (l - c + t) + c7 ^
and M - m2 ~ IMP - a(D + T) + TL7 '
., ' ~ -aB + acM + aktMwith - aD = --------- ---------
K
The main idea is to derive another money supply equation with a re-adjusted 
base B^ including the influence of the outer-world on the money supply 
of an open economy such as that of the Lebanon. The new money supply 
equation will take the form of;
M = mBL (15)
with the multiplier m = /~(k-b+a)(l-c+t) + c7
Xj a.and the monetary base B = B + NFA
.*. BL = G1 + TL - IMF (16)
Let TL1 = TL - IMF thus having BL = G 1 + TL1 (17)
i
The TL is the result of the argument that an increase in the IMF 
positj.on of the Lebanon is associated with a decrease in the Bank of 
Lebanon stock of gold and foreign currency (the opposite is true). When 
the Lebanese government has or wants to finance an increase in the IMF 
position of the Lebanon it is able to do so by providing the Bank of
Lebanon with government liabilities which are represented by TL.
The final picture is painted in such a way in order to let us know that 
any changes in the Lebanese IMF position are accompanied by changes in • 
the Bank of Lebanon’s claims on government. Up till 1974 the IMF. position 
of the Lebanon did not show any dramatic changes, this does not in any 
Tray undermine the theoretical possibility which allows the model to accommodate 
any degree of change in the Lebanese IMF position. In fact allowing for 
such changes makes the model theoretically and empirically rather flexible 
with respect to the Lebanese IMF position.
The main money supply equation is M = mB*J and it is based on a
monetarist model* '^ he idea behind the money supply equation is to help
us in devising a way for analysing the money supply process in the Lebanon
or any other small country which has an open-economy and free capital 
5mobility. The model can be used to study and evaluate the role of our 
four economic agents; the public, the banking sector, the Bank of Lebanon 
and the foreign sector. In order to be able to undertake an evaluation 
the multiplier has to be analysed with more care and attention. We have 
two sorts of multipliers; the dynamic multiplier and the static multiplier 
The money supply equation M = mB^ has m in the form of a static multiplier 
which is a short-run multiplier.
m = /”(k+a-b)(l-c+t) + c7""^  with base B^ 
m2 = ^~(k-b) (1-c+t) + c7 with base Ba
m^ = /K( 1-c+t) +c7 with base B
these three multipliers are static or short-run multipliers. We are 
mainly interested in m and not in m^and m2 simply because m links the 
monetary base B^ with the money supply taking into consideration changes 
in banks foreign assets which represent changes in the Lebanese money 
supply that are imported or exported from / to the outer world.
The dynamic multiplier or the long-run multiplier can be obtained 
from the money supply equation as follows; using partial differentiation 
of the equation M = mB^ gives us:
\ M =& m^B^ + B ^  m 
knowing that m = ^”(k + a - b) (l - c + t) + c7 then
5
^The model is suitable for studying the Lebanese experience in changes 
in money supply for the fifties, sixties and early seventies (1974)* 
Keeping in mind that the economic philosophy in the Lebanon has been 
one that believes in minimum government intervention and with absolute 
international capital mobility.
- m^ / 1-c+t7 a + m^ ^ (18)
we have ^k + a - h7-£l and /1-c+jb/^ 0 in the dynamic multiplier with 
m = 0 and
-m2 /I- Uc + a - b22 = }-f <  0
2 JT •» *7 tm y .-m £k + a - b/ = ^  0
-m2 IX - o + t7 = <_0
2  I "y V  HI y  /-v-m /I - c + t/ = ^  < 0
2 /- ,*7 ^im v Am /I - c + t7 = ^  >  0
The money supply equation can he put in logarithmic form and then
differentiated with respect to time^ in order to show us the contributions 
of each of the four economic agents to changes in the money supply of the 
Lebanon. The four economic agents are individually represented each by 
a different combination of the relevant ratios. The public is taken to 
be equal to:
- /U £ C  + U, *t7
C X *•
where Uc = /^l - (k + a - b)7
and Ut
L  • JL 2 L -  - M _  / I - ( k + a - b ) 7 > 0
M ■ ft - bL ir - bl - 1 K
bk
bx
U and U, their values are taken from the result of differentiatingC "C
the logarithmic form of M = mB^, (look footnote 6). The public is 
presented in such a form, because we are interested in calculating 
its contributions to the changes in money supply, and this can be obtained 
by finding the values for k, a, Js, c and t and then doing the relevant 
calculations.
The commercial banks are the representatives of the banking system 
in the form of
- /Uvi K+  UoAa - U^Ab7
r*
u. = u = u,k a b - o + t ) l  I
The values of U, , U and U, are obtained in the same way as we obtain 
k a u
those of U and U.. In order to be able to regard -IL & K  - U  ^ a  + U, Abc t k a d
as one variable representing the contributions of the banking system to
changes in the money supply of the Lebanon U, , U and U, must be equal,
k  a d
(this condition is true or holds).
The foreign sector and the Bank of Lebanon are both represented in 
the monetary base B^, because
BL = G1 + TL1
1 1G in our model takes care of the foreign sector, while TL represents
the Bank of Lebanon. The foreign sector is in fact equal to the current
accounts on the balance of payments A, plus net capital imports NKI, plus
7
the not recorded transactions on the balance of payment NR, plus an error 
term, therefore we have:
G1 = A + NKI + NR
7
The not recorded transactions on the B/p of the Lebanon according to 
some figures (when available) are rather high. In recent years it has 
become rather fashionable to exagerate the importance of NR for the 
Lebanon for reasons which are not part of my research.
It is possible to combine the activities of the four economic
agents in one equation for empirical estimations, but still the foreign
1 1sector G and the Bank of Lebanon TL have to be represented by one variable
— L “7/theyboth add up to make B /. In my empirical work on the money supply 
equation I will use quarterly data (1965-1974) in order to observe the 
long-run behaviour of the dynamic multiplier, and the long-run importance 
and contributions of each economic variable (the four agents) to changes 
in the Lebanese money supply. We can change the form of the variables 
to allow for percentage changes per-quarter in the following way; let 
A M  be per quarter of a year where:
100 so as = M per cent per quarter of a year.
HZ M ^
This method makes it possible to present the dynamic version of the money 
supply equation which contains a dynamic multiplier, we have:
M = 3^ m (19)
2 2 2 
where bm = m /l - (k+a-b)7^ & - m ^k+a-b7bt - m ^l-c+t7b k
- m^ Jl-c+tJ b a + m^ /l-c-f-t7 & b
we are able to have the following approximation to be used for empirical 
estimations and testings
* *T
M = B - U Ac - U.At - U.Ak - U + TL A b  + error (20)C X iC SL D
U , U+, U, , U and U have been defined in the previous pages.C u X. cl D
•t
Our task after equation 20 is to divide B into its two components
-j
the foreign sector in the form of G and the Bank of Lebanon in the form
1" L *L 1of TL • Since we are treating the monetary base B as B , so must G be
• 1 1 * 1treated as G and TL and TL , this is done by simply having
A G . * 1 ' mr1 .1
- G per cent per-quarter and ■ ■ ■ - TL Per c611* per-quarter.
TL-i
- till -
Prom ?= + TL^ we get
BL = U G1 + UL TL1 (21)
“  *  { ? L  ^ ' f i ] - '
equation 21 shows us the two parts of the monetary base where each can 
be evaluated alone to provide information on the sector which contributes
ELmost to changes in the monetary base. If the monetary base B is not
L 1re-adjusted to B then we will be ignoring the contributions of G or
current accounts, net capital imports, and not recorded transactions of
the balance of payments to changes in the Lebanese money supply.
G1 * A + HKI -f NR (22)
Let per cent per quarter A = and = NKI percent per quarter
and ANRNR. = NR percent per quarter
where U. = A
ui
[ tj, 
1 %
■  [?]->
Then we obtain
G 1 = UaA + UjNKI + UrNR + error (23)
' M - l  ^  ^
Equation 23 is derived in order to furnish us with more 
information about the contributions of the current accounts on the 
balance of payments, net capital imports, and the not recorded transactions 
to changes in the national stock of monetary reserves. Each of the 
mentioned variables has its own behaviour and is responsive to various 
economic factors, such as changes in interest rates in the Lebanese money 
market, and in the Euro-doliar market, and to changes in the exchange 
rates of the Lebanese pound vis a vis the dollar, and to the stability 
of the Lebanese economy. The method or the analysis used to understand 
the changes in the Lebanese national stock of monetary reserves can be 
undertaken by studying the changes in;
a - The current accounts on the Lebanese Balance of Payments which
are presented as U^A where
b - the capital imports of the Lebanese non-bank sectors that
are presented in the form of U^-NKI where
c - the not recorded transactions on the Lebanese Balance of payments,
UjjNR where
I would like to mention that equation 23 will not be tested
empirically, because of the lack of continuous data on changes in the
8 —
current accounts of the Lebanese balance of payments ^mainly for the 
period 1965-747• Nevertheless the model has not been theoretically 
confined to the areas of the Lebanese economy that can be tested empirically. 
8
In fact there is not enough information about the various parts of the 
Lebanese balance of payments. My empirical work is based on quarterly 
and monthly data for the period 1965-1974» and I have not been able 
to obtain all the data I need to test equation 23 empirically. Before 
I started my research on the Lebanese economy I expected to face some 
problems concerning the availability of data which puts some restrictions 
on the empirical estimations.
The Jlebanon as we said before is an open-economy, and has a rather 
large banking sector that is dominated by non-Lebanese banks. The 
activities of these banks can be divided into two parts, domestic and 
international. The domestic activities deal mainly with the credit 
market of the Lebanon, while international activities are mainly the 
changes in the banks net foreign assets NFAV
I would like to analyse the international activities first and then 
move to the domestic activities of the banks. The banking system 
in the Lebanon enjoys free capital mobility, and the banks are capitalising 
on this freedom by attracting capital flows from the Arab oil producing 
countries and investing part of it in Euro-dollar market and in speculations
9in the foreign exchange market, and the rest is used for domestic investment.
The study of the banks' international activities can be presented 
in the form of equations that include Euro-dollar interest rates, Lebanese 
interest rates, the Lebanese exchange rate with respect of the dollar, 
and the stability of the Lebanese economy.
The Euro-dollar interest rates is represented by r^, and net foreign 
assets are responsive to changes in rg i.e. if rg increases say from 5$
8% then we expect to have an outflow of capital from the Lebanon to be 
invested in the Euro-dollar market. Therefore there is a negative relation­
ship between the banks' holdings of NEA and re*
O
9
'The previous chapter expands on this point
The curve d-d represents the banks' demand for UFA (or their holdings 
of NFA) with respect to re# At 5$ of Euro dollar rate re the commercial 
banks in the Lebanon would hold NFA^ if the Euro-dollar rate changes or 
increases to 8fo then there will be a fall in the amount of UFA held by 
the commercial banks in the Lebanon to NFAg. The net result of a y/o 
increase in the Euro-dollar rate would lead to a fall in UFA equal to 
EFA.J - EFAg. In order for this to be true we must assume that the domestic 
rates of interest remain constant, the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound 
vis a vis the dollar is constant, and the confidence in the Lebanese 
balance of payments is also constant.
The holdings of UFA by banks are also dependent on the rates of 
interest in the Lebanon. We have three different domestic rates of 
interest which are capable offinfluencing the decisions of the banks' 
about their holdings of KFA. The three interest rates are 1 - The Bank 
of Lebanon discount rate r^ which is fixed by the monetary authorities,
2 - the return on government bonds r^ which are not popular in the 
Lebanon, and are hardly issued by the Lebanese Treasury. Theoretically 
should be included, because when the Lebanese monetary authorities 
decide.! to make more use of government bonds then the effects of r^ could 
be accounted for in the model. 3 - The commercial interest rate, or the
short-term interest rate charged by banks on short-term bank loans r .L
Most of the loans in the Lebanon are short-term loans, the long-term 
loans are virtually non-existent with the exception of some medium-term 
loans provided by the Industrial Bank.^ Banks' holdings of UFA are 
10One of the problems of the Lebanese credit market is the absence of 
long-term loans. This leads to the establishment of the Industrial 
Bank to provide industry with long-term or at least medium-term loans, 
but the commercial banks are still dominating the show.
positively related to changes in r^, r^ and r^, an increase in the 
domestic interest rates would lead to an increase in capital inflows and 
the inflows and the hanks would hold more UFA. We are assuming that the 
Euro-dollar rate is constant, the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound 
vis a vis the dollar is constant, and the confidence in the Lebanese balance 
of payments is given.
Pig 2
In figure two we can observe that an increase in the domestic rate of 
of interest from 4?° to T/° (by Jfc) would lead to an increase in the 
commercial banks holdings of UFA from NFA^ to UFAg as shown by the 
movement upward along curve LD.
One of the main reasons which have caused capital inflows into 
the Lebanon from Arab oil producing countries during the 1960s and early 
1970s is the relative stability of the Lebanese economy and the Lebanese 
pound on the foreign exchange market (up till the end or 1974)• Another 
reason, is the complete freedom of capital mobility from the Arab oil 
producers into and out of Beirut. The commercial banks are able to hold 
their foreign assets either in Lebanese pounds or any other currency which 
is acceptable on the free exchange market. The end result is speculation 
by banks in the foreign exchange market, ^mainly in the dollar market, and 
some major European currencies7 When the value of the dollar falls with 
respect to the Lebanese pound L.L. then the commercial banks would want 
to hold more of their assets in Lebanese pounds and less in dollars and 
vice, versa.
Let us assume that r and r,, r, and r_ are constant, thuse d* b L 9
making it possible for us to analyse the relationship between NFA
and the exchange rate or with the value of the dollar in Lebanese pounds.
In figure three the curve EE represents the relationship between NFA 
and the price of the dollar in Lebanese pounds, which in turn represents 
the confidence in the Lebanese balance of payments. If the dollar is 
worth two Lebanese pounds then the amount of NFA is equal to NFA^, 
when the dollar can buy more Lebanese pounds say 3 EL per then we 
have a downward movement along curve EE from point S to point L, and the 
net result is a fall from NFA^ to NFA^. The movement from S to L along 
curve EE is caused by, a) the fall in the value of the Lebanese pounds 
leads to some loss of confidence by holders of foreign assets in the 
Lebanese currency thus motivating capital outffows from the Lebanon and 
reducing capital inflows. This argument assumes that the original fall in 
the Lebanese pound was not due to either an increase in capital outflows 
or a decrease in capital inflows. In other words the volume of capital 
flows is given and changes in the exchange rate are due to increase in 
the deficit on the balance of trade, or due to the improvement of the 
dollar on the world market, b) When the value of the dollar improves 
commercial banks located in the Lebanon would want to increase their 
holdings of the dollar and start moving some assets out of the Lebanon
to be invested in the Euro-dollar market. On the other hand an improvement 
in the value of the Lebanese pound with respect to the dollar would make 
the banks more willing to increase their holdings of Lebanese pounds, 
thus moving some assets from the Euro-dollar market into Lebanon.
Their motive is to make profit by speculating on the Lebanese exchange 
market.
The same analysis can be conducted using the national stock of 
monetary reserves G where
i
G = G + IMP + NFA equation 11
or
G^ = A + NKI + NR equation 22
G is capable of being a proxy for the stability of the Lebanese balance
of payments and the stability of the Lebanese pound. A fall in the value
of G creates a situation which might be characterised by loss of confidence
in the position of the Lebanese balance of payments and the Lebanese pound.
For this argument to be true we must assume that all capital flows are
1constant; i.e. the changes in G are not due to changes in capital flows
11which remain constant.
We have treated NFA as a function of Euro-dollar interest rates r ,e
the domestic interest rates r^, r^, r^ and a function of the stability, 
and confidence /by the oiiter-world7 in the Lebanese balance of payments.
Using either the exchange rate /dollars in Lebanese pounds7 or the
1 ■ ' 
national stock of monetary reserves G as a proxy for the above mentioned
stability and confidence. These hypotheses are subject to empirical testings
and in order to do so they are given the following forms:
NFA = f (re, r^ r^ r^, E) E = Exchange rate or dollars
in Lebanese pounds
and NFA = f (r , r. r,r_ , G^)v e* d b L* '
11
The assumption of constant capital flows is unrealistic, but we have 
to make^such an assumption if 7/e wish to present the argument for
using G as a proxy for the stability of the Lebanese B/P, and its
influence on changes in NFA.
both functions will be tested to help us understand the empirical 
significance in the movements of FFA•with respect to changes in the 
different interest rates, and in the position of the Lebanese balance 
of payments.
2 - Free Reserves in the Lebanon
Before developing the hypothesis about Free Reserves in the Lebanon 
it would be rather helpful to look at the commercial banks credit market, 
because free reserves play an important role in determining the volume 
of bank credit.
VC = f(FR, r., rd) (l)
VC being volume of bank credit, FR face reserves, r^ discount rate,
and index of interest rates on the bank credit market. In the
Lebanon as we mentioned before most of bank cr4dit is of short term
-j
nature, thus we can use rT instead of r. withjj i
VC = fl.FR, rd, r£)
On the other side of the credit market we have the credit demanding 
public whose demand for bank credit can be treated as a function of
the volume of bank credit market interest rates r , / r i3 the rate
jj ^  h
banks expect to get on bank credit, while r is the market rate on bankL
credit7i income Y, and expected return of equities W.
PDC = f(, VC, ■ r, , W, Y) (2)
PDC is public's demand for bank credit.
The banking sector in the Lebanon lenas money to three parties,
the government, the commercial sector F, and the consumers or householders 
H. Lending to the private sector by commercial banks is much more 
significant (^greater) in the Lebanon than lending to the government;
- I Z.V ~
FBC = Fd + Hd (3)
cl cl
F is the firm’s demand for hank loans, and H is the household demand
function for bankMoans.
Free reserves enter the picture in the form;
FR = ER - CL (4)
ER being excess reserves of banks. We know from the money multiplier
model that;
Ba = B - CL ; B = C + R ; Ba = C + R - CL
and C = cM, R = K(iH-T), and CL = b(BfT)
Ba = cM + K(3>fT) - b(BfT)
-b^BfT) = Ba - cM -K^BfT)
or -Cl = Ba - /cM + J  (5)
substituting equation 5 into equation 4 we obtain
FR = EH + Ba - /cM + K(3>fT)7 (6)
In the case of an open economy like the Lebanon the NFa  influences the
2L
monetary base B (look under the money multiplier) with;
BL = Ba + NFA and NFa = a(lh-T)
If there is a net capital inflow into the Lebanon (as the case has been 
between 1965-1974)> then we have
FR = ER + BL - /cM -f K(BfT) + a (DfT/7
or FR = ER + BL - /“cm + (7)
If there is a net capital outflow from the Lebanon then we have -NFa with 
FR = ER + Ba - /cM + K(BfT) + a(Bfrl'27 (8)
From equation 7 we have
BL = FR - ER + /cM + K(D+T)7 (9)
or Ba + NFA = FR - ER + /cM + K(BfT/7
12Free reserves for the whole banking system are defined by 
equation 4» FR = ER - CL. Commercial banks hold certain ratios between 
free reserves and total deposits, the free reserve ratio being FR/TD. 
at any point of time the free reserve ratio is dependent on two main 
factors; (a) the commercial banks' demand for free reserves, and (b) the 
rate at which monetary policy of the Bank of Lebanon- adds or withdraws 
unborrowed reserves UR.
The hypothesis about free-reserve ratio desired by commercial 
banks is taken to be a function of the market interest ra/fce rT 9 discount 
rate r^, Luro-dollar rate exchange rate of the Lebanese pound with 
respect to the dollar js, and unborrowed reserves UR.
^ F R / m ) = ftrL , rd ,re ,E,UR) (10; 
the market interest rate r could be used to represent the net yield or
Jj
marginal return on bank earning assets, r could then be considered
jL»
as a measure of the cost of holding excess reserves due to opportunity cost,
and a measure of the gain to be expected from borrowing extra reserves
in order to buy more earning assets.
The discount rate r, couid be used as a measure of the extra costd
the commercial banks have to pay in order to increase the borrowi ngs 
from the Bank of Lebanon, we have r in the form of mR { extra return on
li
assets; and r^ as MC(^  extra cost; if the banks have their M R ^ M C  then they 
would increase their borrowings from the Bank of .Lebanon in order to 
invest more in earning assets, up to the point where jviR =* m C, or r = r^. 
if M R ^ M C  then banks would reduce their borrowings from the Bank of Lebanon 
because their lending rate is lower than their borrowing rate,
^%*ree reserves of one bank are defined as excess reserves at the Bank of 
Lebanon, and loans to other commercial banks, minus borrowings from the 
Bank of Lebanon and commercial banks, nhen the Free reserves of all 
commercial banxs are aggregated the inter-bank loans cancel out, thus 
making free reserves equal to totax excess reserves minus total bank 
borrowings from the Ban* of .Lebanon.
The presence of nuro-doilar rate rg in the function is due to the
fact that .Lebanon has an open economy, and there is complete free capital
mobility between Beirut and Europe, and between Beirut and the Arab oil
13producing countries.  ^ The commercial banks operating in the Lebanon
can use some of their assets in the Euro-dollar market, and the extra
return obtained from investing their assets in the Euro-dollar market is
measured by re* x,et us assume that in both the uebanon and the nuro-dollar
market the availability of investment and the risk involved with it are
given and equal. Then we may argue that if r ^ r  there might be ane jli
outflow of funds from the .Lebanon to the Luro-doliar market; and if
r ^r, there might be an inflow of funds from the Euro-dollar market to e * L
•iyt
Beirut , So we could consider r to be the measure of the cost of holdinge
excess reserves. Any amount of assets held in the form of excess reserves
is losing the opportunity cost of both rates r and r ; in case the banksL e
have not invested any of their Excess Reserves in the Euro-dollar market
then their losses are equal to the amount of return that could have been
gained by investing in the Euro-dollar market. But if the banks invest
some of their excess reserves in the Euro-dollar market, their loss would
be equal to the return that couidhave been earned on the uninvested excess
reserves. This holds if r ^r_, otherwise the excess reserves would bee/  L
invested in the Lebanon, the exception or the r assumption does not
hold when the Lebanese money market cannot abosrb any extra bank credit.
The exchange rate E is included in the function, because there is 
a relationship between free-reserve ratios and the exchange rates in the 
case of the Lebanon. Let us look at this issue from an angle which allows 
us to make use of commercial banks foreign assets. In the .Lebanon during 
the period 1965-1974 the commercial banks were at any time able to sell
13Excluding Iraq, and Libya
14We are assuming that r ^r^ and r^> r^. If we have rg>  r^ and r^< r^
then r i thus the banks will borrow from the Bank of Lebanon to
invest in the Euro-dollar market.
and buy as much foreign currencies as they wished (mainly dollars) from 
the Bank of Lebanon. The willingness of the Bank of Lebanon to buy 
foreign currencies from commercial banks without any limit makes it possible 
for banks to use their foreign assets as reserves and excess reserves. If 
and when the Bank of Lebanon increases the legal reserve requirements on 
bank deposits; say from to IO70 on demand deposits and from 'Jfo to *$> 
on time deposits, the commercial banks can satisfy these requirements by 
simply converting part of their assets held in dollars or other foreign 
currencies into Lebanese pounds.
According to the figures the commercial banks in the Lebanon hold 
a, rather high percentage of their assets in the form of foreign assets:
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
i T o f t o t a f b a S  34,756 39,4?6 39,2^ 44?6 44,3?° U "l7° 40,35i’ 34' 955’
Assets
These foreign assets due to the ease of convertability of currencies in 
the Lebanon can be considered as excess reserves. Prom equation 4 we have 
PR = ER - CL, thus showing the dependence.of free reserves on excess reserves 
and bank foreign assets.
The level of unborrowed reserves UR is dependent on the activities
of the monetary authorities in open market operations. The Bank of
Lebanon can use open market operations to decrease the rate at which
unborrowed reserves are provided to the banks, or decrease the supply
of reserves, thus causing the free reserve ratio to fall. In other
words the Bank of Lebanon can reduce the level of free reserves by selling
government bonds to the commercial banks, upen market operations can also
be used to increase the rate at which unborrowed reserves are provided
to the commercial banks, thus increasing the elvel of free reserves
(and free reserve-ratioj by an outflow of government bonds from -the
15commercial banks to the Bank of Lebanon. The unborrowed reserves UR,
15The use of government bonds and open-market operations are not popular 
in theLebanon yet, and has not been U3ed regularly by the Bank of Lebanon.
and the discount rate represent monetary policy or the tools which can 
be used by the Bank of Lebanon to influence changes in the free-reserve ratio, 
we can use certain graphs in order to illustrate the process by 
which commercial banks adjust their free-reserve ratio in response to
Le£ us assume that r^, E, UR, and the legal reserve requirements are all 
constant, then we can draw the following graph:
In figure 1, the market interest rates and the Euro-dollar rates
are measured along the horizontal axis, and the free reserve-ratio is
measured along the vertical axis. The curve HR is the commercial banks*
deposits TB7. Let us start from theinitial situation where the market 
interest rate ^and the Euro=doilar ratej is equal to UC. At that interest 
rate the commercial banks wish to hold a ratio of free reserves to deposits 
equal to oD corresponding to point l on the demand schedule KR. If there 
is a change in the jiarket rate of interest r say an increase from uC to uE,
L
then the commercial banks would not want to hold a free reserve ratio of OD,
changes in market interest rates r , Euro-dollar rate, and in the exchange
XI
rates of the Lebanese pound with respect to the dollar.
(FH/TD; = f(rL , rd , re, E, DR;
D
F
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Fig. 1
demand curve for free reserves /FR being expressed as a ratio of bank total
but would like to hold a free reserve ratio of OF corresponding to point N 
on RR. Thus an increase in r equal to CE (OE - uC) created a fall in 
the free reserve ratio equal to FD (uD - -OF; and a movement downward 
along curve RR from point L to point JM.
The commercial banks move from ul) to uF by reducing excess reserves 
and increasing their borrowings from the Bank of Lebanon until there is 
no incentive to do so. And since 
FR = ER - CL
a reduction in ER and an increase un CL would lead to a fall in FR.
The process of reducing excess reserves and increasing bank borrowings
affects reserve positions of other commercial banks making those banks
change their portfolios until all the commercial banks Rri portfolio
adjustment^ are satisfied, a  fall in the Market rate of interest has the
opposite effect, causing banks to increase their excess reserves and reducing
16their borrowings thus increasing their free reserves • The curve RR
is downward sloping, because of the opportunity costs of holding excess
reserves, and because of the cost of borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon.
Banks have to pay the rate r^ for borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon
and they pay the opportunity cost r^ and rg for holding idle reserves
(excess reserves). As r^ (and/or rg) rises in relation to r^ with
r^ - r^, rg - r^ increasing then it would be more profitable for the
banks to increase their borrowings from the Bank of Lebanon, and increase
their loans. The increase in r^ and r^ increase the opportunity cost of
ER, thus inducing banks to divert some of their idle balances into loans.
The end result of an increase in r and r in relation to r, causes then e d
commercial banks to reduce their ratio of free reserves FR to total deposits 
TD.17 
16•The arguments used to explain free reserve adjustments due to changes in 
are similar to those needed to explain changes in r^. An increase
in r makes banks want to reduce ER, increase CL thus reducing FR and 
the opposite is true for a fall in re.
17As the market interest rate r and Euro dollar rate r increase it would 
become more difficult for thJ banks to reduce the frel-reserve ratio. 
Because as borrowing increases the banks approach the limits of borrowing 
set by the Bank of Lebanon«
According to the argument about changes in the free reserve ratio, 
due to changes in the market rate of interest and the Euro-dollar rate, 
the interest rates have to be determined autonomously. Y/e might argue 
that the level of free-reserve ratio influences changes in the market 
rate of interest r . But the level of rT is the result of the interaction
±J JJ
between the supply of and demand for money (bank credit), and loanable
funds. The Euro-dollar rate r^ is determined autonomously, and the level-
of the free-reserve ratio of the banks in the Lebanon has no influence on
re* In case there is an increase in legal reserve requirements then
commercial banks have to hold less excess reserves, if they accept this
new level of excess reserves and free reserves then there is no reason for
the market interest rate to change. But if the commercial banks wish to
maintain the same level of free reserves, then they have to sell some of
their bonds and reduce their loans, thus increasing the market rate of
interest. As the interest rate r increases the banks would want to reduce
L
their free reserve ratio as shown by the movement from L to N on curve RR 
in figure one. After the adjustment process by the commercial banks 
we have a new level of free reserve ratio which is lower than the initial 
level, and this has been caused by the increase in legal reserve requirements.
5 - Empirical Evidence
a - The short-run multiplier 
Two money supply equations which include a short run multiplier 
that links the monetary base with the money supply were tested empirically. 
The two equations are:
= m2Ba
and
M1 » mBL
money supply is defined as equal to cash with public (non-bank)
3»and demand deposits with the banks, B is the adjusted monetary base,
e
and B*1 is the readjusted monetary base. The money supply equation with
81the short-run multiplier mg and base B is for a closed economy, it does 
not include the changes in money supply that are due to changes in the 
balance of payments,
_  -1
m2 “ /Tk-bj(1-c+tJ + c7
01The empirical test on = m^B makes use of three different combinations
of observations. Test number one uses eight observations for the period
1969 I - 1970 IV, with quarterly data; we have the following results:
M1 «• 2.893.526 - 179.94m2 - 0.51966Ba
Cl.709; (4.195;
R2 « 0.78 
D.w. = 1.92
log M 1 = 9.86163 - O.4386log m2 - 0.26654 log Ba
(1.85; (4.62;
R2 * 0.811
D.W. * 1.96
The same test was performed using quarterly data for the period 1965 I -
I968 IV - 16 observations and the results are:
M1 = 759.0817 + 52.64 m2 + O.8324 Ba
Cl.703; (6.94;
R2 = u.823 
D.W. « 1.13
rCL-Q ~
a
log M1 = 4.556 + 0.1411 log m2 + 0.3947 log B
(1.757; (7.279;
R2 = u.835 
D.W. xr 1,1
A third test for the money supply equation = m2Ba for the 
period 19661 - 1970 IV using quarterly data - with 2o observations, 
the results are: .
M1 = 1837.5086 - 75.5413 m2 + 0.1639 Ba
(1.55; (0.93;
D.w. = 0.53
R2 = 0.384
log M.J * 6.92675 - 0.16392 log m2 + 0.10718 log Ba
(1.27; (1.26;
R2 = 0.4 
D.W. = 0.51
The Elasticities of the short-run money multiplier m2 are:
8 observations : elasticity =0.45
16 observations : elasticity = 0.14
20 observations : elasticity =0.16
Similar tests were used to study the money supply equation
= mB^, where the short-run money multiplier m is equal to
m = ^(k+a-b;(l-c+t; + c7 ^
The values of the ratios a, b, c, k and t2 and t^ are presented in
table one where t? = T_ , flu being the wide definition of money and
2
M
equal to M. plus time deposits with the commercial banks, and tn = T-*
1
M
In the empirical tests performed on = mBa and = mB^, I used the
values of t^ because the test is only for the money supply equation that
is based on a narrow definition of money M11 •
~ i *- l -
Year a b c k t
M2 2
I - .  t
Mi 1
1965
I 0.546 0.005 0.176 0.052 0.495 0.980
II 0*534 0.006 0.178 0.042 0.497 0.989
III 0.524 0.011 0.177 0.035 0.513 1.056
IV 0.550 0.009 0.167 0.040 0.530 1.129
1966
I 0.525 0.007 0.164 0.041 0.539 1.174
II 0.523 0.005 0.151 0.039 0.559 1.270
III 0.536 0.005 0.152 0.033 0.575 1.357
IV 0.586 0.059 0.188 0.067 0.550 1.180
1967
I 0.614 0.070 0.195 0.070 0.533 1.220
II 0.620 0.096 0.254 0.126 0.512 1.048
III 0.625 0.086 0.237 0.096 0.527 1.115
IV 0.612 0.085 0.234 0.095 0.531 1.136
1968
I 0.614 0.070 0.217 0.092 0.528 1.163
II 0.636 0.070 0.222 0.095 0.538 1.164
III 0.652 0.068 0.218 0.080 0.540 1.174
IV 0.643 0.086 0.242 0.109 0.495 0.983
-  \3o  -
Year a b c k x_ = t 
•M2 2
£ - =  t 
fIl 1
1969
I 0.639 0.095 0.236 0.108 0.510 1.047
II 0.650 0.096 0.228 0.100 0.521 1.090
III 0.658 0.099 0.237 0.108 0.567 1.158
IV 0.659 0.109 0.233 0.114 0.554 1.244
1970
I 0.658 0.072 0.233 0.095 0.568 1.315
II 0.672 0.067 0.219 0.096 0.577 1.364
III 0.682 0.062 0.207 0.090 0.589 1.436
IV 0.691 0.050 0.200 0.100 0.606 1.544
1971
I 0.713 0.051 0.192 0.115 0.607 1.547
II 0.724 0.027 0.178 0.097 0.617 1.613
III 0.712 0.024 0.194 0.088 0.622 1.652
IV 0.754 0.023 0.174 0.124 0.620 1.617
1972
I 0.759 0.021 0.168 0.115 0.631 1.694
II 0.759 0.021 0.167 0.119 0.637 1.761
III 0.766 0.025 0.166 0.111 0.643 1.807
IV 0.757 0.018 0.162 0.107 0.642 1.804
131 -
Year a b c k I  = t
M2 2
2  *= t
M]. 1
1973
I 0.710 0.015 0.168 0.108 0.657 1.917
II 0.678 0.015 0.167 0.129 0.648 1.848
III 0.707 0.016 0.166 0.104 0.649 1.864
IV 0.656 0.026 0.162 0.096 0.661 1.951
1974
I 0.630 0.028 0.146 0.097 0.676 2.093
II 0.631 0.015 0.147 0.121 0.680 2.130
Table 1 showing the values of a, b, c, k t| and t^ for the period
1965 I - 1974 II, using quarterly data.
f ^
The short run multiplier m is distinguished from im, mainly by
linking B^ with , thus including the values of the ratio a where
N F a  L
a = 7*jr*m • ln other words the monetary base B includes the influences
of changes on the balance of payments which are represented by NFA, and 
the changes are linked with changes in the money supply by the help of m.
I think base BL and the short run money multiplier m are more representative
8/
of the .Lebanese economy than base B and the short-run multiplier im,* because 
.Lebanon has an open economy y/hich is subject to capital inflows and outflows.
Test number one for the period 1969 1 ~ 1970 IV - quarterly data,
(eight observations)
M = -61920.48 + 64136.44 m - 0.19726 BL
(0.995) (1.73)
R2 = 0.42 
D.W. = 1.6
log M 1 = 10.5156 + 40.4 log m - 0.3904 log BL
(1.14) (1.94)
R2 * 0.47
D.W. = 1.76
Test number two uses 16 observations for the period 1965 I - 1968 IV - 
quarterly data, the results are:
M1 * 385.6 + 286.79 m + 0.3553 BL
(0.608) (6.04)
R2 = 0.85 
D.W. = 1.1
log M1 = 3.035 + 0.174 log m + 0.552 log BL
(0.565) (6.008)
R2 = 0.85 
D.W. = 1.07
Test number three is based on 20 observations and uses quarterly data 
for the period 1966 I - 1970 IV, the results are:
M1 « 2765.9 63 - 1301.997 m + O.O694 BL
(1.817) (1.503;
R2 = 0.4 
D.Y/. = O.64
log M 1 = 6.28756 - 0.7596 m + 0.1417 log BL
(1.7) (1.5)
R2 = 0.42
D.W. = 0.65
The Elasticities of the short-run money multiplier m are:
Period Elasticity
1969 I - 1970 IV 40.4
1965 I - 1968 IV 0.174
. 1966 i - 1970 IV 0.759
The tests for both money supply equations using three different
sets of observations, indicate to us that the domestic short-run money
18 amultiplier m  ^and the money supply equation B , are more
relevant (statistically) than the money supply equation ^  = mB^, and
the multiplier m. In the case of eight observations,
L 2the equation «* m3 does not really hold, and it has a low R of 0.42
and 0.47 ^he logarithmic ffnction. = mB^ failed the test for the
period 1969 I - 1970 IV and the elasticity for m of 40.4 does not hold.
£1 2On the other side for the same period M«j = m^B has an R =0.78? and the
2 Llogarithmic function has an R of 0.811, and the t-statistics for = b^B
are much better for the above mentioned period. For the period 1965 I -
I968 IV (16 observations), again = m^B3, gives better results than
t 2
M.j = m B • Both equations have similar R around 0.81 to 0.85# hut 
according to t - statistics the short-run money multiplier ra is not 
significant. For the third period I966.I - 1970 IV both money supply 
equations failejthe test, and the short-run multiplier m^, and m and both 
18 ' J .
can be defined as the domestic money multiplier,- because it is 
related to >he base Ba which does not include the foreign sector 
like base 3“ that has m as the money multiplier.
. s. ]jmonetary bases B and B are shown by t - statistics as not significant
2
and the values of R range between 0.38 and 0.42. Finally the results
tell us that the domestic money mi^tipjuer mg is rather inelastic we 
cannot say the same for m because it is not significant in the equation
b - The dynamic ?,Multiplier
The tests for the short run multipliers have .shown that the domestic 
money multiplier provides better results and is more relative for periods 
which vary between 8 and 16 quarters and with 20 observations it becomes 
ratherinsignificant. The money multiplier m failed the three tests and
two periods, 1969 I - 1970 IV and 1966 I - 1970 IV while it is significant 
for the period 1965 1-1968 IV I think that the short-run d^ss^c multiplier 
in order to be able to draw some conclusions about the money multiplier 
and its relationship with the monetary base and money supply*
The dynamic money multiplier as derived in the model is equal to:
2 2 -  £ m r=-m jj. - (k+a-b27^ c - m ^ h+a-b7 6t
- m^/i-c+tT&k - m^/I-c+t7 ka + m^l-c+t7 b b
The dynamic multiplier has been empirically estimated and tested using 
38 observations, and quarterly data for the period 1965 I - 1974 II> 
the results are:
the B^ came out to be not significant according to the t-statistics for
i, = 0.29719™ + 0.44454 bl
(0.052; (5.882)
R2 - 0.5 
D.W. = 1.32
m being in these two equatinns the dynamic multiplier and;
m 0
U.18J U.^24;
R2 * 0.4
D.W. - 1.36
The dynamic multiplier as such has produced some weak results with
2
R * 0.5 and 0*4 for the logarithmic function and Durbin-Watson statistics
of 1*32 and I.56 for the logarithmic function, indicating the presence
* * Lof autocorrelation in the equation. The equation « mB can be
represented in another form in which the dynamic multiplier is divided
into two main sections or parts; the first part represents the cash
demanding public, and the second part represents the commercial banks operating 
19in the lebanon. '
jf « -U AC - U+<At represents the cash demanding public's contributions c x
to changes in the money supply.
CB = -U, £ K  - U A a + U, £b sums up the commercial banks contributions k a b
to changes in money supply.2^
Thus we are able to write the money supply equation in the following
way:
• *T
M *= B - UcA c  - U^.At - + ^b^^ * ^  = error
the above money supply equation was tested empirically for both definitions 
of money the narrow definition and Mg the wide definition.
The results of the empirical estimations which are based on 38 
observations for the period 1965 I " 1574 II are:
= u.5583 BL + 172.048 r - 14.669CB
(8.212; (3.56; (0.94;
i).w. = 1.7
R2 = 0.66
• * T
log M., - 0.61705 log B - 0.04758 log r + 0.08154 log CB
(5.01; (1.41; (1-7;
R2 = O.507 
D.w. = 1.34
19
For the various forms of the money supply equation look in part one 
of this chapter (the money multiplier in the Lebanon).
20
The public's contributions to changes in M can be seen in both />c and ^t, 
and the banks contributions to changes in M can be observed in ab, ^a and <£k.
M0 « 0.75516 BL - 15.25218*' - 27.286CB
R2 * 0.68 
D.W. « 2.3
0.0529 log CB
(0.83)
R2 » 0.67 
D.W. « 1.5
The same form of the money supply equation was tested again, with the 
monetary base B^ being lagged B^ ^ (one year). The reason for lagging 
the base B^ one year is dependent on the argument that changes in the 
monetary base affect changes in money supply after a certain period of 
time (which I have taken to be one year) and not immediately i.e. there 
is a lag between the changes in the monetary base B^ and the money supply; 
this hypothesis has been tested and the results are:
M-j » 0.4724 BL + 0.194 B ^ 4 + 195.7P - 8.1 CB
(5.78) (2.347) (3.66) (0.912;
R2 = 0.68
D.W. = 1.6
•t
According to t-statistics the lagged variable B.J . is significant and
V—4
"Lso is B .
* *T * T
log = 0.373 log B + 0.288 log b£_. - 0.0202 log P + 0.07 log CB
(2.33) (2.2) (0.67) (1.26)
R2 = 0.5 
D.w. = 1.25
*T
Again in logarithmic form of the equation both monetary bases B and the
•t
lagged base B, . are significant, 
t—4
(7.723) (3.016) (0.4)
log M2 = 0.7858 log BL ~ 0.0956 log r +
(6.00) (2.28)
The empirical estimations have dealt with changes in the
"base and the money supply, another form of the money supply equation
was tested and it does not deal with changes in either the base B^
or the money supply, where;
M * BL - U C - U . t - U . k - U a - U . b  + E c t k a b
The results of the empirical work are as follows:
Using 38 observations, quarterly data for the period 1965 I - 1974 II
M1 = 949.147 + 0.22174BL + 56.884P, +12.76 CB1
(27.89) (2.303; (1.212;
K2 - 0.95
D.w. = 0.6
log M.J = 3.849 + 0.487 4 log B1, - 0.00327 log P1 + 0.00088 log CB1
(21.78) (0.48) (0.107)
R2 * 0.93
D.W. * 0.23
Testing the same money supply equation with the wider definition of money 
Mg *= C + D + T, gave the following results:
m2 = 397.339 + 0.9379 BL - 1567.91'-, + 1918.273 CB1 
(23.89; (1.962; (3.77;
R2 = 0.98
D.W. ** 0.81
log Mg = 1.7736 + 0.77H9 log BL - 0.3897 log ^  + 0.70415 log CB1
(25.98; (2.287) (5.0517)
R2 « 0.99 
D.W. » 1.1
*
The empirical estimations wosiconducted on the money supply equation 
in its different forms using both definitions of money supply and Mg.
In some cases the money supply gave better results than Mg in other 
cases Mg gave better results than • The most obvious case is the
test on the equation in the form?
M « BL - U,C - U, t - U,K - V a - U~b + &C "G iC U D
where Mg gave significantly better results than , this is shown by 
2the values of R , D.W. and t-statistics.-> When using we have only 
the base and the public as significant, but with high autocorrelation, 
and in the logarithmic form only the monetary base is significant (with 
very high autocorrelation;. By using Mg the situation improves the 
three variables B^, iJ, and CB became significant in both forms 
(functional form and logarithmic; of the money supply equation, but 
we still have autocorrelation.
Q* T
Graphs one and two show the changes in Mg, B, B and B for
the period 1965 I - 1974 II on quarterly basis. The values of M and the 
base are in millions of Lebanese pounds. It is almost in the same direction 
as and the re-adjusted base B^ has almost an identical path to that 
of Mg. It was mentioned before that it is more realistic to use a 
lagged base in the money supply equation, because it takes a certain amount 
of time for the monetary base to affect the money supply; so it would be 
more beneficial if we keep this idea in mind while looking at graphs 
one and two. In graph two in 1968 IV Ba has a peak and in 19&9 II 
has a similar peak (almost of the same magnitude;. In 1973 II Ba 
has a peak while has a similar peak in 1974 1*
Graph two also tells us that base Ba after 1968 has a path different 
from that of Mg while B^ has a path similar to Mg, so it is hardly surprising 
to find out that Mg has given more realistic results than in the last 
equation. The sudden increase in the base B^ and in Mg after 1970 IV is 
explained by the increase of capital inflows into the Lebanon from two 
sources; a; the Arab oil producing countries b; repatriation of some * 
Lebanese capital from certain African countries mainly in 1972 and 1973*
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21Ronald S* Koot employs a methodological and statistical approach
which involves a two stage procedure in order to define money empirically*
in the first stage Koot uses a set of financial assets which is considered
simultaneously to determine relationships among the assets within the set.
The dimension of the set of assets is then reduced by the statistical
technique of factor analysis. In the second stage Koot applies the
Friedman-Meiselman dual criteria, to the factor analytic results to determine
an empirical definition of money* The empirical results of Koot for the
first stage indicate that the most important determinants of an empirical
definition of money are* currency and demand deposits. But time deposits
and savings bonds show some degree of moneyness; they are near-moneys*
The results of the factor analytic definition under the Friedman-Meiselman 
22criteria have given a satisfactory performance.
The empirical tests of various forms of the money supply equation
(with M.j and j y  have generally given results which show or indicate
23 2that there is autocorrelation. J The values of R range from 0.63 to
#  ' •
0*507 for and j y  and from 0.93 to 0.99 for and Mg. When a lagged
*Lvariable was used ^ the results did not show any improvements though 
the lagged variable came out to be rather significant according to t-statistic3, 
The most common sources of autocorrelation are l) omission of some important 
variable, 2) error in the mathematical form of the equation, 3) errors 
in the macrovariables, 4) mis-specification of the true random term^ u.
21 ~
Ronald^S. Koot, "A Factor Analytic Approach to An Empirical Definition 
of Money1’, The Journal of Finance Sep, 1975 p. 1081-IO89.
^^For the Friedman-Meiselman criteria look, M. Friedman and D. Meiselraan 
’’The Relative Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment Multiplier 
iin the U.S. 1897-1958", in Commission in Money &nd Credit, Stabilisation 
policies, Englewood Cliffs, 1964.
23 * . . »
D.W. for is 1.7 for lag is 1.34» lag D.W. = 1.5, aad for
D.W. * 0,6 and 0.23 for log and 0.81 and 1.1 for Mg and log M2 
consecutively.
For more information about autocorrelation look in Econometric Methods, 
by J. Johnston, McGraw Hill N.Y. 1972 p. 243-254, and in Theory of 
Econometrics, by A. Koutsoyiannis, Macliillan Press Ltd., G.B. 1976 
p. 194-218.
When the values of the random variable u in any particular period
are correlated with its own preceeding values then there is serial
correlation of the random variable ^autocorrelation)* In certain
practical cases or when we undertake applied econometric research the
assumption of temporal independence of the values of the random variable
25can be easily violated* ^
When we build an economic model we do not include all the explanatory
variables, only the most important variables are included explicitly in
the function, so it is natural to expect that omitted variables are a frequent
26
cause of quasi-autocorrelation* The money supply model used the following 
variables, the monetary base; the public's demand for cash, and the 
commercial banks demand for reserves* The values of the monetary base 
in any particular period are partly determined by its own value in the
T
preceding period. The base B includes net foreign assets, and the 
level of net foreign assets in period t depends on the level of net 
foreign assets in period t - 1. An inflow of foreign assets at period t - 1 
would improve the position of the Lebanese balance of payments, such an 
improvement leads to an increase in the Lebanese stock of monetary reserves 
and increases the value of the Lebanese pound on the foreign exchange market p  
thus causing a new inflow of foreign assets into the Lebanon in period t.
"One can hardly think of any significant economic magnitude which is not 
somehow determined by the values which the same magnitude assumed in the
27
past. Furthermore, in actual life, autocorrelation tends to be positive."
The two traditional tests for the incidence of autocorrelation are 
the Von Newmann ratio and the Durbin-Wat son test. The Von Newmann ratio 
is applicable for directly observed series and for variables which are
t
random. When the values of the random variable u are not directly observable 
but are estimated from the OLS residuals ^e's); one might think that the 
25 A. Koutsoyiannis, op, cit. p. 198-199
ibid. p. 198 
ibid. p. 199
28 —
Yon-Newmann ratio could be applied approximately^ (n 30, and e = 0
by definition,)• The Yon Newmann ratio may be used to test a large sample
for positive autocorrelation "by constructing the empirical value obtained
for the V.N. ratio with a pre-selected critical region from the normal
distribution with the appropriate mean and variance, but it is important
to emphasise that even the formulae for the mean and variance are only
true if the e values are independently distributed and this, in fact,
is not true of least squares residuals, even when the true disturbance
29terras are independently distributed." 7
The Durbin-watson test is applicable to small samples, and the e values
are both positive and negative with mean zero. The D.W. tends to be small
for positively autocorrelated series, and large for negatively autocorrelated
30
series,- and somewhere in between for random series." The Durbin-watson 
test has some shortcomings, theD.W. statistic is not an appropriate measure 
of autocorrelation if among the explanatory variables there are lagged 
values of the endogenous variable. TheD.W. is inappropriate for testing
31for higher order serial correlation or for other forms of autocorrelation.
There is an alternative test for autocorrelation, which has the 
advantage of being applicable to any form of autocorrelation and provides 
estimates of the coefficients of the autocorrelation relationship. We 
take the regression residuals and use then instead of the dependent variable 
of the original regression and run another regression with the same independent 
variables. 1 have taken the residuals of the regression.
VS # t
1 = 0.5583B + 172.048*. - 14.669CB 
and substituted them for M, and another regression gave the following results:
t
OQ
ibid, p. 206
2Q
y Jj Johnston, op. cit. p.250
30 ibid. 251-254
31 For more information on this point look A. Koutsoyiannis, op.cit 
p. 207-210 and p. 526 - 534.
The correlation coefficients are:
b l p CB D
1.000 • 0,324 0.331 -0.1352
P -0.324 1.000 0.0914 0.0481 *
CB o;33i 0.0914 1.000 -0.0114
D -0.135 0.0481 -0.0114 1.000
Table 2
D a the residual series of .the estimated model.
Table 2, shows that the correlation coefficients are not high,
2in fact they are low. The R for the first variable, or the monetary
2
base is 0.01829 rather low. The F-statistic is 0.67088 also low. R for
variable P is 0.0023 very low, and F-statistic is also very low 0*08376.
2
And variable CB has R = 0.00013 very low, and F-statistic of 0.00473 
* *Lextremely low. B , P and CB are the independent variables while I) is
the dependent variable. The conclusion which can be drawn from such
results states that the values of the random variable are not
autocorrelated. This is so, because the test has given low values of 
2
R and F-statistics thus making PJs insignificant where P ’s are from:
Gt " Pet-1 + Vt or
« Piet-1 + P2 et-2 and 80 on*
Since P's are not significant then the random variable has successive
independent values.
The same test was applied using the residuals of the regression.
M2 « 0.755 BL - 15.25P - 27.28CB
as the dependent variable D. The correlation coefficients are:
“ ™ L .....
B P CB D
bl 1.000 -0.338 0.310 -0.199
p -0.338 1.000 -0.130 0.037
CB 0.318 0.130 1.000 -0.0019
D -0.199 0.037 -0.0019 1.000
Table 3
. •
Again for the correlation coefficients are not high, the independent 
*L 2variable B has an R of 0.0397 n°t high, and F-statistic 1.49*
2
The independent variable P has an R = 0.0013 very low and
2
F-statistic 0.0495* The independent variable CB has an R of 0.00000
and an F-statistic of 0.00014. Thus we conclude that P*s are not significant,
and each of the variables has successive independent values. In both
equation CB has produced excellent results thus proving empirically
that its values at period t are not related to its values at period
t-1; so did the other independent variables, but not as strongly as CB.
Before presenting the empirical results of this section I would like 
to note that in the function
I
NFA = f (r , r_, G ) 
e d
G' is the national stock of reserves, and I am aware that the net 
foreign assets influence G'. The reason for using G' in the function is simply 
to compare it empirically /being a proxy for the stability of the Lebanese 
balance of payments/ With the influence of the Exchange rate E and NFA, 
when the function resumes a more realistic form
NFA = f (r , r , E)
e d
in fact the results tell us that E is a better proxy for the stability
of the Lebanese B/P than G*.
c ™ Net Foreign Assets
The monetary base B according to the model and the empirical 
estimations plays an important role in determining changes in the money 
supply of the Lebanon, As mentioned before the Lebanon has an open- 
economy, and the balance of payments is subject to changes in capital 
flows. The way the monetary base B1" is derived in the first part of 
this* chapterJ makes it possible for us to trace the influence of net foreign 
assets on B^ and on the money supply in the Lebanon* We have:
BL = Ba + NFA-
and
M = mBL
where NFA = a(D+T), and represents the foreign sector in the monetary base 
BL *
The object of this section is to test empirically the relationship
between NFA, and a set of independent variables, r , r,, G^, TL^ and E.
e cl
The hypothesis about NFA states that there is a negative relationship 
between the level of NFA and rg , a positive relationship between the level 
of NFA and r^, and a negative relationship between NFA and the exchange 
rate (dollars in Lebanese pounds) f thus having:
NFA c f (re, rd, E)
We can have another hypothesis which includes the national stock of monetary 
reserves as a proxy for the stability of the Lebanese balance-of-payments; 
with
HIXi = f (re, rd, G1;
32
Both functions have been tested using quarterly data, and 22
observations for the period 19691 - 1974 II. I think that a great part >
of the funds that are deposited in the Lebanon from Arab oil producing
countries are these, because of the relative stability of the Lebanese 
52
r^ and have been omitted from the empirical test, because it has 
not been possible to obtain any data on r. (the market interest ratesj,
and va3.ues for ¥^are not continuous - they are only available for a short
period of time*
pound (or balance of payments); while the other part of the funds enter 
Lebanon to be invested in the Euro-dollar market, via the commercial banks 
in Beirut.
The NFA are responsive to changes un r& and r^ in two opposite
directions i.e. an increase in r^ leads to an outflow of capital from
Lebanon to the Euro“doliar market, while an increase in r^ causes capital
inflows to Lebanon. I have treated the differences between r ande
r^ by using two alternative methods in conducting empirical tests. The
first method is based on the idea that NFA are responsive to ^rg - r^);
the net result of capital mobility due to changes in rg and r^ is dependent
on the net difference in changes of r and r,. (r -r,). If the value ofe d7 x e dy
- r^) increases it means that has a higher rate of increase than 
that of r^, the opposite is true. So we have the following function:
• NFA = ft r ~ r ,;v e & '
The other method treats one of the interest rates as the denominator;
in my tests 1 use r^ as the denominator having the ratio , for the
rd
period 197H-19711V for example
fe « 1.84, 2.24, 2.57, 2.11
rd
an increase in the ratio from say 1.84 to 2.24 means that the rate of
increase in r has been greater than the rate of increase in r,; or the e d
rate of decrease in r has been less than the rate of decrease in r ..e d
When there is an increase in the ratio then there will be an outflow of 
capital from Beirut to the Euro-dollar market, the function has the following
- \59 -
1 1The first set of regressions includes G and TL f the reason for 
1
including TL » TL - IMF is just to incorporate the changes in the Lebanese 
■IMF position end its influence on changes in NFa . We have
NFA = 95.433 - *0.66xr ~rd; + O.657G1 - o'o738TL1 
(I.6124; (43.14) (0.773)
R2 -- U.99
R.w. = 1.75
log NFA = -0.47976 - u.3‘3571og(re - rd; + l.ul25LogG1 - U.U0106 log TL1
(1.53; (47.9; (0.345;
R2 = 0.99 
D.w. =  1.42
The previous two regressions have the right signs for both independent
1 —  1 
variables (r^-r^) and G , /with rd7? I0 insignificant, so it
has been dropped out and we have:
NFA = 127.71 - 23.72(r -rj + 0.6508G1e cl
(1.96) (51V8)
E2 = 0.99
D.W. .= 1,75
1
By dropping out TL the results improved; thus making (r^~r^) significant
with t-statistic 1.96
log NFA = 0.46833 - 0.0354 log (re~rd) + 1.01117 log G1
(1.74) (49.9)
R2 « O.99 
D.W. « 1.4
Elasticities of NFA with respect to (re~ra) are ~ 0.3337 and -0.035
Another set of regression was run with ^e rather than (r ~^d)
rd
as on the independent variables, the other independent variables are G 
and Tl \
- /*/ -
r 1 1
NFA 143.59 - 53.61 —  + 0.6560' - O.6764TL
rd
(1.2) (33*6) (1.45)
R2 =0.99 
D.W. = 1.6
re 1 i
log NFA = -0.5922 - 0.01871og —  + 1.023 log G - 0.0029 log TL
rd
(0.44) (50.08) (0.877)
B2 = 0.99 
D.W. = 1.15
1 reBoth independent variables G and —  have the right sign, hut
r rd
G Iaccording to t-statistic —  is not significant. TL was dropped out and
rd
the results did not improve, they are:
r '
NFA = 122.23817 - 44.475 “  + 0.65144 G 1
rd
(0.98) (33.6)
R2 = 0.99 
D.W. = 1.4
r 1
log UFA = -0.69324 - 0.00567 log —  + 1.03 log G
rd
(0.16) (32.61)
R2 = 0.99
D.W. = 0.946
It seems from the results that ^r^-r^) is relatively less insignificant
than —  , and in the function;
rd
UFA = f (re-rd, G1)
(re“rd) is significant and so is G ; (according to t-statistic).
The exchange rate E was substituted for g \  and another set of 
regression were run for the same period with quarterly data; The results are;
UFA = 13411.6 - 208.024 (re~rd) - 2991„4E - 12.69TL1 
(3.98) (7.6; (3.4)
R2 = 0.91 
• D.W. « 1.3
log NFA » 11.04 - 0.347 log (re~rd) - 2.17 log E - O.O69 log TL1
(3.231) (7.09) (3.146)
R2 » 0.88
D.W. = 1,25
-j
TL was dropped out, and the results did not show any significant changes, 
except that (re~rd) increased in signficance; we have:
NFA = 9914.503 - 275.318 (*e-rd) “ 1862.19E
(4.509) (7.04)
R2 = 0.86
D.W. = 1.1
log HEA = 10.463 - 0.516 log (r -rd) - 1.58 log E
(4.571) 15.38)
R2 - 0.817 
D.W. = 1.05
The results show that the exchange rate (empirically) is a "better
proxy for the stability of the Lebanese balance of payments than the stock
of monetary reserves.
NFA = f (re-rd,E;
The above function has shown empirically that, both independent variables
are significant, and have the right sign.
Let us study the responsiveness of NFA to the various independent 
* r„1 6variables, (r -r,), G and E; —  has been dropped out, because it is
6  Cl 37 j
1 *
not significant; TL is included only in the function that has E as one 
of its independent variables.
The Elasticities of NFA with iespect to
(r -r.) G1 E TL1v e cr
-0.353 47*98
-0.035 1.011
-0.347 -2.17 -0.0695
**0.516 -1.585
The main conclusion that could be drawn from the elasticities 
supports the hypothesis v/hich states that a great part of the Arab funds 
are deposited in the Lebanon, because of the relative stability of the 
Lebanese pound (and balance of payments;. It seems that NFA is interest 
inelastic - in the case of the Lebanon, The results also support the 
hypothesis which states that commercial banks increase their holdings 
of foreign assets when the Lebanese pound improves its position with 
respect to the dollar, '
The regressions have shown some positive auto-correlation, this is
1
expected in equations which include variables like E, and G , The value 
of E at period t is dependent on its value in period t-i, because if there 
is an improvement in the Lebanese pound on the foreign exchange market 
this could lead to an increase in capital inflows into the Lebanon thus 
improving or increasing the value of the Lebanese pound with respect to 
other currencies, in order to minimise positive autocorrelation the same 
regressions were run using first differences, the results are:
NFA =7.63 ^re“V  + 0,594 °1 “ 0,497 T]j1
(0,467; (10.3:5; (1.66;
R2 = u.87
The implications of the results with respect to monetary policy and the 
controlability of money supply in the Lebanon will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
“ 15? “
log NFA = 0.0149 log (re~rd; + 0.94 log cJ - 0.401 log TL1
(0.373; (38.1; (0.76;
R2 = 0.98
r 1 .,
NFA = 51.2 + 0.59 G - 0.46 TL ‘
d
(0.69; (10.4; (1.56;
R2 * u.87
r 1 1
log NFA = -0.129 log + 0.921 log G - 0.064 log TL
d
(1.362; (39.3; (1.4;
R2 = 0.99
NFA .« 9.98 (r -rd; - 578.08 E - 1.772 TL1 
(0.251; (0.78; (1.75;
R2 = 0.14
log NFA = -1.4117 log (re»rd; - 1.55 log E - 0.155 log TL^
(1.308; (2.512; (0.367;
R2 = 0.5
NFA = 10.16 (re-rd; 174.13 * 
(0.245; (0*456;
R2 = 0.114
log HFA = -1.226 log (r - 1.336 log B
(1.511; (2.54;
R2 = 0.5
The results show that when we use first differences the stock of 
monetary reserves functions much better than E does. ihe empirical estimations
h
with first differences are generally not significant according to t-statistic 
with the exception of G .
FRThe Free-reserve ratio ~  is taken to be a function of interest,
rates, the exchange rate, and unborrowed reserves;
FR = f <r } r ,, r , F, UR;
TD L a e
Since it is not possible to obtain figures for r^  then it has to be dropped 
out of the empirical estimations, the equations that has been tested is 
in the following form:
FR = f U  -r , JB, U)
ID e a ,
n tip S£
FR
= O.U4918 - U.001J2 (r -r,; - O.UI527E + O.OOO26U 
iij e cl
(0.96; (2.5XJ (7.39;
R2 = 0.626
D.vv, =2.3
48 monthly observations were used for the period 1971 Jan.-1974 Bee.
The commercial banks in the Lebanon are able to use their foreign assets
as excess reserves, because the Bank of Lebanon is willing to buy any given
6 4amount of foreign currency that the banks are supplying.
The same equation for the Free-reserve ratio is treated with lagged 
variables, because the influence of the explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable is distributed over a number of past values of the 
explanatory variable. The general form of a distributed-lag model is:
Yt = a * V Xt + b1Xt-l + b2Xt~2 + ••• V t - L *  •••#IJt
The main reason forusing lagged variables is because the level of 
free reserves, and the changes in free reserves are dependent on the * 
present and past pattern of interest rates and the exchange rate; so if 
we lag (ro-r^) one month we get;
34This point has been put forward in the theoretical part of this chapter
FR = U.U5712 + 0.uuuu3^r -r^ .j. - u,0ul9(re~rd; ^  - 0.U17
TD t (0.U16; (O.916; ^2.66;
+ 0.UUU27 Ut
R2 «' O.64
(7*4;
D.w. = 2.35
has the wrong sign, and is insignificant, so is - r ^ ; .
Since the data is based on monthly data a lag of four months, three months 
and two months would give us a more clear idea about the relationship 
between Free Reserves and the interest rates, the estimations are as follows
FR
~  = U.U342 + u.uuui8^re-rd;t - u.00242 (re-*d;t _  ^
* ^O.u9; {,0. 82;
•* OcOuo55vre“r(i;^ > 2 " u.ui653Et + 0.00026u^
1,0.235;, \,2.25; (7.J-24;
H2 = 0.63 
D.w. b 2.5
again the variable (^ r -r,; is not significant and both ^r -r,; , and
6 CL © CL X
VFe“rd;^_2 have the wrong sign.
FR » U.U3I86 ~ u.UU06y (rg-rd)t - 0.00038(re-rd)<fc_1
TD t (0.332; (0.1208)
-0.00308(re-rd)t-2 + 0.00405 (re“rd^t-3 
(0.9949) (1.73)
-0.0108Et + 0.00026Ut
(1.4; ’ (6.98)
R2 = 0.66
D.W. » 2.2
(re-rd)^^ has the wrong sign but is much less insignificant than (Te~T$)tt 
(i*e-rd)^^ and (re“r^)^2 var:i-akle ® this regression seems to
be not significant.
- 0.0064 (re“rd)t^ 2 + °*°°912 (re-3?d)t-5
(1.85) (2.598)
- 0.00481 (re~rd)t_4 - 0.01748Et
(1.857) (2.097)
+ 0.00025 Ut
(6.34)
R2 = 0.69 
D.W. = 2.1
( r ^ - r ^   ^ and (re~rd)^.^ both have the wrong sign, but (rQ-rd) ^ ^
is significant. (re~rd).^ -2---'4^ 'i-4:Pe*"rd)-t-.4 213:6 almos  ^significant. 
Generally the results are not strong according to t-statistic specially 
for (re“rd)-t snd (rg - rd^t-l* may ^ree reserves are responsive to 
past changes in interest rates rather than present changes; i.e. two, 
three and four months before changes in interest rates took place and 
are related to the present behaviour of free reserves.
Another lagged variable has been tested, but only for period t-1; 
the reason being that hi (one month) might have an influence on thei»~i
present level of Free-Reserves, ^> **t-3 611 d three months) is
a rather long period (relatively), and responses of foreign assets and
35changes in excess reserves^ to changes in E are almost spontaneous or 
very short-run oriented, (short-run in this case being less than 30 days). 
We have:
ER
^  = 0.01586 + 0.00087 U e-rd)t - 0.0149*1*
t (1.24) (0.911)
+O.OI869 + 0.00014 Ut
(1.146) (18.9)
R2 = 0.91 
D.W. = 2.4
35For the relationship between E and excess reserves look up under Free- 
Reserves in part one of this chapter.
According to the above regression there is no justification for
lagging E, in fact without E^. ^ the results are much better and E becomes
significant with t~statistic of 2*51* The variable is significant
in all the previous regressions*
Some empirical estimations were undertaken to study the relationship
between total bank deposits and the interest rates, free-reserve ratio,
and U; and the results are:
TD = -1.50844 + 9«0917(re-rd) + 709.6 || - O.OO89U
(0.775; (I.O67; (0.025;
R2 = 0.037 
D.W. = 2.1
using 48 monthly observations for the period 1971-1974 end of. The
results are insignificant, so another regression was run using 40 monthly
observations I97I-I974 April.
TD = 250*18 -f 11.06l6(re~rd; - 2538.9 f§ + 0.238 U 
(1*03; (1.84) (0.84)
R2 « 0.1
D.W. = 2.6
With no improvement on the previous regression, I attempted or introduced 
lagged variables, and the results are:
TDt = -9.0738 + 1.588 (re-rd;t + 9.115 U e- V t -1 + 718,1 "f§
t
(0.08; (0.458; (1.1)
- 0.02112 U
(o.u58;
R2 - 0.43 
D.W. = 2.18
There is no improvement in the results, the (re"^) is still not significant 
showing according to the above regression that changes in total deposits 
are not related to interest rates; or to be more realistic the equation 
has failed to show that there is a relationship between changes in total 
bank deposits and interest rates. The same variable then was lagged over
two, three and four months, and the results did not in any v/ay improve,
TDt « -16,73 +.10*4(re-rd)t - 32 65(re~rd; ^  + 4 0 ,3(re-rd;t__2
(0.51) (1,11; U-91J
PR
+ 476.4 5-5 - 0.15467 fft
t
(0.721; (0.43;
R2 = 0.13
D.W. = 2,3
TDt = -6.20057 + 5.41(r0-rd;t - 24.91.r0-rd;t_1 +23*5(.re-rd;t_2
1,0.251; (0.784; (.0.74;
PR
+I6.9(re-rd;t_3 + 261.39 - 0.16533 Dt
(0.71; (0.361; (0.447;
R2 = 0.14 
D.W. = 2.5
TDt = -1U.7084 + 10.867(,re-rd;t - 34.719(.*e-rd;t_.|
(,0.469; (0.984;
+ 33.535(Vrd;t-Z " 1*5152^ W t - 3 '
(0.958; (0.0412;
+15.76Ure-rd;t_4 + 157.677 §  ^ - 0.077 U*
(0.648; (0.2098; (0.19;
R2 * 0.15 
D.W. = 2.5
Another variable was introduced into the equation, E the exchange rate, 
.Lebanon is an open economy and an improvement in the exchange rate and
A
discount rate might lead to capital inflows, thus increasing total bank 
deposits. 48 monthly observations were used for the period 1971-1974 end of,
TD = 360.10035 - 4.3165 (re“rd) •' " 93*10992 E
(0 .500) (1.224;
0.074 
2.57
The results are very poor, but this does not mean that there is no 
relationship between total bank.deposits and interest rates. The equation 
has failed empirically ;bo show that there is a relationship between TD and 
(re-rd;, and between TD and E. The way the relationship has been presented 
is one conception among many alternative possibilities. The evidence 
considered in this section indicates that the free-reserve ratio of the 
commercial banks operating in the Lebanon is related to the exchange rate 
and to a lesser extent to the difference between the Euro-dollar rates 
and the Bank of Lebanon discount rates. The free-reserve ratio according 
to the results shows that it has some relationship with changes in the 
differences between commercial banks unborrowed reserves and the required 
reserves ratio.
•28,u 66 
(0.05;
PR
TD O.U156 U 
(0.096;
R ** 
D.W. =
e - Forecasting Abilities of the model
The purpose of this section is to test the forecasting performance
of the model, and the measure of the accuracy of the forecasts is based
36on Theil’s inequality coefficient^ which is defined as the positive 
square root of
jj2 _ £ ( Pi - Ai)2/n
£  Ai'Vn
Pi being the forecast change in .the dependent variable, and Ai is the 
realised change in the dependent variable. The seriousness of a given 
forecast error can be measured by
£1 (pi - Ai)2/n
which is the mean square prediction error for the set of all n observations.
And the square root is usually taken in order to obtain a measure which
has the same dimension as the predictions and realisations themselves.
2
The denominator £Ai /n is simply a device to obtain an appropriate unit 
37of measurement.
Theil decomposes the numerator into a number of terms:
1 i (Pi-Ai)2 = (P - A)2 + (Sp - t>A)2 + Z(1 - r) SpSA
n *
where P,A, Sp, SA are the means and standard deviations of the series
38
P^, A^ respectively, and r is the correlation coefficient.
£(Pi - P) (Ai - A) /n 
SA
36' H. Theil, Applied Economic Forecasting, North Holland Publishing Company 
Amsterdam 1966, p. 15-36
57ibid. p. 27-29 *
38For more information about measures of inequality look H. Theil,
Economic Forecasts and policy. North Holland publishing company,
Amsterdam, 1970, p.31-42.
59witn U , U , U as the partial coefficients of inequality y and U 4- U U *
131 s c in s c
The values of the inequality coefficient lie between zero and
infinity
0 < U *
» ■  . \ p S 2 S
v Ai /n
when u = 0, we have the case of perfect forecasts, and when U » 1, 
the model forecasts no changes in the value of the variable Pi, and if 
U > 1  the predictive power of the model is more than the zero change 
prediction i.e. in thi3 case it is preferable to assume that there will 
be no change in the value of the dependent variable between the periods 
t and t+l. The conclusion is that the smaller the value of the inequality 
coefficient U the better is the forecasting performance of the model.
The equations which have been used for forecasting are:
M = BL - U a C - U .  4t'-U. A k - U  <aa + U, a b +£.
C v K S D
• j
M being the dependent variable of the money supply equation.
The Free-Reserve ratio,
\ ID
Both equations were tested in the previous parts of this chapter, similar
tests were performed again for M leaving out the last eight periods.
The money supply equation with has been estimated with 30 observations
* -a-
for the period 1965 I - 1972 II, and then (forecast) is calculated
•*
for eight periods 1972 III-1974 II* Table 4 presents the values of M-j obtained 
from the calculations which are reached by multiplying the value of the 
coefficient of each independent variable with the relevant actual value » 
of that variable for the eight periods. The calculations are available 
on the next page.
59 ibid p. 35-57 
40 The money supply equation was derived in the first part of this chapter.
J = a “ W rd) - b1E + V  + £
•*
Theil’s inequality coefficient u has been calculated for with 
the help of Table 4 where:
U = +
For periods III and XV 1972 the predicted values of M-j’s are:
1£* = a + 0.53597(5.847; + 169.318(-0.0025; - 1.32623(-0.005) = 2.7505
M* = a + 0.53597(5.170; + l69.3i8CO.OOO4; - 1.32623C0.U031; » 2.835
For periods I, II, III and IV 1973 predicted M^’s are:
M* = a + 0.53597C-0.195; 4- 169.318(-0.0007; - 1.32623(-o.239; = 0.08 
M* = a + 0.53597(1.524; + 169.318(0.005; - 1.32623 (0.uo57; = 1.67
M* = a + 0.53597(7.053; + 169.3l8(-u.0025; - 1.32623(0.0060; = 3.83
M* = a + 0.53597(-i.l76; 4- I69.3i8t0.uu2; - 1.32623(-o.o596; = -0.243
For periods I and II 1974 the predicted M^’s are:
M* = a 4- 0.53597(2.270; -f 169.318(0.0071; - 1.52623(-O.Ol62; = 2.43
M* = a + 0.53597(6.519; + 169.318(-0.0003; - 1.32625(0.0220; = 3.42
a is equal to zero, and the coefficient of 
BL - 0.53597
P = 169.518 
CB = -1.52623
I ”
period M*
0
M 1
*2
M 1
•* 0 2 
im1 -
1972
III 2.7505 ' 3.3i6 10.9 0.520
IV 2.835 4.571 20.8 3.03
1973
1 0.08 0.655 0.429 0.350
II 1.67 4.424 19.5 7.56
III 3.83 5.818 33.6 3.92
IV -0.243 2.864 8.18 9.61
1974
I 2.45 0.760 0.577 2.78
II 3.42 u.378 0.142 9.24
£M.( = 
22.8
*2
£  *
94
* * P
c  ^
= 36.71
Table 4
£ M*
_ L  - 24 - 1]L*75
n 8
g t M r - = 36<71 = 4,5Q8
n 8
f*
= U = 0.6248 and therefore U < 1  for M.J and the money supply
equation has shown a good forecasting performance.
e
The same money supply equation was used again-to forecast Mg for
the period 1972 ill - 1974 II* and the same method was followed in order
to calculate Theil*s inequality coefficient u. Table 5 shows the eight 
different values of Mg ^forecast) , and the actual values of Mg for the 
same period or quarters.
+
From Table 5 we have £  ^ Mg - Mg)^ = 70.13 and £ Mg = 172.4 n = 8
Therefore
u + V 21.55
U = 4-^ 0.40 678
U = 0.657797 and U<1
e
The predicted values of Mg’s for periods III and IV, 1972 are:
M* = 2.646 + 0.270 - 0.1195 = 3.996
Mg = 5.400 - 0.151 + 0.131 = 3.400
The predicted values of Mg’s for periods 1, II, ill and IV 1973 are: 
Mg *= -0.132 +' 0.077 + 0.836 » 0.781
Mg = 1.003 - 0.540 + 0.129 = 0.592
= 4.64 + 0.270 - 0.202 = 4.572
Mg = -0.772 - 0.233 + 1.43 = 0.425
The predicted values of l!„'s for periods I, XI 1974
= 1.49? - 0.855 + 0.597 - i.232
M g  4.292 + 0.0389 - 0.785 = 3.546
“7 * 6 -
The regression which gives us the relative coefficients is based on 
50 Quarterly observations 1965 1 - 1972 II and is:
» • •
Mg « 0.65784 Bh - 38.638P - 11.933 CB
Period
•#
m 2
*2
m 2
• 2
(M2 - M2)
1972
III 3.996 4.888 23.89 0.7956
IV 3.400 4.481 20.08 1.1685
1975
I 0.781 4.503 20.28 13.853
II 0.592 2.109 4.45 '2.301
III 4.572 6.338 40.17 3.118
IV 0.425 5.741 32.95 28.19
1974
I 1.232 5.314 28*24 16.64
I! 3.546 1.531 2.34 4.060
*2
* m 2 =
172.4
v * * * P
£(m2 - n2r  
= 70.15
Table 5
According to the empirical estimations the values of Theil*s
inequality coefficient U varies from 0*6248 for and 0.637797 
*
for The conclusion which is "based on these figures supports
the forecasting performance of the model for both definitions of money 
M1 and Mg for the period 1972 III - 1974 II,
The same method was applied to test the forecasting performance 
of the Free-Reserve ratio equation. Table 6 shows the actual and 
predicted values of changes in the Free-Reserves ratio for the last eight 
months of 1974*
,, (Pi-Ai)2/n TJ » + 1/ — — t~t—  n =* 8
Ai /n
p  2 r
£ (Pi-Ai) = 0.00587, and £ A i  = 0.011097 From Table 6
0.000075575
0.001387125
U *= y^O.052897179 
u = 0.229993 U<1
Therefore the Free-Reserves Ratio equation has shown good forecasting 
performance, in fact better than the money supply equation, because it 
has a lower value for U.
The predicted values of changes in the Free-Reserve ratio for the last 
eight months of 1974 are: Let Pi
Pi = 0.00065 - 0.00236 - 0.000255 - 0,0103 = -0.01223
Pi = 0.00065 - 0.001788 - 0.000249 - 0.00238 = - 0.00376
Pi = O.OOO65 - 0.00224 - 0.0002508 - 0.00154 = - 0.00338 
Pi * O.OOO65 - 0.00264 - 0.000249 - 0.01022 = - 0.01245
Pi = O.OOO65 - 0.001535 - 0.O00246 - 0.0005628 = -O.OOI69
Pi - O.OOO65 - 0.001015 - 0.0002519 + 0.54867 = 0.05415
Pi - 0.00065 - 0.000745 - 0.U00255 + 0.09868 = 0.09833
Pi = 0.00065 - 0.0008085 - 0.000253 - 0.0110698 = - 0.0115
The coefficient of 
(re ~ rd) ° ~c-°°035 
E « -0.00011
U . « 0.00014
and the constant a = 0.00065
Period Predicted
Values
Pi
Actual
Values
Ai
Ai2 (P5!-Ai)2
1974
May -0.01223 -0.0072 0.000052 0.0000253
June -0.00376 -0.0013 , 0.0000012 0.00000605
July -0.00358 -o.uo37 O.OU0O14 0.000000102
Aug. -u.01245 -0.0112 0.OOO13 u.00000156
Sep, -u*00169 0.0006 0.00000056 0.OUOUO52
Oct. -0.03415 0.0376-; 0.00141 0*000274
Nov. 0.09833 0.0935 0.00874 0.000023
Pec. -0.0115 O.0274 0.00075 0.000253
£ A 2i = 
0.011097
£ (Pi-Ai)2 «
0.000587
Table 6
£ A 2i = o. 001387125 
n
g ^ ^ i - A i ) 2 = u.000073375
•t
The empirical estimations show that the monetary base B plays
ajnajor^r^_e^3^ determining the values of th e dependent jya^ablejt and
The monetary base itself is dependent on NFA, so NFA were tested and 
the results support the hypothesis that capital inflows to the Lebanon 
are sensitive to changes in the values of the Lebanese pound rather than 
the changes in interest rates. Changes in the Free-Reserve ratio are 
empirically relat^dL to the exchange rates in the Lebanon, but are more
related to changes is unborrowed reserves and required reserves.
APPENDIX J
List of Variables used in the Model for the Lebanon
A . = current accounts on the balance of payments
B *s monetary base
= Adjusted monetary base 
B^ - Re-adjusted monetary base
C = Currency demanded by the public
CL = Banks borrowings from the Bank of Lebanon
D s Demand deposits
• E * The exchange rate of the Lebanese pound with respect to the dollar
HI - Excess reserves of the commercial banks
FR a Free-Reserves
F^- = Firms1 demand for bank loans
G 8 The Bank of Lebanon stock of gold and foreign currency
1
G 8 The national stock of monetary reserves
= Household demand for bank loans 
M.j = Money supply, equal to D + C
}& 2 * Money supply equal to T + D + C
NKI « Ret capital imports
HR = Not recorded transactions on the Lebanese balance of payments
KFA & Bank net foreign assets
rDC = public* s demand for bank credit where;-'PDC = F^ +
T 8 Time Deposits
TD = Total deposits with the banks; TD = D + T
TL = Treasury liabilities
1
TL = TL - IMF where IMF is the Lebanese position with the International
Monetary Fund *
R = Reserves demanded by the banking system
UR 8. Unborrowed reserves
Vc = Volume of bank credit in the Lebanon
Y 8 Income
113 -
UFA
IIiTt ;
cl
a h net foreign assets ratio; a =
b *a The commercial banks borrowing ratio; b =
c = Currency ratio; c =
Rk = Bank reserve ratio; k =
CD + T;
CDfT)
m = The money multiplier with base B;
1 kCl-c+t; + c
31= The money multiplier with base B ;
1ra., =2 (k-bJCl-c+t;-fC
m = The money multiplier with base B^; 
m = 1
 ^k+a-b; C1- c+t; -f c
m = The dynamic multiplier;
2 -  -  2 -
m = m '^I~^k-fa-b2/ c - m ^L+a-b/ t
2  -  -  2  r -  — 2  — —
- m 2^”C+V  k - m /l-c+t/ a + m l-c+t/ b
Tt « Time deposits ratio; t = —
r^ = Return on government bonds in the Lebanon
r .  « The discount rate of the Bank of Lebanond
r  = Euro-doliar rate of returne
r^ = index of interest rates on the bank credit market in the Lebanon
r  = The Lebanese market rate of interest of bank loans•Li
-J
r = The expected rate of interest on Bank loans in the Lebanon
L
w = Expected return of equities
U - c + . „a  = &-
Ua - V ■
FR~  = Free reserve ratio
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Chapter IV
1 - The purpose and effectiveness of monetary 
policy in the Lebanon
The examination of monetary policy can be divided into three 
parts; the information problem, the interpretation of the information, 
and the determination of the targets by policy makers. The Bank of 
Lebanon is supposed to be continuously assessing the general movement of the 
economy, the pace of economic activity, the pressures on the price level 
and the trend in the balance of payments. The choice among competing 
interpretations involves a selection of a suitable scale guiding the central 
banker in identifying the relevant indicators which could be utilised to 
interpret monetary policy. Due to the absence of perfect information the 
policy maker has to make use of the available partial knowledge thus 
producing an interpretation which might not be the most reliable one.\
The policy makers or central bankers adjust their instruments according 
to the movement of the selected target magnitude. .
The purpose of monetary policy in the Lebanon should be to control 
the monetary base BL , which has not been under the control of the Bank of 
Lebanon during the period 1965-1974. The monetary base B L contains the
Q.
adjusted domestic base B and net foreign assets. The Bank of Lebanon 
should create new means and tools in order to separate between the 
domestic base Ba and the influence of the foreign assets on the monetary 
base and the Lebanese money supply.
Perhaps the interpretation of imperfect information could.be considered 
as the second best choice.
I think the Bank of Lebanon should;
Ask for the creation of special deposits. Calls for 
special deposits should be made by the Bank of Lebanon 
rather regularly. The calls should be expressed in terms 
of the percentage of the deposits of the commercial banks 
which is to be placed on special deposit with the 
Bank of Lebanon and specify the data or dates by which 
the deposits are to be completed.
The introduction of this new monetary tool or weapon 
means that as soon as a call has been announced, letters 
must be despatched to the commercial banks informing 
them of the precise amount that each bank is required 
to deposit and of the date by which the deposits are 
to be made.
The calls on the commercial banks operating in the Lebanon 
should be divided between domestic deposits and foreign 
or non-domestic deposits, and a much higher percentage 
should be imposed on nOn-domestic deposits in order to 
absorb any increase in bank deposits caused by the external 
world. In other words the amount of special deposits to be 
placed with the Bank of Lebanon should be calculated by 
reference to two particular bank liabilities, and the 
rate of call should be different for domestic deposits 
and non-domestic deposits.
The reason for distinguishing between domestic and non 
domestic deposits in calls for special deposits is to 
isolate the influence of the foreign deposits on the 
Lebanese monetary base and the money supply.
One of the main problems would be the definition of 
domestic and non-domestic deposits. • Such bank liabilities 
would have to be divided into two parts, the deposits belonging 
to residents are the domestic deposits, and the deposits 
belonging to non-residents are the non-domestic deposits.
The liabilities to which transit items relate are 
impossible to identify. I suggest that the Bank of Lebanon 
should in this particular case adopt the method used by the 
Bank of England and allocate all transit items to domestic 
deposits.
2 - The Bank of Lebanon should make more use of legal reserve
requirements on both forms of deposits? demand deposits 
and time deposits.
3 - flfave a more realistic discount rate policy.
4 - The Lebanese economy must have a much larger bond market
with greater use of long-term and short-term bonds by the 
Bank of Lebanon so as to be able to use open-market operations 
for controlling the monetary base BL and the money supply 
as much as possible.
, 5 - The bond market might help in the establishment of long­
term loans in the Lebanon, which are essential to the 
development of the Lebanese industry and agriculture. This 
will also help to absorb a great part of the banks’ idle 
assets.
The effectiveness of monetary policy can be considered from two
angles:
a) the long-term effect on inflation, employment and 
the balance of payments, and
b) the immediate or short-term effect on rates of interest.
The effect of monetary policy on inflation is based on the philosophy
which argues that there is a causel relationship between the supply of 
2
money and prices, /in order to change the price level the monetary 
authorities have to change the supply of money/ . The major variable 
in monetary policy is the money supply, and the main factors which will 
contribute to the changes in this variable are the Bank of Lebanon, the 
commercial banks, and the public. The process of monetary control is based 
on the manipulation of the monetary base by the Bank of Lebanon.
Monetary policy in the Lebanon has not been effective, and has not 
been used efficiently in order to control the expansion in the money supply. 
It is not possible to level the traditional arguments against monetary policy 
in the Lebanon, because;
• » a) there is not sufficient evidence and data to test
the stability of the demand for money in the Lebanon
b) the Bank of Lebanon has not been using open market 
operations as a monetary tool thus leaving the monetary 
base outside its control
c) the Bank of Lebanon has shown no indication to separate 
the influence of the foreign sector on the monetary base 
from the influence of the domestic sector. Such as the 
use of differential special deposits in order to absorb 
some of the foreign deposits with banks operating in the 
Lebanon.
See M. Friedman "The Supply of Money and Changes in Prices and Output", 
in Mr. Friedman The Optimum Quantity of Money , pp 171-187.
a - The monetary base
Chapter III has been utilised to derive various equations concerning 
the money supply process in the Lebanon, and some of those equations dealt 
directly with the monetary base in the Lebanon. I would like to reproduce 
the relevant equations in order to make the picture more clear;
B = C + R (1)
B. being base money, and R is the reserves demanded by the banking system 
and C is currency demanded by the public.
Ba = B - CL (2)
a
B is the adjusted base, CL is advances to commercial banks by the Bank of 
Lebanon.
BL = Ba + NFA (3)
L
B. is the re-adjusted base, it includes the influence of the capital flows
3
on the money supply of the Lebanon.
a l
The values of B, B and B for the Lebanon during the period
19651 - 1974II are shown in Table 1, and graphs one and two show the
a L ,
movements Of B, B , B and and during that period. From graph one
we notice that B and have almost identical paths, both have a minor peak
at 1967 II and from 1970IV both graphs start to increase steadily. In graph
two Ba and also move in similar paths, but BL moves in similar path to
and not .
According to my empirical results BL is rather significant and 
changes in BL contribute between 60% to 70% to the changes in the 
money supply, while the remaining 40% to 30% are distributed among the 
banking sector and the public.
3 a L
For more information on the derivation. of B and B for the Lebanon
see Chapter III, part I.
-  in -
Year B Ba BL
1965
I 616 604 . 2090
II 619 605 21U5
III 650 601 2166
IV 646 622 2526
1966
I 661 • 641 2331
II 662 647 2463
III 680 663 2627
IV 835 669 2580
1967
I 877 687 2625
II 1191 946 2716
III 987 763 2549
IV 937 718 2503
1968
I 1025 835 2686
II 1081 882 2866
III 1065 863 2985
IV 1127 900 2780
- 2oo -
Year B Ba BL
1969
I 1062 765 2818
II 1022 755 2882
III 1U66 787 2909
IV 1167 856 3016
1970
I 1126 915 3073
II 1148 942 3185
III 1134 936 3297
iv 1192 1019 3610
1971
I 1284 1166 3949
II 1236 1128 4212
III 1356 1252 4423
iv 1465 1360 5031
1972
I 1455 1356 5201
II 1548 1442 5491
III 1577 1448 5832
iv 1615 1513 6150
- £.^1 -
Year B
•• I
Ba bl
1973
I 1632 1542 6158
II 1849 1761 6233
III 1795 1697 6706
IV 1854 1681 6628
1974
1 1867 1667 6782
II 2088 1728 7255
Source: International
Table 1 
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b - Open Market Operations.
Under uncertainty an investor can only be sure of the nominal 
yield on a marketable fixed-interest bond when he wishes to hold that 
hand till maturity, even then he will face “uncertainty over the prospective 
real yield. Investors have to allocate their funds on the basis of their 
expectations of the real yield obtainable on the different available 
investments.*1^
In the Lebanon the issueing of private and government bonds and bills
15should be encouraged. The present stamp taxes increase’s the cost of 
bond issues and is not maturity sensitive, thus discriminating in 
particular against shorter.- term paper. It seems that in the Lebanon 
there has not been any governmental measures to provide liquidity to the 
small bond market. Such liquidity may be provided by financial institutions 
either directly through the agents of the Bank of Lebanon or through 
the establishment of special funds that will stand ready to stabilise 
the market. The Bank of Lebanon by standing ready to refinance a larger 
quantity of shorter-term private bills, could play an important role in 
stimulating and developing the money market, and producing perhaps a 
stronger bond market. More care must be taken by the Bank of Lebanon 
to ensure the reliability of bonds and bills, considerably improved 
auditing and disclosure requirements are needed before expecting the 
Lebanese banking system to move heavily into such paper.
The Bank of Lebanon in the early seventies levied some criticisms
against international bond issues denominated in Lebanese pounds. I think
the issuing of international bonds would make it possible to have some
development of intermediary under-writing mechanisms that might help to
retain at least part of the underwriting and placement profits within Lebanon 
14C.A.L., Goodhart, Money. Information ..and Uncertainty. MacMillan Press Ltd. 
London 1975» p* I5^*1c0
or the period 1965-1974*
The Bank of Lebanon must have a certain strategy for controlling
the money supply, one of the methods that could be used is open-market
operations and it should be aimed at controlling the monetary base.
16According to J.M. Guttentag a strategy of open market operations may
include several targets having control periods of different length for
example, "one possible strategy would include a non-borrowed reserve
target on a weekly basis, total reserves on a monthly basis, and total
commercial bank credit on a quarterly basis. The ordering is in terms of
17the extent to which the targets are under open market control."
The principle aim of open market operations in a country like the
Lebanon should be to control the monetary base; by monetary base is meant
18bank’s reserves and bank’s net foreign assets. The reserves of the 
commercial banks include required reserves, and reserves which are in 
excess of the required reserves, they are known as excess reserves (ER) 
and are an indicator of surplus primary liquidity in the commercial banking 
system. 'Alien commercial banks are obtaining a relatively large proportion 
of their reserves by borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon to meet temporary 
reserve needs, a given volume of excess reserves does not have the same 
significance in term3 of reserve availability and credit expansion 
potential, as when the commercial banks have no need ^ or small need7 
for borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon. Even though commercial bank 
borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon is a source of reserves and is certainly 
a potential backing for bank deposits, it can be used only temporarily 
by an individual bank. The individual bank is in debt to the Bank of Lebanon 
16J.M. Guttentag, "The Strategy of Open Market Operations" in Money and 
Economic Activity ed. S. Ritter, p. 194-210.
17ibid p. '195
18BL = Ba + LTA ; Ba = C + R - CL
and is always under pressure, because it has to pay back the loan.1^
Graphs three and four show the fluctuations in excess reserves, 
free reserves, unborrcwed reserves and commercial banks’ borrowings 
from the Bank of Lebanon, for the period 1971-1974, According to graph 
three Excess Reserves and Free Reserves move in identical paths; 
this means that commercial banks' borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon 
FR = ER - CL
had a rather stable path as shown by graph four (1971-1974). For the 
period 1971-1973 "the curve CL is almost horizontal and hardly showing 
any changes. There is an argument which claims that sometimes it is 
satisfactory to use commercial banks' borrowings rather than Free Reserves 
as a measure of greater or less credit restraint. "At times, however there 
will be sizeable movements in excess reserves that are automatically 
picked up by the free reserves - net borrowed reserves concept, but
20that might be lost from sight if borrowings were the sole criterion."
The volume of free reserves in the commercial banking system of 
the Lebanon is affected by more than one factor, a.) there are what 
may be called the operating factors which influence mainly the reserve 
base, and includes the amount of currency in circulation and various 
international transactions, bj Free reserves are influenced and affected 
by the amount of required reserves as determined by the volume of commercial 
banks' deposits, c) The volume of free reserves is affected by Bank of 
Lebanon operations either in the form of changes in legal reserve require­
ments which are usually made at infrequent intervals to effect massive 
changes in reserve availability; or by using open market operations 
that could be conducted flexibly from day to day and could be directed
21
also to bring about marjor shifts in the availability of bank reserves.__
19Look .t'.D. Stemlight and R. Lindsay, "The Significance and Limitations of
Free Reserves" in Money and Economic Activity ed. L.S. Ritter, p. 169-175 
2Uibid. p. 170
21
Upen market operations have not been used on day to day basis by the
Bank of Lebanon, - ‘ - —  .• r. .. _•
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Graph four shows the fluctuations in the unborrowed reserves for
the period 1971-1974, with a sharp increase during the months of August
and September 1974» and a smaller increase during the earlier months 
22of 1974. Generally we can argue that if the Bank of Lebanon uses open-
market operations to increase the rate at which unborrowed reserves are
provided to the commercial banks ^assuming that market interest rates remain
constant, and the exchange rate does not change/, the free-reserve ratio
25FR/TD and the rate of change of deposits will rise.
m  = f(r , r,, r , E, UHJ 
TD
The variable £ is included to explain the importance of bank net foreign
assets in the Lebanon that can be held either in Lebanese pounds or
any other currency ^mainly in dollarsj and can be changed into Lebanese
pounds very easily, thus making it possible for the commercial banks to
use their foreign assets as reserves and excess reserves ^see chapter 32£
part 27. According to my empirical results banks net foreign assets
^in the Lebanon7 are very responsive to changes in the variable E, where
UFA * f U e-rd, h*, Tl 1J
and NFA = f (r -r,, jb)e cl 7
and thefelasticities of NFA with respect to k, are 2.17 and 1.585. The 
variable £ in FR/TD function has been tested empirically and came out to 
be significant according to t-statistics, but became insignificant when
OA
lagged one month.
The rate of increase in unborrowed reserves (due to open market 
operations; will usually rise more rapidly than the rate of increase in 
total deposits, because some of the additional reserves will be used by 
the commercial banks to increase the free-reserve ratio.
^The changes are not due to open market operations, perhaps they are 
due to the increase in bank reserves, ^excess reserves/ during that 
period as shown by graph 3*
^Look ChapterfJv part 2.
^^Look Chapter^!? part 3 section d.
25
In case the Bank of Lebanon uses open-market operations in order 
to reduce the rate at v/hich unborrov/ed reserves are provided to the 
commercial banks (contract the supply of reserves) the free-reserve 
ratio FR/TD and the rate of change of deposits will fall. The contraction 
in the rate of deposits will lag behind the contraction in the rate of 
unborrowed reserves as the commercial banks increase their borrowings 
and reduce their excess reserves.
UR =s RR + ER - CL 
In a situation where there is a money market strategy changes in
required reserves are accommodated by the Central Bank, such accommodation 
is implied by use of a free reserve target. This aspect of the money 
market strategy has certain important implications.
(a) It implies short-run stabilisation of free reserves and the money 
market but destabilisation of the flow of money and credit. This is so 
because accommodation of changes in required reserves is similar to 
accommodation of changes in the demand for deposits. . For example if the 
free reserve target is given and the&emand for deposits increases, then
26
there will be enough unborrowed reserves to increase the supply of deposits.
(b) Since under a money market strategy the Central Bank is able automatically
to accommodate changes in the demand for deposits, and the system feeds in
reserves as the banks demonstrate that they are willing to use them, an
association is generated between actual changes in deposits and in
unborrowed reserves. The result would be a high statistical correlation
27
between money supply and various reserve base measures.
25
A purely hypothetical case.
26J.M. Guttentag, "The Strategy of open market operations" op. cit. p. 198-200.
27ibid.
Open-market operations could be used by the Bank of Lebanon to add
or withdraw reserves in order to induce the'commercial banks to expand
20or contract deposits at some desired rate. According to the empirical 
results ^chapterQZ) the free reserve ratio is not influenced by movements 
of interest rates. And the results also tell us that changes in the free 
reserve ratio are dependent on changes in unborrowed reserves; thus making 
it clear that if the Bank of Lebanon uses open-market operations to influence 
changes in unborrowed reserves then it would also influence changes in 
the free reserve ratio, lerhaps if the empirical estimations were used 
to study another period, we then might find out that movements in interest 
rates influence the free-reserve ratio. In other words we should not 
rule out the possibility that changes in interest rates could influence 
the changes in Free Reserves in the Lebanon.
The main idea behind open-market operations if to be used in the 
Lebanon would be to control commercial banks1 total reserves, ^and changes 
in unborrov/ed reserves represent open-market operations^. There is a 
tendency to argue that short-run changes in unborrowed reserves could 
produce offsetting changes in the Volume of commercial banks1 borrowing.
In the case of Lebanon, banks’ borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon would
29
not play an important role in offsetting changes in unborrowed reserves,
because their volume is rather small, in certain cases it is only 12 million
L.L. ££or the whole commercial banking sector7and also because the banks
in the Lebanon have a rather high liquidity position with a high percentage 
30of idle balances.
28Look chapter#^ section 2 equations 6,7, 8 and 9 for the link between 
Free Reserves and the monetary base.
29Look graph 4» chapter for commercial banks* borrowings from the 
Bank of Lebanon.
^Look Chapter if, . ' ' _ •  ^ - ;
If the Bank of Lebanon wishes to keep the free reserves
of the Commercial Banks at a specific level, one possibility would be
to create different rates if change of unborrowed reserves at different
times. For example let us say the Bank of Lebanon wishes to maintain a
level of 300 million L.L. of free reserves, it can try to do so only
by changing the discount rate to influence commercial banks* borrowings,
and not by using open-market operations, because there are no government
bonds with the commercial banks in the Lebanon. As mentioned before,
according to my empirical results the changes in the free-reserve ratio are
related to unborrowed reserves rather than to interest rates. And my
conclusion is that the Bank of Lebanon with its monetary tools ^Tor 1970-
1974/ could not have been able to control the changes in the free-reserves
of the commercial banks.
Let us assume that the Bank of Lebanon is able to use open-market 
31operations , and if it uses this tool to maintain a fixed free reserve
level, then the rate of change of unborrowed reserves and the rate of total
deposit change would both be determined by the commercial banks' demand
for borrowings and excess reserves. If the commercial banks want to
reduce their free reserves and the Bank of Lebanon frustrates their attempts
by injecting additional reserves, then total deposits will expand. And
in case the commercial banks want to increase their free reserves and the
Bank of Lebanon frustrates their attempt by withdrawing reserves thus reducing
32
the rate of expansion in total deposits.
31Such an assumption can become an actual fact if the Bank of Lebanon 
uses all the powers that were given to it by the Lebanese parliament.
32
The empirical estimations for analysing the relationship between total 
bank deposits and interest rates, free-reserve ratio and unborrowed 
reserves gave poor results: chapter0?, part 3, section d.
"For all its limitations, the free reserves concept
remains a useful guide to the interpretation of credit policy.
It cannot stand alone, as a single, all-purpose indicator
of liquidity or credit availability, but for that matter
neither can other measures... However, viewed together with
other factors, 3uch as the banking system’s ratio of loans
to deposits, the size and turnover rate of the money supply,
the volume and growth of bank crqdit, and trends in various
market interest rates ..., the' amount of free or net borrowed
reserves can give a useful lead in the interpretation of changing
credit conditions. Clearly, it is more meaningful than either
excess reserves, or total borrowings, taken alone and represents
another in the continually unfolding series of aids that can be
used inAR^ysing monetary developments and Federal Reserve Policy.
Open-market operations and debt management are different names for
the same monetary tool, wielded in the one case by the Central Bank, in
34the other, by the Treasury. The sale of government bonds by a Central 
Bank makes the amount of base money available for use as bank reserves 
less than it would otherwise be and thus tends to reduce the stock of money 
The sale of similar bonds of the same total amount by the Treasury with the 
proceeds added to its balance with the Central Bank has the identical 
effects. /The opposite is true7*
The differences between open-market operations of the Central Bank 
and debt management operations of the Treasury are, a) the Central Bank 
conducts open-market operations through theuse of the monetary base, while 
the Treasury keeps accounts at commercial banks and conducts its operations 
33P.D. Sternlight and R. Lindsay, "The significance and Limitations of 
Free Reserves" op. cit. p. 174-175 and look pages 172-173 for arguments 
against the concept of Free-reserves.
^M. Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability, Fordham University Press, 
New York, 1959, p.52.
at- times in deposit money. A transfer of funds by the Treasury from
Commercial banks to the Central Bank is like a decision by the public
to convert deposits into currency and so exerting downward pressure on
the money supply. The power to make such transfers* can be used as a
35monetary tool to alter the stock of money. b) The other difference is 
that the Central Bank creates and destroys high-powered money by using 
open-market operations, while the Treasury generally uses existing cash 
balances to redeem bonds and adds proceeds of sales to its balances'.
Such a difference is mostly in words. "In ^erms of its effect on the public's 
cash balances, increasing or reducing Treasury balances of high-powered
36
money is the economic equivalent of destroying or creating such money.”
The main conclusion is to have co-ordination between open-market operations
and debt management, and giving full responsibility for debt management
37to the Central Bank.
In the case of the Lebanon I think the Treasury should expand the 
size (and frequency) of their bonds and bills concentrating on longer-term 
ones in order to activate a bond market. There are some autonomous 
agencies of the Government in the Lebanon /the Electricity Office and 
others7which could be given the authority to issue bonds to the public.
Bond issuing by such agencies would lead to some appropriate internal 
financial planning for the concerned parties, and would introduce a larger 
volume of longer-term debt securities into the market. Since the bond market 
in the Lebanon is rather small and has not been developed yet, this offers 
the Lebanese monetary authorities a chance to start a bond market which 
is based on co-ordination between debt management and open-market 
operations in the future.
^5ibid p. 55 
^ibid p. 56 
^ibid p. 59
"The burden of controlling the pace of monetary expansion 
falls mainly on the authorities' open-market operations.
In some circumstances this burden can seem insupportable.
In particular, the authorities can rarely foretell with 
any confidence how the,market will respond to their operations. 
Investor's demand for bonds is not just a simple function of 
current bond prices, but also depends on the expectations 
generated in an uncertain world ... Uncertainty about the 
market's response and fear of large, erratic and unpredictable 
variations in interest rates make the authorities tentative 
in such operations."^
38C.A.E. Goodhart, Money Information and Uncertainty. MacMillan Press Ltd. 
London 1975, p. 15
c - Discount policy in the Lebanon
The theory of discount policy in the lyzvs was known as the 
Riefler thesis; the hypothesis stated that "borrowings occurred primarily 
when banks, for brief and unexpected reasons, found themselves short of 
reserves •••, banks were not motivated basically by relative profit 
considerations but rather reluctantly resorted to the discount window 
to meet adverse clearing balances and unanticipated seasonal loan demands ... 
The monetary policy of the Riefler thesis suggested that the way to initiate 
a credit tightening action would be through the use of open-market sales 
in order to decrease the reserve base, and force.banks to the discount 
window.^
Discount policy is one of the monetary policy tools which have been 
used bytthe Bank of Lebanon ^during the period 1965-1974? since it was 
established. The discount rates between 1964 and 1974 are as follows:
Prom I964 to 1. 11. 197:5 the discount rate was y/o
From 1. 11. 73 to 1.6.74 the discount rate was 5/o
Prom 1. 6. 74 to 1. 7> 74 the discount rate was 770
Prom 1. 7* 74 and up till 1975 the discount rate was O'/a, the figures
were obtained from the Bank of Lebanon.
According to the money supply equation used in chapterJ3P£ the
extension of advances by the Bank of Lebanon expands the monetary base
B, and the repayment of these advances contracts it. The Bank of Lebanon 
establishes the line of credit available to the commercial banks, sets 
the conditions for advances and posts the interest rates at which central 
bank advances will be made. The Bank of Lebanon has the ability of making 
its terms for advances rather favourable £or not favourable? by lowering 
the discount rate, but it does not have the ability to make the commercial
35*’” ""”””””"" ~ — —  - —  — .
Folakoff, "Federal Reserve Discount policy and its critics" 
in Money and Economic Activity ed. l . Ritter p. 2z2
^ibid. for the development of the discount policy theory, such as the 
profitability thesis of the I9i0s.
banks willing to borrow from it, and so cannot influence the monetary
A *1
base in this case, un the other hand the Bank of Lebanon could increase 
the discount rate and reduce Commercial Banks1 borrowings from it.
The Commercial Banker's borrowings from the Bank of Lebanon is 
one method of adjusting to a deficiency in his cash reserve position.
The other methods are, a) call outstanding call loans, bj sell short­
term liquid assets in. the money market, c) borrowing from other commercial 
banks and d) borrowing from foreign money markets. The basic consideration 
would be the relative cost of the alternative adjustment methods. Table 
2 shows the commercial banks' borrowings from the Bank of Lebanon, and 
table 3 shows CL as a percentage of total bank loans to the private sector 
in the Lebanon, /Table 4 shows CL as a percentage of L for Italy, Prance 
and West Germany7, .'for the period 1965-1974. The values of CL as a 
percentage of L in the Lebanon varies between 14.58/© and 0.582%, Italy 
and West Germany show low percentages, but not less than 1.774%. France 
has rather high values for CL as a percentage of L, up to 25.24% in 1969*
The main idea behind tables 2, 5 and 4 is to compare the CL as a 
percentage of L of the Lebanon with those of other open economies that 
have bond markets (where open-market operations are being used by the 
Central Banks.)
The main feature of the Discount rate policy is that the 
initiative is in the hands of the commercial banks.^ The Bank of 
Lebanon can affect the amount of discounting by exercising discretion 
with respect to the commercial banks that borrow from it, or by changing 
the discount rate to influence the incentive on the part of the commercial 
banks to discount. "The exercise of discretion is an undesirable kind of
^Look chapterllX-sectionl, for the adjusted monetary base Ba and B^.
^ F o r  more details on this issue look M. Friedman, "Rediscounting" in 
Readings in Money and Banking ed. L.S. Ritter, p. 211-217.
Bankd' Total Banks' Lending to Banks' borrowings from
Deposits private sector The Bank of Lebanon
1965
I 2312 2007 * 12
II 2383 2074 14
III 2516 2199 19
iv 2667 2310 24
1966
I 2777 2410 20
II 3029 2577 15
III 3201 2708 17
IV 2785 2336 166
1967
I 2712 2331 190
II 2540 2316 245
III 2590 2298 224
IV 2566 2285 219
1968
I 2704 2279 190
II 2838 2313 199
III 2954 2302 202
IV 2630 2028 227
1969
I 2721 2078 261
II 2800 2115 269
III 2809 2146 279
IV 2849 2132 311
Year TD Banks1 Lending To Private Sector CL
1970
I 2939 2095 • 213
II 3040 2102 206
III 3167 2148 198
IV 3420 2145 173
1971
I 3633 2195 118
II 3931 2312 108
III 4203 2527 104
IV 4353 2672 103
1972
I 3476 4577 99
II 3697 4826 106
III 3923 5082 129
IV 4105 5344 100
1973
.1 4391 5660 90
II 4429 5716 88
III 4743 6130 98
iv 5112 6502 173
1974
I 5526 6969 ' 200
II 3643 7065 112
Table 2 
In millions of L*L.
Source - International Financial Statistics - I.M.F.
Year CL as a °Jo of Bank Loans To Private Sector Year
CL as a v/o of Bank Loans 
To Private Sector
1965 1970
I 0.597 I 10.167
II 0.675 II 9.800
III 0.864 III 9.217
IV 1.038 IV 8.065
1966 1971 •
1 0.829 I 5.375
II 0.582 II 4.671
III 0.627 III 4.H5
IV 7.106 IV 3.854
1967 1972
I 8.150 I 2.162
11 10.578 II 2.196
III 9.747 III 2.538
IV 9.584 IV 1.871
1968 1973
I 8.336 I 1.590
II 8.603 II 1.539
III 8.774 III 1.598
IV 11.193 IV 2.660
1969 1974
1 12.560 I 2.869
II 12.718 II 1.585
III 13.ouu III -
IV 14.587 IV -
Table 3 - For the Lebanon
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specific credit control that involves detailed intervention into the affairs
of individual hanks and arbitrary decisons by governmental officials.
Moreover, it is incapable of being applied in a sufficiently sensitive
ax
way to produce predictable results over short periods." ^
Another defect of the discount rate is the difficulty of predicting 
the effect of a change in the rate on the amount of discounting and on 
the stock of money.44 The effect on the willingness of commercial 
banks to borrow from the Bank of Lebanon is rather different under 
different circumstances, depending on various factors such as the level 
of other interest rates, the demand for commercial bank loans, the supply 
of funds from other sources (foreign money markets; and the opportunities 
available for investment.
45ibid p. 213 
44ibid p. 214
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d - Reserve Requirements in the Lebanon
According to Article 76 of the Code of money and credit, the
Bank of Lebanon has the power to vary reserve requirements up to 2570
45on demand deposits, and up to ±5v/o on time deposits. Article 76
of the Code of money and credit was amended on the 5 October 1973 to read
as follows:
The Bank of Lebanon may, if it deems it appropriate, 
consider banks1 investments in government stocks or 
in stocks issued with government guarantee as part 
of the reserves up to a specific ratio to be assessed by 
the Bank of Lebanon,
The Bank of Lebanon shall enforce varying ratios on 
the different categories of bank liabilities within the limits 
set in the preceding subsection, /25% on demand deposits and 
1570 in time deposits7.
In exceptional cases, it may impose special limitations 
on what exceeds in these liabilities or some of their 
categories a fixed limit or on the excess occurring, in 
these liabilities or some of their categories, after a fixed date. 
The other two amendments of article 76 are:
^a; The Bank of Lebanon has the power to compel banks to
deposit with its assets ^special minima reserves; amounting 
to a specific ratio of assets as may be fixed by the Bank of 
Lebanon.
^b; Accept, in the light of the general monetary situation,
46
deposits bearing interests as may be fixed by the Bank of Lebanon.__
45^his point has been discussed in chapter TH "" - 
46
For information on the arguments about 100% reserve requirements and 
zero required reserves see, "100 per cent reserves" by Irving Fisher, 
and "Is the Federal Reserve system Really Necessary?" by D. Carson 
in Readings in Money and Banking ed, L.S. Ritter, p.252-245
The idea behind using reserve ratio variations is to create particular 
changes in the size of the money supply in the Lebanon. Such a monetary 
tool has been rather ineffective in the Lebanon for the period 1965-1974 
for two main reasons.
(a) Legal reserve requirements were increased only to 10°/o 
during 1973-1974 on demand deposits; /and were never 
above 10%7«
(b) As mentioned in chapter VH, commercial banks in the 
Lebanon have been able to treat their foreign assets 
as equivalent to cash, because the Bank of Lebanon 
has been willing to accumulate foreign exchange.
If the Bank of Lebanon wishes to increase the legal 
reserve requirements or even cash reserve ratio this 
will not produce any serious changes in the supply of 
money, because the commercial banks can simply use 
their foreign assets as cash. This argument as long as 
the Bank of Lebanon is willing to accumulate foreign 
exchange.
Some economists such as Friedman argue that "the elimination of
discounting and of variable reserve requirements would leave open market
operations as the instrument of monetary policy proper. This is by all
odds the most efficient instrument and has few of the defects of the
others. It can be used continuously, from day to day, and in amounts
varying by fine gradations. It need involve no public announcement,
and thus there are neither announcement effects nor any obstacles to
reversal of policy within a brief compass of time ... It is highly impersonal’
48and its effects are diffused over the banking community.” The opposite 
view is held by other economists who argue that the rapid impact of reserve 
ratio changes is a positive attribute where all commercial banks are 
affected simultaneously and immediately, and the errors of magnitude 
can be adjusted through appropriate open-market operations. Since the 
Bank of Lebanon has not used open-market operations up till the end of 1974, 
and the legal reserve requirements have been rather low, therefore the 
monetary base in the Lebanon is not effectively (practically) under the
control of the,-Bank of Lebanon^, and neither is the money supply._________
Commercial Banks in the Lebanon can also use their foreign assets as 
excess reserves, see chapter ill part 2.
48m
•Friedman, A Program For Monetary Stability, Fordham University Press,
York 1959, p« 50.
e - Other Activities of the Bank of Lebanon
The Bank of Lebanon has the option to use certain direct regulations
in order to control the activities of the commercial banks, or use an
49alternative form of control known as moral suasion. Article 79 of the 
Code of Money and Credit was amended on the 5 October, 1973 so as to read 
as follows:
The Bank of Lebanon may also exercise an influence over 
the general credit situation by limiting the volume of credit 
in specific categories or granted for specific purposes or to
50specific sectors, and lay down conditions to govern such credit.
Article 175 of the Code of Money and Credit was amended on the 5 October, 1973 
so as to read as follows:
In order to safeguard sound banking activity, it shall be 
the duty of the Bank of Lebanon to occasionally specify, 
either generally or pertinently to individual banks, the 
ratio that it is essential to maintain between assets and 
liabilities or between some items of the assets and liabilities.
Direct credit control in the Lebanon could be successful in achieving 
proximate objectives, such as the control over certain big loans by some 
commercial banks, but such a method will not necessarily be effective in 
achieving the ultimate objective, changes in the money supply {reduction 
in the money supply;. "Selective controls attack the symptoms of the 
economic ailment, not the causes".
^ I n  general moral suasion is designed andjtsed to restrain commercial 
banks and other financial institutions from activities they would 
normally undertake or to induce them to undertake activities they 
wrouid not do voluntarily.
50
The amendments of articles 105, 106, lu8 and 1U9 all deal with the 
activities of the Bank of Lebanon with respect to government bonds, 
thus giving the Bank of nebanon the legal power to use open-market 
operations.
"ti\ S
un the 8 uctober, 1973 the law promulgated by Decree No. 6iu4 
ratifying the measures adopted for the approval of the new price of gold 
in relation to the U.S. dollar and the approval of the real parities of 
foreign exchange in relation to the Lebanese pound required from the Minister 
of Finance, following agreement with the Bank of Lebanon, to lay down 
appropriate rules and take such steps as may be necessary for the ratification 
of the following:
Approving the new price of gold in relation to the U.S. dollar 
and approving the real parities of foreign exchange in relation 
to the Lebanese pound for the purpose of collecting taxes and dues 
levied on sums drawn up in foreign exchange, and adapting the 
last two prices of the U.S. dollar in relation to gold for the 
settlement of the Bank of Lebanon's accounts in accordance with 
the period of validity of these two prices.
According to article 70 of the Code of Money and Credit, the overall 
duty of the Bank of Lebanon shall be to safeguard the Lebanese currency
51as a fundamental guarantee for permanent economic and social development.
In the early months of 1974 ^also 1972, 1973; "the value of- the Lebanese
pound increased with respect to the dollar and other currencies thus making
the prices of Lebanese agricultural and industrial exports go up. On the
other hand the prices of imported goods did not fall. In fact from 1973-
1974 the Lebanese pound increased by 2^ r/o with respect to the dollar,
thus increasing the prices of Lebanese exports, where the volume of
some industrial products in the export market fell almost to zero. _The_
51a)Safeguarding a sound Lebanese currency, b) Safeguarding economic 
stability, and c) Safeguarding the basic structure of the banking 
system, are the duties of the Bank of Lebanon Article 70, Code of 
Money and Credit.
Bank of Lebanon found it rather necessary to reduce the value of the
Lebanese pound on the foreign exchange market in order to safeguard the 
52Lebanese economy (reduce the price of the Lebanese exports).
The Bank of Lebanon's policy in the early 1970fs (1972, 1973 and 1974) 
was to help the economy (exports) by buying dollars and selling Lebanese 
pounds, and hoping to stabilise the price of the dollar a t ^  2.40 L.L. (1974) 
The main idea was to reduce the price of the Lebanese pound,?and not to
help the dollar, but in doing so the Bank of Lebanon had to help the dollar.
On the 8tkof November 1974 the Bank of Lebanon bought 15 million dollars 
in order to stabilise the dollar at 2.40 L.L., but the dollar remained 
at 2,19 L.L. On the second day the Bank of Lebanon bought 60 million 
dollars and the dollar reached the figure of 2.40 L.L. In fact in a period 
of 12 days the Bank of Lebanon bought 500 million dollars just to stabilise 
the dollar at 2.40 L.L. Such actions left a big question mark on the 
ability of the Bank of Lebanon for stabilising the value of the dollar at 
2.40, because the Bank of Lebanon's capacity (November 1974J allows it to 
buy 350 million dollars more, and would buying 350 million dollars 
stabilise the dollar^ at 2.40 L.L. ?
The Bank of Lebanon was buying dollars in order to stabilise the
price of the dollar with respect to the Lebanese pound, but such an action 
would lead to a fall in the volume of net foreign assets. According to 
my empirical estimations in chapter;#^ I found that the commercial banks'
net foreign assets are sensitive to changes in the price of the Lebanese
pound with respect to the dollar. \
NFA = f (r^jr^r^r^, E) from chapter FTfl
 ■ —  --------------------------------------
The domestic purchasing power of the Lebanese pound fell very dramatically 
during 1973-74
53It is interesting to note that most of the Lebanese importers during 1974 
were basing the prices of imported goods on 1970 prices of the dollar 
around 3 L.L. while they were buying each dollar for 2.20 L.L. in 1974*
54^
Luring November 1974 the bank of Lebanon kept buying dollars and was 
able to push the price of the dollar to about 2.31 L.L.
showing an inverse relationship between NFA and E, and the empirical 
results support this judea. If the volume of NFA falls then the monetary- 
base will fall because
BL » Ba + NFA
thus reducing the money supply in the Lebanon according to the equation 
M = mBL
the main conclusion would be that the Bank of Lebanon used a certain 
method to stabilise the dollar which also could have some influence on 
the volume NFA and the money supply in the short-run.
Appendix rZZ.
.price Developments in The Lebanon
"Monetary expansion will have a stimulating effect upon the
economy, even though the exact transmission mechanism may be obscure
and the process of uncertain strength and timing. Depending upon
the existing availability of spare capacity, and current expectations
a general stimulus to money incomes will lead in part to a rise in real
1output and in part to a rise in prices'*
The only general indication of price development in the .Lebanon
2is either the consumer price index or the wholesale price index.
Table 1 shows the wholesale price with 1965 as base year, and consumer 
prices with I97u as base year. Graph one represents the movement of the 
wholesale prices from 1965 till the end. of 1971» with a continuous 
increase, showing a drop during 1968. Graph two represents the 
consumer price index from 1971 to 1974, /an increase of 21$ from 
the third quarter of 1971'to the first quarter 19747 with a very sharp 
increase during 1972 and 1973* The figures in Table 1 must be treated 
with considerable caution because (a) the wholesale price index has been 
discontinued since the end of 1971 and (b) the consumer price index is 
based upon the consumption pattern of lower income groups, /£>000 L.L. 
per annum in I966 or about 200©dollars7. The lower income group 
represents about 7Q/° of total expenditure,^- thus it would not be realistic 
to place great reliance upon this price index. Table 2 shows the official 
Index of prices of foodstuffs, and housing, again such indexes are not 
really reliable because rent control in the Lebanon applies only to lower 
1
C.A.E. Goodhart, Money. Information and uncertainty. The MacMillan Press Ltd. 
London 1975, p. 214
2
There is not a GDP price deflator in the Lebanon 
^Ministry of Planning, (Lebanon), Bulletin Statistique Mensuel
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rent housing (lower income about 7%)• Table 3 shows export price
indices of Lebanon’s trading partners, which have some dramatic
increase in the year 1973*
The Lebanon has imported some of the increase in prices from the
outer-world (see Table 3j» but the appreciation of the Lebanese pound
should have helped to offset much of the rise in import prices. This
did not happen, perhaps because of the rigidities among importers who in
1974 were buying the dollar for 2.40 L.L. and charging for the prices of
5
their imported goods 3*00 L.L. for the dollar. Other reasons for 
the increase in prices is due to the increase in government spending^ 
in 1971> 1972, 1973* The main contributer to increases in the prices in 
the Lebanon is the increase in the money supply. The increases in bank 
reserves and bank net foreign assets lead to an increase in the monetary 
base, and the monetary base through the multiplier leads to increases 
in the money supply (see chapter ifl.) , and increases in the money supply 
cause increases in the price level, 1 ’ : ..
^This took place only during 1972-1974» but before that from 1965-1971 
the dollar had a steady price around 3*10 to 3-20 L.L.
^According to the Bank of Lebanon, "Rapport sur l’Annee 1972" 
there is no evidence that government expenditures have exceeded 
government revenues.
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